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ABSTRACT
The area of study examines the process of political socializa-
tion, in contemporary Maoist China--that is, how the Chinese
masses are taught and learn correct political attitudes and
behavior. Specifically, our major concern is what determined
"correctness" during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
That is to say, we are concerned with the identification of the
standard upon which the process of political socialization was
based, and how that standard functioned.
The major propositions resulting from this study are the
following:
1) that Maoism can, at a certain point in time, be viewed
as a religious belief system in that it addresses the
ultimate, eschatological questions; presents a set of
values, morals, or orientations to life; and generates
what can be identified as religious experiences; and,
more importantly,
2) that Maoism, when viewed as a religious belief system,
fucntions as a standard upon which the process of
political socialization can be based, in that it serves
as a basis for symbolism, as a basis for sanctions,
and as a basis for role--models by ultimately determining
what is correct and what is incorrect.
The thesis develops and tests these propositions utilizing a func-
tional analysis as the method of study and four of the eight model
revolutionary theatrical works as a primary data source.
Thesis Supervisor: Lucian W. Pve
Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science
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PART ONE
MAOISM AS A RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Not to have a correct political point of view is like
having no soul. The ideological remoulding carried on
in the past was necessary and has yielded positive
results. But it was carried on in a somewhat rough
and :ready fashion and the feelings of some people were
hurt--this was not good. We must avoid such short-
comings in the future. 1
On the Correct Handling of
Contradictions Among the People
Mao Tse-tung
February 27, 1957
Mao Tse-tung's observation in 1957 indicated a reassess-
ment of the nature of ideological remoulding and political
socialization. The poignant emphasis placed upon having
a "correct political point of view" implies that incorrect poli-
tical attitudes were still impeding progress on the road toward
socialism, even after eight years of struggle. The importance
of correct political attitudes through the task of ideologically
remoulding the masses is highlighted by the potential negative
effects it can have on the ultimate goal of political socializa-
tion.
That ideological remoulding could not be considered
totally successful by 1957 is supported by the "anti's"
campaigns (i.e., the Sanfan and Wufan movements) launched in
the early and mid-fifties.2 Mao's statement was part of the
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forecast of a change in the political socialization process--
a change in the ideological remoulding techniques which we
began to see in the early sixties and which culminated with
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-69.
The general area of concern of this thesis is an explana-
tion of political socialization in the People's Republic of
China during the 1960's with particular attention to the
period surrounding the Cultural Revolution. Our study will
identify and characterize those factors which constitute
"correctness" in political attitudes and behavior, which delineate
the changes in the process of ideological remoulding, and which were
made to "avoid the shortcomings" of the past. In more specific
terms, our study will suggest that Maoism, as it evolved in
the 1960's, can be viewed as a religious belief system
which functioned both as a standard for determining "correctness"
of political attitude and behavior and as a basis for symbols,
sanctions, and role-models in the political socialization
process.3 Our principal focus here is an examination of the
function of the Maoist religious belief system within the
process of political socialization. Only in our conclusions
do we address the question of the effectiveness of Maoism in
this function. Before we develop this discussion further, it
is perhaps more important to establish first what we mean by
the terml"'religious belief system" and how we shall use it
here.
Within the context of this study, it is particularly
important to view the term'Teligious belief system" in its
12
broadest sense. Such a view facilitates the understanding of
the concept and nature of religion from the Chinese perspective.
In both traditional and contemporary China, references to
religion imply an all-encompassing power, rather than a theistic
being, as is the usual inference in the West. Association with
this power source was all important in traditional politics.
As C. K. Yang observes in a discussion of religion and its
power in traditional China:
. . . the basic factor was the overwhelming power
of Heaven and its forces. There was no more
readily observable symbol of supremacy above man
than the mysterious limitless heights of Heaven.
The regular movements of the heavenly bodies symbol-
ized Heaven's regulative power to keep the universe
in stable order. And the power of the heavenly forces
to produce the proper succession of seasons was of
particular importance to an agricultural people.
. . . Any individual or group that succeeded in
convincing the people that they were the earthly
representatives of such forces would enjoy, in the
public mind, superhuman power.4
Traditionally, as well as contemporarily, the omnipotent
parallel between the forces of Heaven and its guardians (the
political leaders) on Earth was accepted by the Chinese. The
nature of the ultimate and absolute control of the religion
over its believer was transferred to the relationship between
party members and political ideology. In assessing religious
qualities in contemporary Chinese communist ideology, Yang
observed:
The unconditional nature of such a command (the command
of Communist ideology) is based on the believer's
absolute certainty that the Communist ideology is
the only guidance to man's inevitable destiny, the
only infallible road to national strength and economic
development.5
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The political ideology's believer learned to feel with all
certainty that the ultimate outcome of all things important
to him was determined by the ideology--a concept which parallels
the modus operandi of religious belief.
A review of the literature, concerning the broad and
general nature of religion and religious belief6 indicates
that the term "religious," although usually defined as that
which pertains to God or a theistic divinity, can also be
defined in a broader sense. That is, the term religious can
also include that which pertains to the sacred ultimate or to
what L. R. Brown simply characterizes as a set of values or
orientations to life. Thus, by combining the broad definitions
established by scholars of theology and religion, we can
identify as "religious" any belief system which addresses the
ultimate eschatological questions of life and death; presents
a set of values, morals, or orientations to life; and generates
what can be identified as religious experiences (i.e. intense,
total responses to what is experienced as ultimate reality). 8
The underlying generalization is that any individual, group,
object, or system can assume this religious character if it
can be perceived as having the power or insight to control,
interpret, or predict the outcome of what is considered to be ulti-
mate., For example, within the framework of this understanding of the
term religious, money can be perceived as a god in a Capitalist
system just as the masses of people can be perceived as a
god9 in a Socialist system.
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What is important in this definition is that we view
religion in terms of the individual's perceptions of the
sacred or ultimate, and how he then responds to these percep-
tions. In other words our primary concern is with the potential
function of religion as a belief system, rather than simply
with the content of various religious dogma. We focus our
attention in this study on the function of a religious belief
system in the political sector of the social environment.
In traditional China particularly, as we will explore in
later chapters, we observe this general definition of religion
and religious belief systems in a political framework.
There is growing support in the fields of political
science and sociology for the proposition that religion in
general can serve an important function in the political pro-
cess, particularly with regard to political participation and
political socialization. Donald Smith writes:
. . . religion is a mass phenomenon, politics is
not; but religion can be used to make politics
meaningful. Religious values are also an important
influence on political culture, and predispose
individuals and societies toward certain patterns:;of
political life.10
In addition to a general role in the political socializa-
tion process, religion can be used to stabilize an ideology or
to mobilize a society. The works of Gerhardt Lenski11 indicate
that religion can serve an important role in establishing and
perpetuating political attitudes from generation to generation.
Observations of C. K. Yang show, in the other hand, that religion
15
can function in "integrating large numbers of individuals
into an organized group capable of collective action."12
With regard to contemporary China, we will address in this
study the role of religion in the theoretical effectiveness
of the political socialization process. We will seek to point
out the functional effectiveness, rather than the empirical
success, of a Maoist religious belief system functioning as
a.;standard for ideological correctness.
It is not our intent in this thesis to suggest that Mao
or party leaders of the sixties intentionally established Maoism
as a religious belief system, or that Maoism should be viewed
solely as a religious belief system. The former supposition
can only remain a speculation without substantiating evidence.
As for the nature of Maoism posed by the former point of
view, we recognize it as a political ideology and as an influ-
ential component of contemporary Chinese political culture.
With regard to its impact on political culture, an
observation critical to our study is that Maoism, particularly
in its function as a religious belief system during the Cultural
Revolution, should be recognized as a continuum of Chinese
political culture from two perspectives. First, the Maoist
religious belief system continues the same functional inter-
relationship between religion and politics observable in
traditional China. Similar to the function that the Mandate
of Heaven served for allConfucian Emperors throughout Chinese
dynastic history, the Maoist religious belief system attempted
to legitimize and perpetuate Mao's political power (when it is
16
most in question), and attempted to instigate and mobilize
the Chinese masses so that they would rid the political
system of its "corrupt" influences.
Secondly, the Maoist religious belief system can be
recognized as an attempted merger of the divergent traditional
religious influences of Confucianism and Taoism into one
religious belief system. As we shall see in Chapter II,
individuals (both official and peasant alike) in traditional
China often shifted back and forth in the expression and prac-
tice of these two religions. Although the two religions
shared certain characteristics, such as discipline from the
believer, they diverged in many ways. Confucian doctrine
espoused egocentrism (within the framework of exemplary life
style) while Taoist doctrine preached brotherly love and a
sense of community.13 Maoism, in its function as a religious
belief system attempted toincorporate these divergent character-
istics of each religion into one religious belief system,
thus adding a new influence on Chinese political culture,
rather than creating a new political culture as some might
argue. What we will argue however is that to view Maoism
functionally as a religious belief system adds a new dimen-
sion to the understanding of the nature of Maoism and of its
role in contemporary Chinese politics, particularly viz. the
socialization process.
The socialization process in China has been given atten-
tion by three noted scholars in the field. Richard Wilson's
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study has focused on the role of education in the political
socialization of children in contemporary Taiwan. Both
Lucian Pye and Richard Solomon, on the other hand, have examined
the influence of traditional Chinese political culture on the
political socialization process in contemporary China. Both
their studies were aimed toward the characterization of
Chinese political culture. If we for the moment take the view
that political culture is cumulative, our study will examine
one time slice of its continuum (i.e., a Maoist religious belief
system in the 60's). By the 1980's, we may well view a Maoist
religious belief system, relative to political culture in
China, as a component of political culture much in the same
way we view Confucianism today. The aimof our study though
is not to validate the cumulative nature of political culture,
or to determine the position Maoism will take within the politi-
cal culture of China. Our aim is to examine from our new per-
spective, at a relatively more rudimentary level, how Maoism,
the religious belief system, functions as a basis for the
socialization process of contemporary China.
As we suggested earlier, we will not attempt to measure
the degree of impact upon the Chinese political socialization
process, of its having as its basis a Maoist religious belief
system, or the degree of effectiveness experienced due to this
basis. We can and will, however, describe how political social-
ization functioned in the People's Republic of China in the 1960's.
On the basis of these observations, we will, in our conclusion,
18
attempt to describe the socialization process and discuss why it
may or may not have been effective, given China's socio-politi-
cal history and the socio-political realities during the 1960-
1970 period.
Maoism..as a Marxist Ideology and as a Religious Belief System
At the basis of this assertion that Maoism is a religious
belief system lies a question critical to our study. Simply
stated it is: Can what is viewed as a political ideology from
one perspective be viewed as a religious belief system from
another perspective? We answer this query in detail in
Chapter III of this work. Let it suffice for us to state
here that such a dual observation is valid, particularly when
one introduces the notion of function.
What we are in fact stating throughout this study is
that Maoism, though recognized as an interpretation and appli-
cation of Marxist political ideology, from the perspective of
policy directives and official public statements, can, when
studied from the perspectives of its function within contempor-
ary Chinese society, be simultaneously viewed as a religious
belief system. The underlying basis for this argument is
found in the recognition of the fact that at a functional
level the Chinese have made Maoism transcend the realm of a
secular political ideology and have allowed it to enter the
sacred domain of a-religious belief system.
We gather this conclusion partially from our observation
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of the operation of the personality cult of Mao Tse-tung
which surfaced during the height of the Cultural Revolution
and partially from the various official attempts (through media
and officially established drama communication channels) to
create an ethereal, all-powerful illusion around the thoughts
of Mao Tse-tung. The thoughts of Chairman Mao, as we will dis-
cuss in Chapter III, were attributed to providing (i) meaning
to life and death (much in the same way as Western eschatologi-
cal religious doctrine); (ii) answers and miraculous solutions
to personal and natural catastrophe; and (iii) intense emo-
tional experience (which we will explain in Chapter IV .to be
religious experience).
In conjunction with the dual (if not multifaceted) nature
of Maoism, one must concurrently ask: Can Maoism which is
professedly Marxist in its ideological world view be simultan-
eously religious? Many Marxist and non-Marxist would immediately
assert a negative response. Marxism represents materialism,
scientific thinking and atheism to the core. And Mao, as a
professed Marxist, would automatically assume these responses.
We do not suggest by our proposition that we can observe
Maoism functioning as a religious belief system wish to
negate the Marxist influences in Maoism. With the patience
of those who might think that this is what we indeed are
doing, we would- like to offer our interpretation of Marxism, par-
ticularly, the Maoist interpretation of Marxism as it concerns
the nature and function of religion in society.
We will offer an explanation for how Maoist interpretation
and implementation of Marxist ideology altered the ideology
to make it applicable to and effective in the context of con-
temporary China. If one bears in mind Marx's understanding of
religion and its function in society, our recognition of an
application of Marxist ideology functioning as a religious belief
system within this particular context does not contradict
Marxist thinking on that nature of religion and its application
or the nature of Marxism.
Although Marx devoted much attention to an historical
review of the content of various religions, particularly
Christianity, his primary concern seemed to be, as ours is,
the function of religion in society. Marxisml5 defined relig-
ion as "the fantastic reflection in men's minds of those
external forces which control their daily life, a reflection
in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural
force."l6 (We note here that Marxist notions of religion as
a reflection in men's minds is not far from our generalized
definition of religion as man's perceptions of the supernatural
or of divine force.)
Marxism is not as concerned with these "fantastic
reflections" in men's minds, as he is with the reasons men hold
so dearly to these reflections. Man clings to his religious
feelings because 1) his inability to comprehend and therefore
to deal effectively with the forces of nature and 2) the
inability of the oppressed segment of the population to endure
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and comprehend the reasons for oppression (which Marx asserts
is the result of the development of classes within the
society).17 Once man overcomes nature with science (or more
specifically a dialectical materialism)l8 and after he
destroys classes, thus putting an end to oppression, Marxism
held that religion would automatically disappear. There would
no longer be a human need for dependence on the illusion of
all powerful, superhuman forces.
We feel that Marxist thinking was opposed to the reasons
for the existence of religion rather than to religion itself.
Further substantiation for this conclusion is gained when we
examine remarks concerning the function of religion as the
opiate of the people:
Religious distress is at the same time the expression
of -real distress and the protest against real distress.
Religion is the sign of the oppressed creature, the
heart of the heartless world, just as it is the
spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the opium
of the people. 19
That religion is "an opiate" is not though the only view that
Marxism takes of religion. We also note Marx's observation
that religion is (or perhaps can be) an expression of protest
against real distress (oppression). Marx saw institutionalized
religions as the bulwarks of the status quo. Though, they,
in conjunction with the class of secular oppressors, used the
religious feeling in the masses to reinforce their power to
oppress, Marx points out the religion could also be used by
the masses as a means to mobilize against oppression.
22.
The sentiments of the masses were fed with religion
to the exclusion of all else; it was therefore neces-
sary to put forward their own interests in a reli ious
guise in order to produce an impetuous movement.20
We see here the functional potential of religion as an impetus
for mass movement.
Although there has been a tendency to regard Marxism
as an absolute atheistic ideology,.it is not clear to this
author that such an observation is wholly accurate. We have
seen in our above discussion that Marxism regarded the religious
imageof the divine as an illusion in the minds of the oppressed
or unpowerful. At a basic level this can be recognized as
atheistic. Yet, Marxism was seemingly as opposed to the
potential of atheism (and ideology) to function as opiates
within the society: "Atheism, ideology and religion must be
superseded by science of thought and its laws--formal logic
and dialectics. "21
We will not attempt here to answer the question, if
Marxism is not an atheistic ideology, then what is it? What
we see here is a realization, internal to Marxism, that
atheism, ideology, and any of man's manners of thinking or per-
ceptions can also function as opiate-like. Further, we observe
the realization that religion or "functional religion," though
opiums, can also provide the impetus for change, manipulation
of mass movement and the expression of protest.
At this point let us turn to Mao the Marxist. Can
Maoism be both Marxist and religious? Our response based on the
above discussion is yes. Maoism is Marxist in its view of society,
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history, the need for revolution, dialectical materialism, etc.
Yet, Maoism is also religious (even within a Marxist frame-
work) in its empirically observable attempts to create illusions
of superhumanness through the personality cult of Mao and
the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung and in its use of religious-like
fervor to manipulate mass movements. In other words, we view
Maoism as Marxist in content (although as the reader will see
in Chapters III and IV of this study, we also can identify
certain religious themes in Maoism which transcend Marxist
thinking) and religious in function during the period of the
Cultural Revolution.
As we view this study as principally an examination of
the function of Maoism rather than of the Marxist content of
Maoist thinking, our treatment of the Marxist qualities and
influences of Maoism will be scarce throughout the remainder
of this work. However, the reader should not infer from this
omission that we do not recognize Maoism as Marxist or that
we do not deem important this characteristic of Maoist thinking.
To the contrary, Maoist interpretations of Marxism add yet
another interesting and important dimension to the understanding
of Maoism, but that discussion is regarded by the author to be
beyond the scope of this study of the religious function of
Maoism.
Method of Inquiry and Analysis22
In order to systematically describe the functioning of
the socialization process in contemporary China, the method of
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inquiry chosen will be based upon a structural-functional
analytic framework. Karl Deutsch provides us with a defini-
tion of the key terms--system, structure, and function--of
this method:
A system is a set of parts or sub-systems which
interact in such a way that the components tend
to change so slowly that they can be treated tempor-
arily as constant. These slow-changing parts can be
called structures. Their interactions and trans-
actions with each other are such that their basic
structural characteristics persist; if these trans-
actions turn out to be conducive to maintaining or
reproducing the system, they are called functions.23
Our discussions will be on two levels of functionalism.
As mentioned earlier, the broad concern of this thesis is how
political socialization functioned in the People's Republic
of China during the period of the 1960's. At a more specific
level, we are interested in what function a Maoist religious
belief system::serves in the socialization process. We do not
concern ourselves with further establishing that political
socialization is conducive to maintaining or reproducing the
political system. Political scientists such as David
Goslin, Richard Dawson, and Kenneth Prewitt have
contributed qreatly to establishing this point and further
inquiry is beyond the scope of this investigation. We will
establish that Maoism during the 1960's, however, when viewed
functionally as a religious belief system, was conducive to
maintaining or reproducing the political socialization process
and inferentially the political system. We will establish this
point by explaining the process by which Maoism functioned as
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a religious belief system and how the Maoist religious belief
system functioned in the political socialization process. An
orderly mechanism through which we can identify and discuss
these functional relationships is structural-functional analysis.
Carl Hempel recommends a structural-functional analytic
framework25 as an important methodological tool in explaining
systemic phenomena. He provides a basic model for utilizing
functional analysis as an explanatory device. The model abstractly
defines and relates the components of a system, and, most
importantly, establishes a method of identifying the presenge
of functional relationships which perpetuate the system.
(a) At t (a certain time t), s functions adequately
in a setting of kind c (characterized by specific
internal and external conditions);
(b) s functions adequately in a setting of kind c
only if a certain necessary condition, n, is
satisfied;
(c) If trait i were present in s then, as an effect,
condition n would be satisfied;
(d) (Hence) at t, trait i is present in s.
Relating this schema to our study, t is Maoist China in the 1960's;
s is political socialization; c is Maoist China with is histori-
cal traditional relationship between politics and religion; n
is a standard of correctness upon which political socialization
can be based; and trait i is Maoism viewed as a religious
belief system.
With this basic pattern, we can operationally define the
process of political socialization and establish the validity
of the functional inter-relatedness of the Maoist religious
belief system and political socialization during the period
of the sixties. We do so, however, with slight modification
to the basic Hempel model. Hempel argues, in his discussion
of the logic and application of structural-functional analysis,
that the basic pattern presented above is logically valid solely
when item (c) asserts that i is the only trait by which n can
be satisfied in setting c. If this assertion cannot be made,
one is required to identify the alternatives which might equally
satisfy requirement n. In contemporary China, the former would
mean that absolutely the only standard for correctness, in
the political socialization process, is a Maoist religious
belief system. We recognize that a political ideology, a
political culture, and historical experience are also traits
from which a standard for correctness for the political
socialization process can be derived.
As a result, we can merely infer that condition n is
being satisfied in some way or other at time t by at least
some one trait i in a Class I of all identifiable functional
equivalents of i. It is this refinement of the original model
which characterizes the political socialization process in
contemporary China. Hempel provides us with another basic
pattern for conducting a functional analysis to deductively
explain a Class I phenomenon:
(a) At time t, system s functions adequately in a
setting of kind c;
(b) s functions adequately in a setting of kind c
only if requirement n is satisfied;
27
(c') I is the class of empirically sufficient conditions
for n, in the context determined by s and c; and I
is not empty;
(d) Some one of the items included in I is present in
s at t.
With our utilization of the Class of I, we do not wish to
merely infer that "in some way or other"26 a standard for cor-
rectness exists in the political socialization process in China
during the 1960's. We wish to examine the subsequent impli-
cations that a Maoist religious belief systemi.is some one of
the items included in Class I that we can observe to be func-
tionally present in the political socialization process, parti-
cularly during the period of time surrounding the Great Prole-
tarian Cultural Revolution.
Methodological approaches similar to the one we con-
sider here have been deemed superficial in certain areas of
political science.27 However, in the field of Chinese Politics,
where extensive field research and data gathering in the
country is restrained to all but a few, and where survey
inquiry is practically limited to refugees whose orientations
and interpretations are often biased, we feel this approach
lends itself to an objective assessment of the ideas in discus-
sion. Through this method we can carefully observe, operation-
ally describe, and insightfully interpret the meaning or
implications of current activities and events in China.
Data Source
As the intent of this study is the observation and
description of functions within a process, the reliability of
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data was critical to the validity of our conclusions. To be
sure, the primary data base for any study is critical to the
conclusions drawn. However, as we indicated earlier primary
data sources available from and about the People's Republic
of China are scarce. From our vantage point, the principal
data source; available which, with varying degrees of reliability,
provide insights into the functioning of the political process,
is mass communication. We refer here primarily to communica-
tion which is transmitted from the political system to the
population. In a study of the political socialization process
such as the one undertaken here, an examination of mass communi-
cation can provide the researbher with responses to two levels
of inquiry. The first level concerns a questioning of the
effects of mass communication on the political socialization
process,28 while the second level of inquiry allows the
researcher to utilize mass communication to mirror the politi-
cal system and thereby examine a political socialization
process from a distance. In the latter instance, an examina-
tion of mass communication which emanates from the political
system allows one to observe the function of variables which
the political system deems important to the political socializa-
tion process. The assumption here is that the political
system utilizes mass communication to transmit the correct
political attitudes which are to be learned by the population
during the political socialization process. We have utilized
this second level of inquiry provided by our examination of
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mass communication in our study of political socialization in
China.
There are various types of mass communication which the
researcher can examine to study the political socialization
process. News media (both printed and broadcast), official
political statements, and as we shall see the arts, particularly
drama and the theatre are usually accessible data sources for
investigation. The type of mass communication we utilize as
our data source for this study was, in some manner of speaking,
self-selective.
The data source that we employ to functionally analyze
the political socialization process is contemporary Chinese
revolutionary theatre. Unlike news media, and official politi-
cal statements by party officials emanating from the People's
Republic of China--which tend to be highly esoteric in order
to confuse and sidetrack certain audiences outside China's
borders---contemporary revolutionary theatre was intended
solely for the masses. The primary function of the revolutionary
theatre particularly during the 1960's was to remould the ideo-
logical thinking of the masses or, in the words of Mao Tse-
tung, to "educate and politicize." 29 As we shall see, great
care was taken during the Cultural Revolution to make certain
that the theatre, dominated by model revolutionary operas
and ballets, communicated correct (Maoist) political attitudes
and behaviors to the masses. The actors on the stage, through
the characters they portrayed, became the principal political
socializing agents during this period.
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Our plan is to use four model revolutionary Peking
Operas30 to characterize how Maoism functioned as a religious
belief system during the period surrounding the Cultural Revo-
lution and to observe how the Maoist religious belief system
functioned as a standard for correctness in the political
socialization process during this period. We will accomplish
this by examining the texts of these operas for both content
(explicit and implicit) and style (plot devices,use of char-
acters, etc.).
Lois W. Snow reminds us of the potential use of the
theatre as a mirror of the political process. It is easy to
overlook the fact that all art, particularly theatre, is
political, and that, whether it is intended to be or not,
theatre especially is a reflection of the society that spon-
sors and controls it. In the case of Chinese theatre, Lois
Snow points out that the purpose of its existence and use is
"for a precisely guided moral-political education, not for box
office profits." 31 Mao Tse-tung himself spoke to the signifi-
cance of revolutionary literature and art in May 1942 when he
said:
We do not favour overstressing the importance of
literature and art, but neither do we favour under-
estimating their importance. Literature and art
are subodinate to politics, but in their turn exert
a great influence on politics. Revolutionary litera-
ture and art are part of the whole revolutionary
cause . . . they are indispensable cogs and wheels
in the whole machine, an indispensable part of the
entire revolutionary cause. . . . If we had no
literature and art . . . we could not carry on the
revolutionary movement.32
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Within the realm of revolutionary theatre the four model
Revolutionary Peking Operas received particular emphasis in
the political socialization process of the 1960-1968 period.
These operas dominated the stage to the exclusion of all other
productions during the Cultural Revolution and represented the
direction of theatre in the new China. These four operas
are Shachiapang' and 'The Red Lantern both revised collect-
ively by the Peking Opera Troupe in May, 1970; Taking the
Bandits Stronghold or Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy
revised in 1963 by the Peking Opera Troupe of Shanghai; and On
the Docks . Prior to our examination of these scripts in
Chapters VI and VII we will present brief synopses of these
works to acquaint the reader with thaupi-incipal characters,
setting and plot for each opera.
To further clarify our approach to this thesis, it is
important to discuss at this point the methodological issues
associated with using the literary mode of theatre as an
investigatory device. The primary issue of concern to us in
utilizing revolutionary theatre as a data source is the question
of reality. Chinese drama, particularly the modern revolution-
ary theatre of China, presents a symbolic interpretation of
reality. Literature and other symbols, in China, as Kenneth
Burke observes, are a form of action, a real response in
symbolic terms to a real situation experienced by the author. 33
Etienne Balazs succinctly describes in his reference to the
fable of the yellow Millet Dream, what can be thought of
as the goal in the portrayal of the relation between symbol
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and reality in traditional Chinese literature:
The story is remarkable, because it contains the
dream of happiness shared by all Chinese and ex-
presses it with the utmost conciseness, yet without
leaving out a single salient feature. It is as if the
writer had striven to put all his experience into a
nutshell, and in so doing, he has summarized two
thousand years of history.34
The literary and artistic guidelines for the relation between
reality and symbol, with regard to contemporary art, were laid
down by Mao at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art in 1942:
Works of literature and art, as ideological forms,
are products of the reflection in the human brain
of the life of a given society. Revolutionary litera-
ture and art are the products of the reflection of
the life of the people in the brains of revolutionary
writers and artists. The life of the people is always
a mine of the raw materials for literature and art,
materials in their natural form, materials that are
crude, but most vital, rich and fundamental; they make
all literature and art seem pallid by comparison;
they provide literature and art with an inexhaustible
source, their only source. 35
Revolutionary art and literature draws its substance from the
masses and is carved out and moulded by revolutionary artists
and writers. Mao writes that revolutionary realism and revolu-
tionary romanticism are combined by the revolutionary artist
and writer to generate revolutionary truth. This truth is
defined by Mao to be "life as reflected in works of literature
and art on a higher plane, more typical, nearer the ideal,
and therefore more universal than actual every day life." 3 6
Reality in this framework is truth--and the objectives of the
revision of the works of the theatre were to ensure this
truth was conveyed. Our view of the four selected model
revolutionary operas will be that they are an interpretation
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and statement of ideal reality. To support this point of view,
let us briefly review the environment and circumstances sur-
rounding the emergence of these model revolutionary works.
As we have stated earlier, we have identified the years
just preceding and during the Cultural Revolution as one period
of time when a Maoist religious belief system can be observed
as functioning as a standard for correctness in the political
socialization process. During these years, as had been the
case in the years before the communist takeover,37 the theatre
played a vital role in re-moulding the political attitudes of
the Chinese masses. As we shall see, great pains were taken
to revise existing Peking operas and throw out what was not
ideologically salvagable for the new regime. Mao's fourth
wife, Chiang Ching, assumed primary responsibility for this
task of supervising and reviewing the rewriting and revisions
produced by dramatic troupes all over China.
Through hindsight, we might surmise that the purpose of
revolutionary theatre during the period was to be a cathartic
vehicle for transporting the masses through the traumas of
the Cultural Revolution. In the model theatrical works we
see a total emotional commitment of the heroes that can be
likened to a religious fervor, and can transmit religious fervor
to an audience. Lois Snow recalls her emotion and that of the
audience while watching another model theatrical work:
I was especially touched with Hsi-seh returns
to her village and meets the friend who helped
her escape from the landlord's house . . . the
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audience was with it when the landlord met his fate.
They wanted Hsi-seh to join the revolution . . . and
she did. I could understand any kids out front going
right out the next morning to sign up with the PLA.
. . . In other words, we in the audience connected.3 8
In addition to total emotional commitment, participation
in a revolution requires a commitment of self-sacrifice even to
death. Eric Hoffer observes that without the elements of make-
believe, ritual, or ceremony, there is nothing on earth or
in heaven worth the self-sacrifice of death.
It is only when we see ourselves as actors in a
staged (and therefore unreal) performance that
death loses its frightfulness and finality and
becomes an act of make-believe and a theatrical
gesture. . . . It is one of the main tasks of a
real leader to mask the grim reality of dying and
killing by evoking in his followers the illusion
that they are participating in a grandiose spectacle,
a solemn or light-hearted dramatic performance. 3 9
As we shall see further on in this study, the model Revolution-
ary Operas not only provide this element of make-believe, they
reinforce the notion of individual and group commitment to self-
sacrifice and death for the sake of Maoism.
We view the heroes and heroines of the model revolution-
ary operas as ideals, tobe likened to saints in Christianity.
They are models, toward which the masses should strive. It
is a given that every Chinese must be willing to give up his
or her life for the masses--and most importantly for the
achievement of the reality of a Chinese socialist state. The
model revolutionary operas depict the symbolic bases of that
reality.40
This study is presented in two parts. We begin our
analysis in Part One with a review of the historical functional
relationship between religion and politics in traditional China
thus suggesting an historical continuum in the Chinese political
culture which validates our observation of the functional
characteristics of Maoism during the Cultural Revolution. We
next explore the origins of the Maoist religious belief system
during the period between the Long March and Yenan. There
are certain characteristics of Mao's experiences and of the
contexts which influence Mao's thinking during this period
which influence certain key themes which are identifiable (and
assist us in identifying) in the functional attributes of the
Maoist religious belief system. In 'Chapter IV we
examine these themes more closely and discuss their role as
functional characteristics of the Maoist religious belief
system in the political socialization process during the Cul-
tural Revolution. In the final chapter of Part One we explore,
within a theoretical framework, the political socialization
process in China during the Cultural Revolution. Our emphasis
here is on political learning, and most specifically on the
function of the Maoist religious belief system in promoting
political learning.
Part Two of this study presents our examination of the
model revolutionary Operas. In two chapters we identify and
discuss passages or character portrayals in the opera scripts
which illustrate our assertions about the nature and function
of the Maoist religious belief system. We will take the
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contents of the operas at their face value. That is to say,
we have made every effort to let our conclusions flow from
the actual text of the operas, rather than taking our conclu-
sions to the data source. We will not concern ourselves with
questions of whether or not the operas contain the political
intentions of the Chinese leadership of the 1960's. We will
also not attempt to assess how the masses received the works.
These questions are beyond the reach of this study.
In our final chapter we present our views concerning
the effect of the Maoist religious belief system on the outcome
of political socialization during the Cultural Revolution. We
conclude with a speculative discussion of the impact of the
political socialization process in the sixties on the Chinese
socio-political process of the seventies, with particular
attention given to the status of the Maoist religious belief
system since Mao's death in October, 1976.
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symbolism. The second change, religious in nature, occurs in
the 1960's, particularly around the period of the Cultural Revo-
lution, the symbolism of the Cult of Mao, and the model revo-
lutionary theatrical works. The third stage of symbolism,
represented by the Lin Pio-Confucius campaigns, is identified
as political symbolism. For further clarification of the use
and meaning of symbolism as we employ it here, we refer the
reader to "Learning and Legitimacy" by Richard Merleman,
American Political Science Review, Volume LX, September 1966,
pp. 548-561. Merleman suggests that symbols of legitmacy are
learning aids, in that such symbols become gradual reinforce-
ments in a six stage paradigmoof the learning (political
socialization) process.
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGION AND POLITICS IN
TRADITIONAL CHINA
As was discussed in the previous chapter, our intent in this
study, is to examine the functioning of a Maoist religious belief
system, as a standard for correctness in the political socializa-
tion process in China, during the period 1966-1969. We have iden-
tified this period around the Cultural Revolution as one in which
the relationship between religion and politics is readily observ-
able. The implication of our focus on this particular period,
however, does not deny the existence of such a relationship in
other periods in traditional or contemporary Chinese political
history. In fact, when we historically scan Chinese political
culture, we see evidence that the relationship between religion
and politics is a basic and influencing element of that culture.
As we scan through the dynastic cycles, we will find evidence
of religion functioning as a legitimizer for the political author-
ity of the emperor, through the concept of Mandate of Heaven.
1
By exploring the basic tenets of certain secret societies and
the rebellions they inspired, we will be able to observe relig-
ion from another viewpoint--in the form of various religious
belief systems--functioning as a mechanism for unifying or
legitimizing political dissent in traditional China. These
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observations and others are important as they will establish the
historical continuum of a functional relationship between
religion and politics within the Chinese political context. We
will, as an implication of this historical continuity, propose
that the functional relationship we now observe in contemporary
Maoist China is not necessarily a unique phenomenon but is
representative of a trend of Chinese political culture. Further,
we will propose that the Maoist religious belief system, as it
operated during the Cultural Revolution, was an attempt2 to blend
the contending religious influences of Confucianism and Taoism
into one belief system which allowed the contemporary Chinese
individual to be both egocentric (Confucianist) and altruistic
(Taoist) without suffering the personal disequilibrium of such
a paradox. Though secondary to our main thesis, the latter
proposition will be a useful contributor to our understanding of
the Maoist religious belief system on a functional level as
we shall explain at a later point in this work.
In this chapter therefore, we will examine the functional
interrelation of religion and politics as it was manifest through
the Mandate of Heaven, through select secret socities, and through
rebellions in traditional China. Our first task is to establish
the nature of religion in traditional China. In this discussion
the historical continuity of religion in Chinese political cult-
ure will be delineated. We will then explore the role of
religion in political socialization by examining a model of social-
ization of children in traditional China. It will prove useful,
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however, before addressing the historical relationship which
exists between religion and politics, to point out briefly the
nature of politics in traditional China; and then to enter into
a discussion--in some detail--of the nature of religion in tradi-
tional China.
An Overview of Politics in Traditional China3
When one refers to politics, the concern is with the nature
of the governmental process. One might simply ask--(l) Who
gets the rule to rule? or Who rules? and (2) How do they rule?
This latter query would incorporate concepts such as technique,
process, and style. In reviewing the politics of traditional
China, the answers to these two questions describe well the
governmental process.
From the Ch'in dynasty (221-206 B.C.)4 to the early Ch'ing
(Manchu) dynasty just prior to Western impact, Chinese political
history could be described as an aristocratic (hereditary-monarch-
ial) centralized bureaucracy, bounded within the framework of
the dynastic cycle.5 In particular, from the Han dynasty on,
we see a pattern of strong central political control alternating
with periods of disunity and chaos. The kings and later emperors6
perpetrated their political authority in despotic empires until
that authority was challenged. While in power, they relied, in
varying degrees, on eunuchs, vassals, military leaders, and a
bureaucracy produced through a civil service examination system,
to interpret and enforce their imperial edicts. The governmental
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structure was highly specialized, with agencies and public
offices constituting a bureaucratic administration which handled
judiical, economic, domestic, and foreign policy matters.
Government policy theoretically originated in the Imperial Court
and was passed through a Council of State--made up of agency
officials--and through various administrative channels and
ministries until it was finally received by provincial and
local officials. In return, policy suggestions were to be sub-
mitted by local officials via the same channels to the Imperial
Court, in an effort to communicate the policy needs of their
districts. However, in actuality what we observe is a decentral-
ized political structure in which provincial authority often
functioned autonomously. The excessive time factor involved in
receiving policy directives from the Imperial Court and communi-
cating local response resulted in a decrease of the influence
of the Emperor and his council at the local level. Consequently
provinces usually administered their own revenues and, in the
more remote areas, performed state functions such as policy
formation (based on local needs) and foreign relations with
border territories. The provincial governors in such provinces
had only to communicate support for the Emperor and render the
local tax obligations through the district magistrate and their
autonomy was relatively secure. In this system of local self-
government, the provincial governor had power proportional to
the Emperor. He served as the local representative of the Son-
of-Heaven (Emperor) and thus, it would seem, shared the "divine"
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legitimation of his political authority with the emperor.
In order to assure the necessary checks and balances on power,
at all governmental levels, the Censorate operated as an investi-
gatory and critiquing body, scrutinizing policy directives and
implementation even up to the Imperial Court. Confucianism, which
served as the socio-political ethos beginning in the Han dynasty, 8
functioned as an additional mechanism of checks and balances in
traditional political history. According to the principles of
Confucius, governmental officials were responsible for the
public welfare.9 The emperor was required to perform his duties
to the best of his abilities so that he would set an example
that would inspire all those under his authority. No person or
group was to usurp or impede the authority or responsibility of
another in carrying out governmental processes. Lucian Pye
observed of the Confucian order, ". . . it set forth the remark-
able ideal that government should help the individual to realize
his full moral potential." 10
Whether or not the political system functioned according
to these ideals and principles is a question for historical and
political analysts and beyond the scope of this study. We do
know however that the Chinese of this period--and today as well--
"believed that they had devised man's most perfect system of
government"; their system of government endured for centuries.
Politics and the political system, as we pointed out, was
pervaded by bureaucratic structures which both interpreted and
enforced imperial edicts, and supported and reinforced all aspects
of the political process. In general, political socialization
to certain values was strong. The Chinese population was ex-
pected to revere the political leader,on one level as the divine
link with Heaven, and, at a more earthly level as a paternal
parent. Total obedience and compliance with governmental policy
was mandatory. In return, the political leader had the respon-
sibility to rule benevolently and exhibit exemplary qualities
of social conduct. Yet, the Chinese masses were not passive
in their compliance with political decrees. When a political
leader flaunted corruption ormalevolence (evidenced by drought,
famine, barbarian invasion, etc.) the masses responded with
dissent and rebellion. This was the only form of political
participation available to China's masses. The population
learned compliance, on the one hand, and on the other, learned
dissent. As we shall see in the section below, China's
traditional religious trends contributed to this dichotomous
political socialization.
An Overview of Religion in Traditional China
To present a succinct historical scan of religion in tradi-
tional China is not easy. We mentioned earlier that in tradi-
tional China religion was conceptualized as an impersonal power
rather than a theistic being. In general this is an accurate
description. However, to fully appreciate the nature of religion
in pre-modern China, we must incorporate in this description
the influences, both individually and as an intermingled whole,
of ancestor-worship, Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Mohism,
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animism, and the broader realm of Heaven and its powers upon
religious practices, beliefs, and experiences. Also, we must
differentiate between religion--as it was perceived--at the
official, literate level; and religion--again, as it was per-
ceived--at the popular level, without creating artificial and
unrepresentative divisions between the two.
Bearing in mind the risks of over-simplifcation, we might vent-
ure to say that each of the religious influences cited above have one
common trend in traditional China--an animistic focus on cosmic
and earthly order and disorder. For example, among ancestor-
worshippers, it was believed that to venerate and pay homage to
deceased anecestors, particularly those who had held high family
status in life, would guarantee that the ancestors would maintain
the balance between the cosmic and earthly worlds and might inter-
cede for the living family with certain deities to prevent mis-
fortune or calamity. Even the Emperor, the physical link with
Heaven would offer "prayers" to his ancestors to bring rain in
times of drought. A very brief review of the key doctrines of
the three most identifiable religious influences will further
elucidate this trend.
Taoism:
Taoism, founded by the mystic philosopher Lao Tzu (circa
604 B.C.), generated the belief that "the way," Tao was the un-
changeable course of nature and that man must flow with nature
without attempting to interfere with its course. To the Taoist,
wu wei ("non-action") assured true equilibrium between cosmic and
earthly forces. Wu wei did not mean passivity, but rather a
spontaneous responsiveness to natural phenomena and processes.
We see this concept illustrated by a ninth century Taoist poet:
Following our own bent
Enjoying the Natural, free from curb,
Rich with what comes to hand,
Hoping some day to be with God.
To build a hut beneath the pines,
With uncovered head to pore over poetry,
Knowing only morning and eve,
But not what season it may be .
Then, if happiness is ours,
Why must there be action?
If of our own selves we can reach this point,
Can we not be said to have attained?l2
Taoists perceived society and all its institutions, espe-
cially government, as creating artificial "curbs" on the natural
flow of "the way." (Tao) This perception was in direct opposi-
tion to Confuciani-sm, which sought to initiate and maintain
moral and social order with rules for correct behavior and moral
codes. For the Taoist, this initiative was regarded as a frontal
assault on Nature and could only result in chaos and catastrophe.
The Tao Te Ching (the Classic of the Way and Its Power), pre-
sumed to be authorized by Lao Tzu, served as the sacred text
of Taoism and contained verses, thoughts, and stories that could
transcend the reader beyond the chaos and catastrophe of society.
Yet for many Taoist, even the Tao Te Ching could not capture
the mysticism and flow of Tao. Tao was an intuitive feeling
to be unhampered by written description. One poet, so inspired
by this "feeling" critiqued the Tao Te Ching and its author
with a verse:
"Those who speak know nothing;
Those who know are silent."
These words, I am told,
Were spoken by Lao-tzu.
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If we are to believe that Lao-tzu
Was himself one who knew,
How is it that he wrote a book
Of five thousand words?l 3
Above all, Taoism with its transcendental mysticism also
functioned as a response to the Confucian political state. As
a religion it provided a justified escape from the inhibiting
social codes of Confucianism (to be explored below). Many
Taoist physically removed themselves from society and politics
living hermetic lives in caves. However, most Chinese idealized
this escape through their practice of Taoist ritual and magic.
Although Taoism, as we have described it above, promoted an
individualistic approach to life uncluttered by social codes of
interaction, it also generated a sense of camaraderie and
cooperation among the masses of Chinese who evidenced their
dissent against the elite Confucian state by their adherence
to the principles and doctrine of Tao. A verse written by Tu Fu,
one of "eight immortal" poets illustrates this sense of brother-
hood:
Thinking of My Brother on a Moonlit Night
The war drum booms: all roads are bare.
One wild goose clangs: 'tis Autumn there.
Our nightly dews hence will be white.
On our old home this moon is bright.
Brothers have I all scattered far.
Homeless, how know if still they are?
Letters I send: but none reply.
Is this not War's sad tyranny? 14
In the above verse, Tu Fu expresses not only the sense of brother-
hood, implicit in Taoist believers, but also their sense of
outrage at and their criticism of politics (particularly war).
We will examine this latter dimension of Taoism in our discussion
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of secret societies and their role in political dissent further
on in this chapter.
Confucianism:
Confucianism, as was mentioned above, was initially con-
ceived as a code of ethics, ordering society and its process of
government. Confucius (551 B.C. - 479 B.C.) lived during the
turbulent Chou dynasty, a period of unending feudal wars and
rivalries. Confucius' doctrines (later collected as The Analects)
were a response to the corruption and human discord of this
period. Confucius intended to provide guidelines for human
action and interaction, based upon his belief that all men were
basically good, but that power corrupts and must be therefore
controlled by ethical codes of moral responsibility for all
levels of society.
Confucius attributed this inherent good in man to Tao.
In this regard his understanding and usage of Tao was much like
that of the Taoists. However, Confucius felt that Tao could be
influenced, unlike the Taoists. Confucius believed that virtues
(teh)4were the tools of Tao. In other words, to succeed in
life depended on Tao, yet one could influence Tao by a virtuous
life exemplified by good qualities. To this end, Confucius
organized a system of five virtuesl5 which, when applied to
one's life brought success. These virtues were Jen
benevolence; yi (4 ) righteousness or justice; li
correct behavior and ritual; chih (AO ) , knowledge or wisdom;
(1-j fitTr-oaly 16and hsin ), faith or loyalty. Of these five virtues li
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has received the most attention and emphasis. This is due pri-
marily to the fact that the virtue li served as the basis for
Confucius' ordering of Chiense society, particularly at the
levels of interpersonal behavior. This social ordering dictated
how the ruler should treat his subject, how the father should
trust his son, how the husband should treat his wife and so on.
As can perhaps be seen from the above, Confucianism had
implicit in its core a superiority/dependence relationship
structure which produced a fear of authority which determined
(and, perhaps still does) how the masses of Chinese people
responded to its political leadership. Confucianism nurtured
this fear by its interpretive applications of the political
leaders' divine link with Heaven.
Although Confucianism can be considered a pragmatic, philo-
sophical societal code moderating behavior and interaction, its
religiosity cannot be questioned. That Confucius was more con-
cerned with and prioritized finding solutions to order the chaos
of his earthly environment should not exclude a belief or con-
cern with the supernatural. As Yang observes:
A close examination of the Confucian doctrine as con-
ceived by Confucius and Mencius . . . will disclose
that it contained a subsystem of religious ideas based
on belief in Heaven, a predetermination, divination,
and the theory of Yin-Yang and the Five Elements. 17
He further explains:
The subsystem began with the belief in Heaven as the
anthropomorphic governing force of the universe, includ-
ing the human world. Hence the belief in fate or in
predetermination as a course of events preordained by
Heaven as the supreme ruling power. Divination and
the theory of Yin-Yang and the Five Elements were both
devices for knowing Heaven's wishes and for peering into
53
the secrets of this preordained course so as to help
men attain well-being and avoid calamity.18
One can perhaps argue whether or not Confucianism should
be recognized as an official, state religion in traditional
China. However, it is clear to this author that Confucianism
at the very least, should be recognized as a political religion.
Confucius disavowed some forms of ancestor worship,19 yet he
was neither agnostic nor atheist as we have seen above. Both
human virtue and political power were vested in the divine.
Buddhism:
Buddhism, though of foreign origin, was sinicized into
the traditional Chinese religious concept of Heaven and Earth
and the influences of each on cosmic and physical order. It
was first introduced to China from India in the first century
A.D. as a result of the silk trade across Central Asia. Initially,
the religious severity and frugality of Indian Buddhism was not
well received in Han China.20 However, as sinicization occurred,
Buddhism flourished politically and economically until the T'ang
dynasty.21 Even after this period, Buddhism penetrated Chinese
religious life.
Buddhism was amalgamated into a conglomerate of China's
animistic religious practices and beliefs, which incorporated
the cult of ancestor-worship, Taoism, Confucianism, and a
respect for the cosmic order of T'ien (Heaven). One author
noted of the influence of Buddhism in thirteenth century China:
The whole of China had become permeated by Buddhism, but
it had gone so deep that many people, even among the
upper classes, were no longer conscious of it . . .
the Confucian eithic and Buddhist morality, mingled
indistinguishably.22
Kenneth Ch'en provides more detail of this process as he explains
the metamorphosis of Indian to Chinese Buddhism is a discussion
of the deity Maitreya:
Very early in the Pali tradition Maitreya appears
as the future Buddha waiting to be reborn on earth
to purify the religion in some distant future . . .
on the whole he does not play an important role in
Indian Buddhism. Only after he was introduced into
China did he become an important figure. By the
fourth century A.D., there was a Maitreya cult in
which the devotees vowed to be reborn in Tushita
Heaven in orer to see Maitreya face to face. After
the seventh century the cult declined. . . . When
Maitreya reappeared in the thirteenth century, he
took the form of a fat, laughing image, and he was
referred to as the Pot-Bellied Maitreya or the
Laughing Buddha. It appears that this image of
Maitreya was based on legends surrounding the life
of a tenth century Chinese monk with a wrinkled
forehead and a mountainous belly.23
Ch'en further observes that the latter additions of a "bevy of
children" climbing over Maitreya make this Buddha representative
of the Chinese life ideals of prosperity and a large family,
denoted by the fat belly and the children. We see through this
an illustrative example of the process of sinicization of
Buddhism.
As Chinese Buddhism evolved, the Chinese acquired a more
defined understanding of cosmic (T'ien) and physical order
and disorder. Buddhism revealed that physical disorder was an
inevitable consequence of man's sins and that man's proper place
in the cosmic order (rebirth as a deity or human rather than
in animal or demonic form) could only be attained by piousness
and self-sacrifice. From the Chinese perspective, Buddhism gave
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substance to the mysticism of Taoism and animnism; rationale to
the societal ethical codes of Confucius; and legitimacy to the
cult of ancestor-worship (particularly if ancestors could be
reborn as a deity of a human).
Yet, the result of this interface of religious tendencies
is a pattern of religious beliefs and practices in traditional
China in which each religious influence is vaguely distinguish-
able, and no religious influences can be clearly defined as a
separate entity. Thus, we can observe ancestor-worshippers
throughout traditional China seeking Tao; paying homage to river
and house deities; regularly requesting that a particular Buddha
intercede for them in a Tushita T'ien (Buddhist Heaven where
Maitreya resided); and religiously abiding by Confucian ethical
codes--all this without any readily observable conflict or chaos
in their religious experiences.
There is, however, one very imnortant distinguishable
feature of religion in traditional China. As cited earlier,
from a sociopolitical point of view, we can differentiate between
official, literate religion and popular religion. What we see
is a polarization of religious belief, practice, and experience.
If we look from the top down,24 we see Confucianism influencing
the religion amalgam outlined above; and if we look from the
bottom up, we see Taoist influences. From this perspective
we observe what we identify as an idealization/practice paradox
of Confucianism and Taosim. The elite believed in the ideals
set forth in Confucianism (the virtues, social behavior codes,
etc.) but also practiced "wu wei" in their daily lives. The
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masses, on the other hand, believed in the ideals of Taoism (free
flowing, unstructured, mysticism, etc.) yet in their daily life
practiced Confucianism through their hard work, discipline, and
adherence to social codes. However, from a class perspective the
paradox is explained somewhat in that the elite were free in
their exercise of idealization and practice, while the masses,
no matter what their ideal, were compelled to practice Confucian-
ism in their daily lives. They had no choice but to live and
outwardly aspire to be Confucian men in a Confucian society
ruled authoritatively by Confucian elites.
Earlier in this chapter, we identified the antithetical rela-
ship of these two religious influences. That the educated elite embraced
Confucianism and the peasant masses, Taoism, further adds to
this antithesis and should further indicate the complexity and
dimension of religion in traditional China. Yet, in some ways,
this religious dichotomy may not only make sense in the context
of traditional China, it may serve to illustrate the dynamics
of societal interaction. What we observe is that those in
power, the educated elite, espoused a religious pattern that
legitimized their social position and maintained social status
divisions. Confucianism not only prompted social order but
gave the officials as much explicit control over the social
order--with the Emperor having the most control--as it did over
the religious order.
One author observes, about the religious control endowed
in the Emperor:
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Confucianism taught that the Emperor was the religious
as well as the political head of the state since upon
him depended in large part the beneficient cooperation
of the universe with man. . . . He could admit, pro-
mote, and demote divine beings in the official pantheon
and upon him devolved the duty of performing the
religious ceremonies which further the smooth coordina-
tion of the universe with man. 25
Couple this imperial religious power base with the primary tenet
of Confucian principles--submissiveness to authority--and one
can appreciate the socio-political benefits of Confucianism.
At the other end of the spectrum, we observe the masses
of illiterate, uneducated peasants seemingly attracted to
Taoism. Tao mandated that those who attempted to influence or
control social and cosmic order would be rendered powerless and
those who submissively yet purposefully flowed with the
Natural26 would have power. For the large segment of the tradi-
tional Confucian social structure which was unable to control
their own destiny, this concept of power, no matter how illu-
sional, must have been uplifting.
From the surface, the intricacies of traditional China's
religion blur. From a western perspective, it is difficult to
determine where ethics and philosophy stop and religion begins--
if one even sees a religious pattern of beliefs and experiences.
Nonetheless, religion is apparent in traditional China and, as
we shall discuss, functioned significantly in the political
process of traditional China.
Religion and Political Authority
The primary functionof religion in traditional Chinese
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politics was twofold. On the one hand, religion served to
legitimize the political authority of the emperor. On the
other hand, it functioned as a legitimizer of political rebel-
lion and dissent. Both of these functions, although divergent,
were encompassed in the concept of the Mandate of Heaven (t'ien
ming)(O 3). The use of the Mandate of Heaven as a legitimizer
of the political authority of the emperor originated with the
Chou dynasty (1122 - 221 B.C.). The Chou had as their chief
deity, T'ien (Heaven) which was recognized as the force of
nature and determined the fate of man. When the Chou leaders
toppled the Shang, they justified their overthrow of the Shang
by saying that the Shang rulers were not responding to the Will
of Heaven by carrying out their religious, administrative,
and political duties with religious piety, wisdom, and justice;
and, therefore, had lost the Mandate of Heaven to rule. The
Shu Ching (Book of History) of the Chou aptly explains both
the concept of the Mandate and how the Mandate of Heaven was
lost and gained:
God sent down correction on Hsia, but the sovereign only
increased his luxury and sloth, and would not speak kindly
to the people. . . . He kept reckoning on the decree of
God in his favor, and would not promote the means of
the people's support. . . . The first cause of his evil
course was the internal misrule, which made him unfit
to deal well with the multitudes. Nor did he seek at
all to employ men whom he could respect. . . . Heaven
on this sought a true lord for the people, and made its
distinguishing and favoring decree light on T'ang,
the Successful, who punished and destroyed the sovereign
of Hsia. From him down to the emperor Yi, the sovereigns
all made their virtue illustrious, and were cautious
in the use of punishments; thus also exercising a stimulat-
ing over the people. . . . It was the case that the last
sovereign of your Shang was luxurious to the extreme of
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luxury, while his schemes of government showed neither
purity nor progress, so that Heaven sent down such a
ruin on him.
The passage continues,
Heaven for five years waited kindly, and forbore with
the descendant of T'ang, to see if he would indeed
prove himself the true ruler of the people, but there
was nothing in him deserving to be regarded. Heaven
then sought among your many regions, making a great
impression by its terrors (either refers to rebellion
or a natural calamity such as drought or famine) to
stir up one who might look reverently to it, but in
all your regions, there was not one deserving of this
regard. There was, however, our kings of Chou, who
treated well the multitudes of the people, and were
able to sustain the burden of virtuous government,
and to preside over all services to spirits and to
Heaven. Heaven there upon instructed them, and in-
creased their excellence, made choice of them, and gave
them the decree . . . to rule over your many regions. 27
By the Later Chou dynasty and the time of Confucius (551
B.C.), the concept of the Mandate of Heaven had been accepted
as the vehicle by which political legitimacy and power was trans-
ferred from ruler to ruler. When an emperor ascended the throne,
his first duty was to perform an impressive ritual with imperial
sacrifices to consecrate himself as the Son of Heaven and recip-
ient of the Mandate, thus solidifying the link between Heaven
and his throne.
Confucius further reinforced the concept by emphasizing
the divine character of the position of Son of Heaven and of
the political power associated\with the position. However, the
divine Confucian emperor maintained a unique position as relig-
ious and political leader. The emperor could promote and
demote deities at will and could admonish them when through
prolonged droughts or excessive bandit raids they caused
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misfortune among the people. Yang observes that "when sacrifices
and prayers failed to halt a prolonged drought," the local offi-
cial, presumably empowered by the emperor, "might thrash the
ch'eng-huang (local deity) image or expose him under the scorch-
ing sun to induce rain." 28
Regarding the unique position of the traditional Chinese
emperor, one scholar has commented:
. . . the emperor was raised to a dignity far trans-
cending his temporal powers; he performed cosmic
functions as the central figure in the triad of
Heaven, earth, and man, and as the bearer of Heaven's
mandate, he possessed an aura of divinity worthy of a
true Son of Heaven. Indeed the whole hierarchic
order of the universe focused on him, for upon the
emperor depended not only the political administration
of a vast empire, but also the very fulfillment of
man's being and the harmonious functioning of the forces
of nature. 29
It is important to note that the Mandate of Heaven applied
to the position of emperor, as well as to the person who became
emperor. As was cited above in the Shu Ching, the man who
aspired to political leadership had to first be chosen by
Heaven. The fact of his selection was indicated by his success
in attaining the throne, either through leading a rebellious
uprising against the current emperor or some other political
strategem. In other words,succession to the throne was thought
to be a fate predetermined by Heaven; and success or failure
in seeking political leadership and power was considered evidence
of Heaven's choice. Once an emperor assumed the throne, he no
longer had to justify his claim to the throne or that of his
heirs. Because of the religious predispositions of the peasants
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in traditional China toward unequivocally accepting that one's
fate was determined by the designs of heavenly forces, and be-
cause of the Confucian ethic which dictated that the emperor
as religious and political leader be venerated, the concept of
the Mandate of Heaven became entrenched in China's traditional
political history.
The problem with the original concept of the Mandate of
Heaven--as fashioned by the Chou--was that, given the universal
power of the emperor, complete with solidifying divine sanc-
tions, only death could precipitate a change in leadership.
There were no provisions for attacking the political power and
legitimacy of an emperor who no longer seemed to hold the sanc-
tion of the Mandate. Surely, no mortal man, no matter how daring
or righteous, would challenge Heaven's choice of leadership.
Mencius (372-289 B.C.), who was a disciple and primary inter-
preter of Confucius' teachings, clarified and expanded the
concept of the Mandate of Heaven to include the rights of the
people in establishing and revoking the mandate of a ruler.
He declared that the people must accept Heaven's choice of a
ruler in order for the Mandate to be in effect. In clarifying
the dual acceptance by Heaven and by the people, he stated:
He (the emperor) was appointed (by Heaven) to preside
over the sacrifices and all the spirits were pleased
with them: that indicated his acceptance by Heaven.
He was then placed in charge of public affairs and they
were well administered and the people were at peace:
that indicated his acceptance by the people. 30
When referring in particular to the people's right to revoke the
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Mandate, Mencius expounded:
He who outrages humanity is a scoundrel; he who
outrages righteousness is a scourge.. A scourge or a
scoundrel is a despised creature (and no longer a King).
I have heard that a despised creature called Chou
was put to death, but I have not heard anything about
the murdering of a sovereign.3 1
Thus, the concept of the Mandate of Heaven provided a
lawful means of replacing an unworthy "Son of Heaven." It dic-
tated that the people had the Heaven-granted right to rebel a
against an emperor. However, as was previously mentioned,
Heaven's predisposition to the legitimacy of the rebellion
could only be established by its results. If a popular rebel-
lion succeeded, then Heaven had passed on the Mandate to the
victor and the new emperor or dynasty gained immediate political
legitimacy. If, on the other hand, the rebellion failed, it was
perceived as an indication that those holding political authority
remained in Heaven's good graces through their just and moral
rule. Thus the Son of Heaven would maintain his legitimate
right to rule. The emperor then had the "divine" right to
exercise, what we shall call, a paternalistic repression of his
antagonists and their supporters. Attempting to maintain his
Confucian virtue of benevolence (seldom successfully as history
records) the ruler assumed the task of "correcting the evil" 32
often tortuously. The unsuccessful rebels would then be left
to determine which ancestor or deity they had angered and, if
they survived the "repressions" of the emperor, make amends.
Simply stated, if you won, you were recognized by all as emperor,
Son of Heaven. If you lost, you were recognized by all as a
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rebel, bandit, or, in some cases, a barbarian.33
Religion and Political Dissent
In the above discussion, we have established how the con-
cept of the Mandate of Heaven served to religiously legitimize
political authority and political dissent in traditional China.
However, the focus was on the legitimization of political
authority. In this section, we focus on the function of religion
in political rebellion and dissent in traditional China.
Although the Mandate of Heaven, as expanded by Mencius,
legitimized popular dissent and rebellion against an unworthy
emperor, the guidelines and organization for dissent and rebel-
lion in traditional China were often found within the framework
of secret societies (hui-t'angj ). Secret societies pri-
marily attracted the vagabond and other disenfranchised elements
of the Chinese peasantry. Their core membership consisted of
individuals who were considered bandits by local and central
governmental officials. Jean Chesneaux identifies most secret
society members as "people whose social existence was denied
by the cultivated literate."34 Generally, secret societies
were characteristically an amalgam of political and social dis-
sent from the established Confucian order,35 nurtured by a
religious fervor and righteousness based on Taoism, Buddhism,
and/or animistic beliefs. However, most importantly, the
secret socities stressed a sense of "community" and "brotherhood."
And, it was perhaps the influences of Taoism which facilitated
this kind of communalism. While Taoism did not stress "brotherhood"
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in its doctrine, as a religion it transcended the believer
beyond the realm of the real world. In the case of the tradi-
tional Chinese believer that the real world was dictated by
Confucianism which stress individual ethic and ecocentrism
rather than brotherhood and community. At a level of Taoist
mysticism, one could transcend the real world with its artificial
restraints on interpersonal relationships and experience a new
mode of interpersonal behavior not defined by Confucian ethics.
Thus, a form of social dissent was exhibited by secret society mem-
bers, evidenced by their
seded a member's family
the Confucian concept o
individual was accepted
association all outside
exist. The new member
family. All individual
etc.) were surrendered
by all society members.
brotherly code of loyalty which super-
kinship--a direct confrontation with
f filial piety (hsiao ). Once an
and initiated into a secret society
kinship ties were supposed to cease to
took on all society members as his
assets (land, personal possessions,
to the common till for communal ownership
The homage and respect given to one's
genetic ancestry was transferred to martyred society members.
Political dissent was manifest by rebellion and peasant
uprisings challenging the political authority of the emperor or
seeking to establish a new socio-political order, founded in
the religious principles or belief systems adhered to by the
secret societies. 36 The religious foundations of secret
societies usually varied according to the influences of Taoism
or Buddhism, or a mutant blend of both. Most religiously-based
secret society leaders claimed some messianic duty or divine
65
lineage or association. They often believed that they had the divine-
inspired power to heal the sick and wounded and cast out sin or
demons from the possessed. Religious ceremony and ritual pre-
ceded all major undertakings and usually accounted for most of
the time of meetings. These ceremonies sometimes included exer-
cises which placed members in a trance-like state and convinced
them that they were invincible to death and pain (usually per-
formed before going to battle) and orgiastic rites of initiation.
We have identified'two religious-basedsecret society groups
active in traditional China to further our discussionof the
role of religion in political dissent--the Yellow Turban (Huang-
chin) sect, who figured prominently in the downfall of the Han
Dynasty in 184 A.D., and the White Lotus Society (Pai-lien-hui)
which operated intermittently from the fourteenth through the
eighteenth century. In the case of both secret societies
cited here religion (Taoism in the former instance and Buddhism
in the latter) significantly figured in the rationale for
rebellion. Although we briefly review the major events of the
key rebellions attributed to these secret societies to provide
context for the reader, what is important to note here is how
religious doctrine, particularly Taoism, functioned in legitimiz-
ing political dissent.
The Yellow Turbans were members of a sect which sought
T'ai-p'ing-tao 37 (Great Way of Peace and Prosperity). They
rose in rebellion against the Han leaders from a base in Chu
Lu on the Shantung peninsula in Northern China. Their religious
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basis was Taoism. They had as their chief deity the Taoist
Huang-ti (Yellow Emperor). Prior to the rebellion, members of
the sect practiced faith healing and preached among the local
peasantry. The success of the faith-healing is unknown. How-
ever, the doctrine of the Tao and T'ai-p'ing-tao (especially
the principle of an egalitarian society) must have been well
received by the poor peasantry because the sect had amassed a
relatively large following by the outbreak of the rebellion.
As was previously mentioned, the T'ai-p'ing-tao sect rose
in rebellion against the Han in 184 A.D. They received their
name, Yellow Turban, from the yellow scarves they wore on their
heads in battle. They were led by Chang Chueh (d. 184), a
Taoist fanatic who had messianic visions of delivering the
peasantry to T'ai-'ping-tao. He believed that by uttering
magic words of Taoist origin over water, he could change the
water into a medicine that would cure disease. He also assured
his followers that they could never be killed by any sharp-
pointed instrument such as an arrow or sword. It is said
that Chang signaled rebellion by allowing a rumor to circulate
among his followers that the blue heaven (the Han emperor) was
dead, and the yellow heaven (Chang Chueh's allusion of his
associations with the Taoist Yellow Emperor) would reign. 38
The fighting began somewhere around April 14, 184. Chang's
plot was discovered by local officials and thwarted. He escaped
and quickly organized another bellion with a following of approxi-
mately 500,000 peasants and sect members. Although this second
attempt at rebellion took the political administration by
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surprise, central and local government forces effectively
countered the rebels, and the Yellow Turbans were defeated
within a year. Although the Han forces succeeded in quelling
the rebellion, the impact of the Yellow Turbans and others39
caused the Later Han empire to collapse under the strain of
domestic turmoil and the Three Kingdoms period (220 - 280 A.D.)
began.
The Yellow Turbans were one of the first religious based
secret societies (chiao hui-t'ang ) to be directly
associated with a rebellion against political authority in
traditional China. This fact is significant in understanding
the functional dimensions of the Mandate of Heaven in traditional
Chinese politics. Although documentary records on the Later
Han and the causes of the Yellow Turban rebellion are scanty, we
cannot assume that the Yellow Turbans under Chang Chueh were
as concerned with unseating an unworthy Son of Heaven--as the
Mandate of Heaven would dictate--as they were with creating a
new social order. Their allegiance was not toward the Confucian
social order. In fact, they were very much opposed to the man-
darin elite who justified their privilege with Confucian
doctrine. They adhered to the doctrine of the Tao, which as
cited earlier was in direct opposition to Confucianism and thus
functioned as a counterculture. As they did not believe in
Confucianism, they therefore would not evoke the Mandate of
Heaven to legitimize their dissent, not to mention the political
authority of the emperor.
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The White Lotus Society (also called the White Water Lily
Society, Incense Swelling Sect, and White Yang) originated from
the Buddhist T'ien-t'ai sect of the sixth century. The White
Lotus religious belief system combined a belief in the Eternal
Mother (Wu-shang lao-mu) creator of all life, with the Buddhist
Maitreva, and Manichaean concepts of Darkness and light. This
latter doctrine held a messianic promise to the world that a
King of Light (ming-wang) would appear after three cosmic eras
or Kalpas: the era of the Blue Sun (Ch'ing-yang) when the
Jan-teng Buddha reigns; the era of the Red Sun when the Sakyamuni
Buddha reigns; and the era of the White Sun when the Bodhisattra
Maitreya, Buddha of the Future reigns and signals final salva-
tion and the end of the universe. 40 White Lotus Society members
believed that when the Maitreya Buddha had descended on earth,
the King of Light would be born with the messianic duty of
instituting a state of T'ai-p'ing. Consequently, the leaders
of the Society assumed messianic characteristics, as had the
Yellow Turban leaders centuries before them, and vowed to
deliver their devottes in T'ai p'ing. With this religious
doctrine functioning as a legitimacy base for political dissent,
White Lotus members claimed freedom from secular political
control and continually challenged the political authority of
the emperor. Elizabeth Perry, in her study of White Lotus
influences in political rebellion, has described the preoccupations
and characteristics of the Society in the following way: "Its
practices included medical healing, sitting and breathing exer-
cises, martial arts, and chanting of spells and charms."41 She
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further observed that "the Society was a haven for poor and dis-
affected peasants of the North China plain. It provided a
source of material aid and an otherworldly refuge from their
difficult lives." 42
The White Lotus Society has been linked, directly and in-
directly, to a number of political rebellions against central
and local governmental authorities. It is accepted that the
White Lotus operated as a secret society from about the seventh
century. However, the first evidences of TWhite Lotus challenges
to political authority occur during the Yuan dynasty (1260-
1367) ruled by the alien Mongols. Han Shan-t'ing, a White
Society member and practicing Buddhist, declared himself a
direct descendant of the Northern Sung emperor, Hui-tsung (1101-
1125), and therefore claimed the throne as emperor. He went
about announcing the coming of the Maitreya Buddha, and, thus,
prophesying the end of the Yuan dynastic rule. He was
arrested by Mongol government forces in 1351 and executed
after a short imprisonment. Although his preaching was short-
lived, its impact on White Lotus members, coupled with his
martyrdom, was apparent. Han's son, Han Lin-erh, was proclaimed
emperor and recognized within the White Lotus as the incarnation
of Maitreya. This association resulted in the father and son
being recognized as the Major King of Light (Ta Ming-wang) and
the Minor King of Light (Hsiao-Ming-wang) respectively. When
corruption, internal disputes, peasant unrest, and floods and
famine resulted in the Mongol collapse, Chu Yuan-chang (1328-
1398) founded the Ming dynasty.
70
There is no substantiated evidence that Chu was a member
of the White Lotus. However, the fact that he named his
dynasty Ming leads one to suggest that he was either a member
of the society or was greatly influenced by the preachings of
Han Shan-t'ing and his son. Whichever the case, Chu realized
the strength of organization within the Society and its religious
mission to create a new social order, complete with a new form
of political structure. Once Chu assumed the throne, he singled
out the White Lotus Society as a heretical organization which
was leading its followers astray. One might presume from this
observation that the new emperor viewed the White Lotus as
a subversive threat to his imperial power. In 1420, the Ming
dynasty, in fact, was challenged by a White Lotus inspired rebel-
lion led by a Shantung woman, T'ang Sai-erh.
Through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the White
Lotus Society remained active both at the local and state levels.
Around 1774, a White Lotus member, Hsu Hung-ju, led a local
peasant uprising calling himself Chung-hsing Fu-lieh-ti
(Renaissance Great-Blessedness Emperor). In the 1794-1804
period of Ch'ing rule, the White Lotus again rose in rebellion
against political authority. During this uprising, they attacked
imperial and administrative corruption and called for an end to
the Ch'ing and a return to the Ming. Finally, there are suggest-
ions of White Lotus influence in the Nian Rebellion (1851-1868).43
We have chosen to focus our above discussion of secret
societies on the Yellow Turbans and White Lotus because they
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provide good examples of the historical relationship of
religion and political rebellion in traditional China. How-
ever, these two socities are only representative of broader
"rebellious" attacks on the socio-political Confucian
order which were founded on reliqious belief systems. James
T. C. Lin44 has identified five reasons for the significance of
religion in political rebellions, either secret society
inspired or otherwise: 1) practicality--religion placed
emphasis on everyday problems rather than philosophical and
theistic matters; 2) religions emphasized the use of magic
and sorcery (which was particularly useful in promoting a
fanaticism which convinced rebels that they were invincible to
pain and death); 3) official proscription--the more a govern-
ment prohibited a religion, the more that religion (and perhaps
the secret society based in that religious doctrine) gained
popularity among the peasants; 4) communal organization--the
strict discipline and mutual aid (usually found in secret
societies) helped in the economically difficult times;45 and
5) novelty--the newness of the new religion attracted peasants
who may have been disappointed or disillusioned with aspects of
the orthodoxy of Confucianism both as a socio-political struct-
ure and as a religion. C. K. Yang observes that, in general,
rebellions in traditional China usually identified their
political cause with the divine mission of universal salvation. 46
We might conclude our discussion of religion and political
rebellion by expanding Yang's premise and suggesting that
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rebellions, whose organization and inspiration can be either
directly or indirectly attributed to secret societies, had as
their underlying principle the creation of a new social order
which would replace the Confucian world order, and that this
was clearly seen as their divine mission. A more contemporary
evidence of this assertion can be seen in the T'ai-p'ing
rebellion which in the nineteenth century represented still
another religious based group of rebels (brought together under
the auspices of a secret society) who sought to destroy the
Confucian world order as a divine mission.
The Role of Religion in Political Socialization
In the preceding pages, we have discussed the role of
religion in legitimizing political authority and political dis-
sent in traditional China. Nonetheless, our historical analysis
could not be considered complete without a brief look at the role
of religion in the political socialization process of traditional
China. We are concerned here with the mechanism paradoxically,
involved, on the one hand, with generating the norm in political
behavior and attitudes considered correct in the orthodox Con-
fucian state; and, on the other hand, with both nullifying the
prevailing orthodox political norm and providing a new norm
of correctness. We maintain that religion can be identified
as that mechanism which performed the dual function of legitimiz-
ing two contradicting political norms (political authority and
political dissention) throughout traditional China's political
history. Let us first examine political socialization in
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traditional China.
Fred Greenstein distinguishes between political socializa-
tion to determine "politically relevant aspects of personality
development" and political socialization to influence "specific
political learning."47 The first notion refers to the develop-
ment of basic dispositions, beliefs, and attitudes about
politics in general; the second notion refers to particular
attitudes about and knowledge of "formal" political life includ-
ing such items as the recognition of governmental officials
and symbols (e.g., who presently holds political offices,
the significance of a national flag, etc.) and the functioning
and interrelatedness of governmental institutions. Our focus
on political socialization in traditional China will be
limited to a brief examination of the first classification
of Greenstein. We present here a view of what political
dispositions, beliefs, and attiutdes seemed to be prevalent in
Confucian China prior to the nineteenth century. To accomplish
this immediate end, we will concentrate on socialization within
the family unit.
In traditional China, as in other traditional societies,
the family48 functioned as the basic socio-political unit.
Within the framework of Confucian society, it was the family
which served as the model for establishing correct political
norms,49 both in terms of attitude and of behavior. In the
Hsiao Ching (Classic of Filial Piety), we read: "the filial
piety with which the superior man serves his parents may be
transferred as loyalty to the ruler."5 0 John K. Fairbank, in
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a dicussion of the traditional socio-political order of
Confucian China observes:
Their solution (to politics) began with the observation
that the order of nature is not egalitarian but hier-
archic. . . . In effect, this was a doctrine of obed-
ience, to be manifested through the virtues of filial
piety, chastity and loyalty. . . . Within the family,
the patriach was like an emperor, while ordinary family
members, each in his own status, depended on the
group for their livelihood.5 1
Family interpersonal dynamics not only modelled the citizens'
attitudes and behavior toward government, it also served as
a training mechanism of future public officials: "(the superior
man's) regulation of his family may be transferred as good
government in any official position," 52 and "the ruler,
without going beyond the family, completes the lessons for
the state."53 Elsewhere, we read: "(the emperor) wishing to
order well his state must first regulate his family."5 4
What should be emphasized in particular, as a result of
these observations, is the Confucian concept of filial piety as
seen in the relationship between father and son.55 We find,
within this relationship, the political notions of authority,
legitimacy of authority, obligations to authority, and the like.
In a study of political socialization of Chinese and American
children, Richard Wilson56 notes that, in traditional China,
sons unquestionably obeyed their fathers and that one achieved
authority over subordinate members of the household "legally,
ideally, and actually" by the mere fact of fatherhood.
The authority relationships between the father and son
figures was absolute. It has been observed that in the family-
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relationships of traditional societies, the child was regarded
"less as a potential equal than as a person who must learn to
conform and to rise only slowly in the hierarchy and who must
never expect to live in other than superior and subordinate
relationships with others."57 We see an example of this lesson
in A Chinese Childhood:
On the New Year's Eve of my twelfth year . . . my
father called me into his study and sent me to ask
my grandfather whether I might be shown the family
clan book. It is traditional in China for a child
to be told, on reaching a certain age, something of
the history of his family . . my grandfather gave
his consent.58
Further in the passage, we read:
Father passed quickly over the first few pages .
but he raised his voice and made a gesture of
respect when the first name appeared. 'This,' he
said, 'so far as the records show, was our first
ancestor.' He did not speak the name . . . because
it is not customary in China for a person to address
or speak of an elder by name; he called him 'Yuan-
ching Kung.' Yuan-ching was another name for our
first ancestor, and Kung was a respectful term used
in referring to elders. Actually the first ancestor's
full name was 'Chiang Hsu' . . . No member of my
generation would be permitted to name him thus, and
I only do so here to make the matter clear to my
readers.59
In both passages, we can observe the socialization of a
young boy in dominant/subordinate authority relationships within
his family. In each instance, the son observes his father in
a subordinate role to an elder, while maintaining a dominant
relationship with the son. These examples might serve as
reasons for Wilson's definition of traditional Chinese socializa-
tion as an authority-dependent relationship, where interrelation-
ships are "highly structured hierarchically" and the subordinate
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is "excessively dependent" upon those above him in the hierarchic
chain. 60
From the subordinate's point of view, fear prevailed in
the relationship. Within the family, the son generally feared
his father, particularly when punishment for wrong doings was
in order, and would often rely upon his mother to intercede for
him with his father. Pye, Solomon, Kiniker,61 have indi-
cated that this fear of authority resulted in an ambivalence
toward authority and power where the individual either avoided
the authority figure or immediately complied with his wishes.
Again, we see this learning took place at an early age. Chiang
Yee describes an episode in his early childhood when he and
other cousins disobeyed his grandfather's decree and listened
as a maid recounted her encounter with a Manchurian:
Grandfather was about seventy-four at this time. . . .
He was always good-humored and very fond of his
grandchildren, and I, being a favorite of his,
played in his quarters more often than the others
of my age. After the maid episode I did not dare
to go there for some time. I had begun to realize
his nature and to think that he might not like me to
play.62
Within the traditional Chinese family, one's relationships
with one's peers--an extension of the family relationship--also
served as a basis for political socialization. Richard Solomon
notes that "in the Confucian family there was no behavior
which was more likely to result in swift punishment than when
a child quarrelled or fought with another sibling or neighborhood
playmate."63 Among one's peers neither hostility nor self-
assertion and aggression was acceptable. In instances when the
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child exhibited such tendencies, shame and ridicule was utilized
to reinforce the negativeness of the behavior.
The notion of filiality within the family facilitated the
individual's transition between interacting within his family
(or peer) structure and interacting in the political system.
The individual simply transferred the same deference, fear, or
compliance one had given one's father to the political authority.
Abbe Huc observed of the place of filial piety in traditional
China:
All means are made use of to exault (sic) this
sentiment (filial piety), so as to make it an abso-
lute passion. It assumes all forms, mingles in all
action, and serves as the moral pivot of public life.
Every crime, every attempt against authority, property,
or life of individuals is treated at filial disobed-
ience; while on the other hand, all acts of virtue,
devotion, compassion toward the unfortunate . . . or
even valor in battle, are referred to as filial piety
. . . to be a good or bad citizen . . . is to be a
good or bad son. 64
Wilson, more recently, writes of the nature and origin of politi-
cal attitudes in traditional China:
We know that in traditional times there was a fear of
government . manifested in a desire to stay out of the
magistrates's yamen. These general avoidant feelings
seem also to have been felt by most people with regard
to their fathers as well. 6 5
If we can conclude then that the nature of political
socialization in traditional China was to promote fear, avoid-
ance, and lack of self-assertion of the individual towards
government, the importance of religion in either perpetuating
or negating this predisposition toward authority patterns is
apparent. On the one hand, religion provided the emotional
78
fervor and moral correctness to perpetuate the authority relation-
ship of dominance and subordinance. The religious cult of
ancestor worship and a pious Confucian code of social order gave
celestral credence to the superior/subservant relationship be-
tween Emperor and common man. That the Emperor was designated
as Son of Heaven provided the religious connection and therefore
a foundation for traditional political attitudes of awe and
fear in pre-modern China.
On the other hand, religion negated the fear and avoidance
the common man associated with politics. The divine mission of
changing the social order to create T'ai p'ing superseded tradi-
tional political predispositions and beliefs. One might posit
that those rebellions in traditional China which came closest
to success, thus qualifying as true revolutionary attempts,
had their basis in religious foundations fostered by secret
society doctrine or other religious groups teachings. In any
event, we can state that religion, at the very least, provided
the emotional fervor necessary to initiate a break with the
socialized norm of political behavior and attitudes in traditional
China.
There seems to have been a shift in the relationship
between religion and politics with the onset of serious Western
impact66 in China around the mid-eighteenth century. As European
missionaries and merchants descended on China and caused external
pressures (both the First and Second Opium Wars), China was
concurrently being internally rocked by unrest and dissension
which culminated in the T'ai p'ing rebellion (1852 - 1864).
When the alien Manchurians conquered China in the 1600's
and established the Ch'ing dynasty, the religious legitimization
of the Mandate began to weaken. The Chinese resented the
Manchu rule and potential rebels received continuous signals
from Heaven to defy the Mandate. The Ch'ing rapidly became
corrupt, and were weakened by the numerous rebellions and
internal unrest. Although their actual authority and control
was questionable, they maintained a semblance of control, not
through their divine link with Heaven, but through the malevolent
support rendered them by England and France. At the same time
that these European powers were humiliating Manchu officials with
forced opium trade, gunboats, unequal treaties, etc., they pro-
vided the Ch'ing with the military support to defeat the rebels.
In fact, had it not been for British intervention, the T'ai p'ing
rebellion may have succeeded in revolutionizing the Chinese
social order.
Dynastic Chinese history had seen the same or, at the
very least, similar rebellious upheavals at the end and subse-
quent beginning of each dynastic cycle. Yet, with the Manchus
it was different. Not only did the Ch'ing dynasty lose the
Mandate of Heaven on October 10, 1911--the very concept of
the Mandate came into question. The result was a period, begin-
ning with the Republican era (1911) and up to the dawn of the
communist takeover, when no basis for political legitimacy or
correctness existed. China reluctantly existed throughout her
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semi-colonization being, what third world development specialists
term, "anti-Western Western"67 and looked to Europe and the
United States for social and political structure, as well as
standards for political legitimacy and correctness.
The Chinese experimented with a Republic, a national demo-
cracy, even a monarchy; but each of these superimposed political
cultures failed. Their bases for legitimacy did not seem compat-
ible with China's religio-political history, China's present
realities, or China's socio-political needs. Yet, with the
wounds of humiliation, by the West, attributable to traditional
social and political orders--including the Mandate of Heaven--
China could not look back. The burden of the challenge was to
find, at least functionally, a basis for legitimacy and
correctness which utilized concepts of the past political
history; and which would therefore be compatible with Chinese
political culture on the one hand, without stressing obvious
similarities with a political past that had been deemed obso-
lete and discarded. Maoism as it evolved up to and surrounding
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, functioned as a
religious belief system legitimizing the authority of and
establishing a standard of correctness for the political system
much the same way as the Mandate of Heaven had functioned in
China's political tradition. Functioning as a religious belief
system, Maoism, in some ways, seemed to also be an attempt to
blend China's politico-religious traditions (centering around
Confucianism individualism and Taoist communalism) into one
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belief system. This attempt was directly aimed
at eliminating the idealization/practice paradox of Confucianism
and Taoism discussed earlier. The paradox though grounded in
religious beliefs and practices seemed to also influence social
interactions and political participation. By the 1960's
this paradox had taken the form of "red" versus "expert." The
Maoists determined that to be "red" (Maoist) ideally would make
one automatically expert. Mao's antagonists had just as
seriously decided that to be "expert" ideally allowed one the
opportunity to practice being "red." To finally resolve this
paradox would clarify what constituted correct political atti-
tudes and behavior, and as a result operationalize correct
political learning. This was the function of the Maoist religious
belief system during the Cultural Revolution. We will explore
this function of Maoism in Chapters further on in this study.
CHAPTER II
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CHAPTER III
THE MAOIST RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM: ORIGINS
". . . every society will have a religion--even if
it is called anti-religion."l
In the previous chapter we have taken note of the complex-
ity of traditional religious beliefs in the Chinese context.
Among a melange of religious beliefs (ancestor worship,
animism, ying/yang principles, Buddhism, etc.) we have identi-
fied two levels of reliqious belief and practice--the official
religious function of Confucianism with its social ethics and
orientation to life and societal ordering and popular Taoism
with its mysticism. Our task in this chapter and the next is
to illustrate how Maoism is a continuation (with modifications)
of China's religious traditions.
However, before doing so we must address two critical
philosophical questions: a) what is a religion? and b)
can what is viewed as a political belief system from one
perspective be regarded as a religious belief system from
another? The first question explores the differences and
similarities between Western and Chinese understanding of
the functional use of religion. Having addressed these two
philosophical questions, we will discuss the origins of the
Maoist religious belief system, pointing out Confucian and
Taoist influences where appropriate.
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Identifying a Religious Belief System
There are three principal methods of describing and
identifying any phenomenon--examination of the content, the
structure, or the function of the phenomenon. Content refers
to the substance or meaning of an entity. An examination of
content entails describing the essence of the unit under
investigation. Structure, on the other hand, is concerned
with the interrelationship of the parts of a whole. An
examination of a phenomenon's structure can result in the
identification of that phenomenon based upon its systemic
pattern within another unit. Finally, an entity can be
identified by its function--that is, by its operational
role within a broader unit. In the case of the first method
of identification, content, the description of the entity
and, therefore, our understanding of it can be taken to be
fairly absolute.
Once the essence of a matter has been identified, it
is unlikely that its basic meaning will change. In contrast,
both the structure and function of an entity are bound to the
context in which they appear. In other words, the identifica-
tion or description of the unit is very much dependent upon
the broader perspective in which it is located. Such that,
if the broader unit changes or is modified, the systemic
pattern and operational role of the entity can change in such
a way that its identity also changes. Further, in the case of
function, since the operational role of the entity is by far
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the most dynamic of the three descriptive methods, identifica-
tion of the unit, though most easily observable, must always
be regarded as relative to the broader unit. The purpose of
this brief discussion is to clarify our intent and approach in
identifying a religious belief system.
As mentioned in our introduction, the term "religion" and
the nature of its inherent meaning have perplexed both experts
in the field and mankind in general. The only seemingly
accepted "known" of religion is that it refers to or repre-
sents an "unknown," whether from an eschatological viewpoint
or a divine suprahuman viewpoint. In order to cope with these
religious unknowns, mankind has established various belief
systems2 which make the unknown comprehensible and, therefore,
manageable in a tangible sense. Emile Durkheim has gone so far
as to define religion as "a unified system of beliefs and prac-
tices relative to sacred things, unifying into a single moral
community all those who adhere to those beliefs and practices."3
This definition still does not assist us greatly in dif-
ferentiating between religious and nonreligious belief systems.
Therefore, we have established three criteria which will
facilitate our differentiation. We identify religious belief
systems as those systems which 1) address the ultimate and
eschatological questions of life and death, or the meaning of
life and death; 2) establish values, morals, or orientations to
life, which assist the individual in coping with personal
tragedies or uncomfortable experiences of life; and 3) gener-
ate what can be identified as religious experiences. Although
our criteria add structure and focus to our discussion of
religious belief systems, we realize that they do not consti-
tute a definition of religion nor do they encompass our full
understanding of the nature of religion. We will attempt to
present such a definition and an explanation of our understand-
ing below.
As we have discussed in Chapter I and point out again
here, we do not limit our use or understanding of the term
"religious" to the divine, in a rigorously theistic sense.
We maintain that religiousness can depend upon the individual's
perception of what is ultimate, as well as upon the observer's
analysis of what the individual or society views as ultimate.
William James, the noted expert on religious phenomena, was
perhaps the first in his field to adhere to this broad notion
of religion. He defined religion as "the feelings, acts, and
experiences of individual men . . . so far as they apprehend
themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider
"5the divine." More recently, Paul Tillich has asserted that
everything which is a matter of unconditional concern
is made into a god."6 Of particular interest to us here
is his observation:
If the nation is someone's ultimate concern, the
name of the nation becomes a sacred name and the nation
receives divine qualities which far surpass the reality
of being and functioning of the nation. The nation
then stands for and symbolizes the true ultimate. 7
Thus, according to Tillich, the content of a religious system
can vary as greatly as the society's notions of the ultimate.
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As each of the definitions cited above indicate, one
cannot attempt to define or discuss religion without mention
of certain key terms--divine, sacred, supernatural, superhuman,
ultimate, etc. But one must ask, if religion is defined by
the divine and sacred, without being circular in argument,
what does it mean to be divine and sacred and so on. Most
religions in content associate the divine and sacred with a
god or gods or some form of superhuman being. To be divine,
according toman's perceptions and interpretations, is to be
all powerful, to have control over nature and man, and to hold
the answers to the meaning of life and death, whether the
context be a heaven or utopia. Yet this notion of religion as
divine and sacred, etc., is only one aspect of the nature of
religion. The second, and equally important aspect of the
nature of religion is man's response and relationship to his
notions of religion. From this perspective we understand
religion in terms such as numinous, cosmic, mystical and
transcendental, spiritual or having to do with a soul, and
mythical. Religious man learns of the divine mythically; is
tied to the divine by a spirit or soul; communicates with the
sacred through mystical, transcendental or cosmic connectors;
and is numinous in the presence of the divine. Taken as a
whole then, our definition and understanding of religion
emerges from the point of man's perceptions of and response
to the divine and sacred, or, as Tillich asserts, to the
ultimate.
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These perceptions of religion are basic, the divergence
or differences in religious content are bound and determined
by the cultural and traditional contexts upon which the
various interpretive religious contents are based. Thus, for
the purposes of this study, we define religion as: Man's per-
ception of the divine and sacred or ultimate and his numinous,
mystical or transcendental response to these perceptions. This
definition does not attempt to address the existential question
of the existence of the divine (as in God) but only defines
religion within the limitations or parameters of man's percep-
tions. In other words, some choose to perceive the sacred as
a superhuman being, some choose to perceive the sacred as the
state, and some choose not to perceive notions of the sacred.
However, there is a question as to the existence of this latter
group, both in our mind, and in the minds of such scholars in
the field of religion as Eliade Mircea and Yinger. 8
Our next question then is how do this definition and
understanding of religion fit into the traditional (andeven-
tually contemporary) Chinese perception and interpretation of
religion? To answer this question, we must again focus on the
two levels of religious tradition in China. Confucian
doctrine had little to say of the supernatural (much like
formal Maoism as we shall later see) yet it established the
political leader (emperor) as the godlike figure (Son of
Heaven) on the basis of his divine connections with the sacred
entity of Heaven. In other words, Confucianism officially
established man's perceptions of divinity, sacredness, and
religion. On the other hand, Taoism, at the popular level,
was preoccupied with the supernatural, but the preoccupation
focused on man's response tothe supernatural, his mystical,
spiritual relationship to Heaven.
One identifiable difference between our understanding
of religion and the Chinese traditional cultural interpreta-
tions is that while Confucianism established orientations to
life through rules rigidly ordaining a social order, there was
no evidence of an attempt to establish meaning of life. The
official Confucian godhead was not concerned with establishing
an ontological meaning of life and death. However, Taoist
responses to the sacred at the popular level did include an
interpretation of the meaning of life and death, From this
historical perspective the Taoist influences on popular Maoism
with its emphasis on the purpose of life, and ontological
issues of mortality are clear.
In summary, although the two levels of traditional Chi-
nese religion (official Confucian and popular Taoist) do not
directly correspond to our dual understanding of religion
(perception and response), the similarities between the two
contexts of understanding indicate our definition and under-
standing of religion are applicable to the Chinese context.
Our second theoretical question dealt with the validity
of viewing a political ideology as a chameleon which might
also be recognizable as a religious belief system depending on
context and perspective, and, we will add, function. Ideology
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has been defined as a quasi- or pseudo-religion. Yet, such a
definition fails to explain or illustrate how ideology can
be perceived as a political belief system from one perspective
and a religious belief system from another.
Although ideology can be broadly structurally defined as
the collective thoughts and attitudes of a specific historico-
social group,9 it has been connotatively defined (in content)
synonymously with Marxism. In this latter instance the
historico-social group is determined according to class and the
collective thoughts concern themselves with the human condition
of the oppressed and its causes. In neither of these instances
do we find the faintest hint of the divine or transcendental.10
However, if we consider ideology functionally as does Karl
Mannheim, we are led to the possibilities of a religious
conceptualization of the term. Mannheim observes that the
opinions, statements, propositions, and systems of ideas,
which constitute the content of ideology, are not taken at
their face value but are interpreted in the light of the life-
situation of the one(s) who express them. And further he
states that the specific character and life-situation of the
subject influences his opinions, perceptions, and interpreta-
tions. In other words, man's ideologies are a product of
his perceptions and in turn his ideologies determine his
perceptions. Or, at an even more ontological level, what is
important in a definition of ideology is not the doctrine of
what is espoused but the socio-historical environment and man's
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response to it intellectually in his system of thoughts.
Functionally, then, ideology can be regarded as a mirror
which reflects man's perceptions of his "life-situation."
This definition somewhat corresponds to our definition of
religion which we might also functionally regard as a mirror
which reflects man's perceptions. But in the case of a relig-
ious belief system the perceptions are intended to conceptual-
ize the supernatural and sacred and the response to these
perceptions are emotional before they are intellectual,
Thus, we differentiate between the two solely on the
basis of man's perceptions and his response tohis perceptions;
therefore, from the researcher's perspective we do so on the
basis of the observable manifestations of these perceptions
and responses. If man perceives or is observed to perceive
his "life-situation" as synonymous with his perceptions of the
sacred, there is an apparent overlap between ideology and
religion. Eliade Mirceal2 has observed such a dichotomy in
traditional societies. Pre-modern man perceived his secular
world as sacred (created by supernatural or divine beings).
Thus, Mircea concluded, one could not take, for example, an
observation of a ritual of initiation in a traditional environ-
ment at its secular face value. Rather, one had to interpre-
tively observe, as did Mircea, that the ritual of initiation
is a functional reflection of traditional man's continual
attempts to make his religious, sacred past his "life-situation"
present.
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From one perspective the initiation ritual is observed
as secular, from another perspective it becomes an observable
manifestation of the sacred. Mircea goes on to assert that
modern man's perceptions of the sacredness of his life-situa-
tion are deceiving in that he attempts to deny his sacred past
and assert his secular present. Thus, the observer cannot
assuredly take his observations of secular man's perceptions
at face value. Modern man can assert secularness but mani-
fest sacredness. Returning to our study of Maoism, in the
manner we observe Maoism from one perspective as a political
ideology and from another perspective as a religious belief
system. Further, we note both the secular assertions of
Maoist/Marxist praxis and the sacred manifestations, at a
functional level, of a Maoist religious belief system.
Having addressed the theoretical question of differen-
tiating between an ideology and a religious belief system,
we must now turn our attention to a more specific theoretical
focus, the methodological approach to an identification of a
religious belief system. Specifically, we have chosen to
focus upon how a religious belief system functions in the
political socialization process, above and beyond the function
that political ideology serves in the process, We need not
precede such a discussion by establishing that religion does
indeed have a role in the socialization process, since this
task has been performed by noted experts in the fields of
13
sociology and political science. Rather, our first task is
to discuss how to identify a religious belief system by
examining its role in the political socialization process.
It is important that we mention here again our recogni-
tion of the dynamics of function. That is to say, we recognize
what what we functionally identify as a religious belief
system at one point in time can functionally be identified
as something else (1) as the needs or context of the broader
system change or (2) if it is observed at a different point
in time. As an example of the former case, Figure 1 on the
following page contrasts contextual differences in the hier-
archial relationship of environmental factors which weigh
heavily upon the course chosen to attain politically correct
behavior--and therefore upon the selection of the functional
mechanism to transform environmental factors into a framework
suitable to generate politically correct ideas. "Political
Socialization Process I" is socialization in Maoist China
during the Cultural Revolution. Here tradition and traditional
values and relationships prescribe the nature of the belief
system. "Political Socialization Process II" can be likened
to any dictatorial regime where a combination of pure ideo-
logical and raw coercive approaches force correct ideas. The
same environmental factors exist in both cases, but the
nature of the functioning mechanism generating correct
political ideas differs because of the differing relative
importance or emphasis assigned to each factor.
In order to understand the concept of a functional
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS I
Environmental Factors Transforming Force Socialized Behavior
1. Need for mobilizer, in-
tegrator, legitimizer Hierarchial order of
Environmental Factors Politically correct2. Strong religious/ ggg40imply religious belief ideas
political tradition system exists
3. Interjection of new symbols
4. Eradication of competing
political dogmas, symbols,
institutions
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS II
Environmental 'Factors Transforming Force Socialized Behavior
1. Eradication of competing
political dogmas, sym-
bols, institutions- g ierarchial order of
2. Interjection of new symbols Environmental Factorsimply non-religious
3. Strong religious/political (ideological) belief
tradition system exists
4. Need for mobilizer, inte-
grator, legitimizer
Politcally correct
ideas
FIGURE I
IDENTIFYING BELIEF SYSTEMS
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Maoist religious belief system within the context of an ideo-
logically atheistic political system, it is important to
stratify contemporary Chinese society into three categories
or groups of its population. The first and, in terms of
numbers, the most significant group is the masses of Chinese
people themselves. We refer here to the workers, urban and
rural, who, although participants in the socio-political
system, do not significantly contribute to policy or ideologi-
cal directives. Members of this group can include both
party (CCP) and nonparty members. The next category consists
of artists, political officials, bureaucrats, and the like
responsible for interpreting and transmitting policy and
ideological directives based on their knowledge and under-
standing of social history and political culture. Again
this group can include both party and nonparty members. The
third and final group, which is by far the smallest of the
three, is composed of the policy-makers and direct influencers
of the policy-makers. We refer here to those select individuals
who assume primary responsibility for establishing policy
and ideological directives.
With this stratification of the society's population,
we can approach an understanding of the functioning of the
political system by examining the way the system functions
fo reach of these population categories. One method which
allows us to ascertain the functional relationships between
these three groups is the notion of input-output (see Figure 2).
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familiar to political theorists concerned with structural communi-
cation with a political system. Within the contempoary Chinese
context, however, the communication process functions somewhat
differently. What we see instead of the theorized flow is an
incomplete cycle of inputs and outputs, where policy and ideologi-
cal directives are not necessarily initiated as a result of
demands or responses emanating from the social-political masses
(Figure 3).
When we attempt to identify a functional Maoist, religious
belief system--referring now back to our discussion of the con-
text of a function in identifying that function--we must be
aware of both when and how a Maoist religious belief system
functioned within the socio-political structure of contemporary
China. We must also be aware of the popular affection for
Mao that existed in China during this period, Maoist ideology
was being interpreted, and therefore, received by the masses as
a religious belief system (see Figure 4 on the following page).
On the basis of this notion of communications--occurring
as they are described in Figure 4--as well as by our observa.-
tion of the relationship of religion and politics in traditional
China, it is conceivable that we might observe the co-existence
of a Maoist religious belief system functioning in the politi-
cal socialization process of China in the 1960's, with
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SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEM (CONTEMPORARY CHINA)
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anti-religious policy directives being issued by the CCP
leadership under the auspices of Mao.15 In other words,
our functional view of a Maoist religious belief system must
at one point focus on the numinous reponse of the population
to its perceptions of divinity. This dichotomy in contempor-
ary Maoism can be further explained as a continuation of the
historical dichotomy in that, traditionally, every Chinese,
whether official elite or popular peasant, must be recognized
as both Confucian and Taoist in religious disposition. The
existence of a functional Maoist religious belief system is
made even more likely when we examine the experiences and
activities identified with Mao himself. Beginning with the
Long March (1934), the cult of Mao grew steadily, and, not
coincidentally, reached its height during this period of
the Cultural Revolution. Let us now examine this portion of
the structure which became the Maoist religious belief
system.
Origins of the Maoist Religious Belief System
The foundation to the Maoist religious belief system we
observe in the 1960's had its origins long before the 1949
communist takeover. The first instance when we can observe
Mao being associated with those criteria for a religious
belief system established earlier in this chapter (i.e.,
ultimacy, orientations to life, and religious experiences) is
during the period of the Long March Chang Chen),l6 October
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1934 through October 1935. The Long March has been regarded,
by Chinese and non-Chinese alike, as an epic unequalled in
history. In fact, the Chinese, particularly under the
auspices of a cult of Mao established during the Cultural
Revolution, seem to have made the Long March into a "semi-
religious" experience, glorifying the leadership of Mao and
suggesting through personal testimony of Long March partici-
pants17 and media editorials that the March constitued a
near, if not actual miracle. In a book, written by Chen
Chang-feng, Mao's personal bodyguard throughout the Long
March, we find evidence of the Chinese attempts to elevate
the Long March to religious dimensions. Chen, in one passage,
recalls the march over Mount Linpan, which occurred just
as he was recovering from an attack of malaria.
The program began with the history of the origin
and nature of the family from cave men to capitalism
and went on to discuss the role of women under
capitalism. Mao spoke the first rule of the Red Army
with regard to women. . . . 'The Red Army soldier
does not rape women. . . . Rape is a counter-revolu-
tionary activity.'
Chen recalls:
As we neared the top, I couldn't go another step.
My head swam, my body seemed to float and I suddenly
collapsed in a heap.
I was vaguely aware of two large hands helping
me to my feet, and I heard Chairman Mao's kindly
voice say, 'Get the medical orderly to give him some
medicine in a hurry. His Malaria has come back.'
My heart sank. 'It's not malaria, Chairman,' I cried.
'It's just that I have no strength. I'm afraid I'll
never get to northern Shensi.'
'You will definitely. Don't worry,' the Chairman
said encouragingly. 'There's nothing frightening about
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difficulties. The only thing to worry about is being
afraid of them. They're pretty frightening if you
are. But they're not the least bit if you don't let
them scare you.' The Chairman's words gave me
confidence. . . .
'Are you cold?', the Chairman asked.
'Chilled to the bone.'
'Here, put this coat on and drink some more hot
water. . . .'
All he had on underneath was a grey cotton army
uniform. . . What's more, he had worked until very
late the night before and had marched for hours today
in the rain.
I pushed it back. 'I don't need it. I can march.'
I refused to put it on, and struggled to walk. . . .
I took one step and collapsed in a faint. When I
opened my eyes again, I was wearing the Chairman's
coat. The Chairman stood in the rain the autumn wind
ruffling his thin grey army tunic. . . .
Warmth flooded through me. My strength seemed to
return. I rose to my feet and stared at the Chairman.
My throat was constricted. . . .We camped in the village
at the foot of the mountain that night. I lay on my
bed, thinking of all that had happened that day. 'If
it weren't for the Chairman's care and encouragement, I
probably wouldhave died on Mount Liupan today,' I said
to myself. I thought and thought, and tears filled my
eyes. 'I'll never forget what the Chairman said,' I
vowed. 'No matter where or when, I'll remember
always.'18
What we observe at the end of Chen's narrative is a numinous
emotional response to a deified figure. It is the apparent
level of emotional response to Mao that indicates his trans-
cendence from just a concerned or benevolent political leader
to a deified figure in the eyes of Chen. Chen's intense
commitment (vowing always to remember the words of Chairman
Mao) goes beyond mere political commitment in this author's
opinion.
The statistics of the Long March are indeed over-
whelming:
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- Out of a total of 368 days en route, 235 were day
marches, and 18 night marches.
- Of the 100 days of halts, 56 were spent in north-
western Szechuan, leaving only 44 days of rest
over a distance of about 5,000 straight miles.
This averages out to about 1 stop for every 114
miles of marching.
- The mean daily march covered 24 miles.
- The Red Army crossed 18 mountain ranges (5 of which
were snow-capped); crossed 24 rivers; passed through
12 different provinces; occupied 62 cities; defeated
10 different provincial warlord armies (in addition
to the main Government forces under Chiang); and
crossed 6 aboriginal districts (many of which con-
tained tribes hostile to the han).1 9
However, our task here is not to argue whether the Long March
was or was not an outstanding event in world history. Com-
pared to the feats of Hannibal and his army or the Roman
army under Caesar, the heroism or achievements of Mao's Long
March appear only relative in the light of history. Yet, the
Chinese have elevated what was in effect a military retreat
to a religious crusade to rid China of the evil forces of the
Japanese invaders and the Kuomintang nationals.
Throughout the Long March, Mao conducted a daily study
session called "The March and Study Program." For these ses-
sions, he prepared an elementary course in Marxism to instruct
new peasant recruits who joined the March along the way. We
could argue here that Marxism was presented in the Study
Programs as an ultimate Utopia by a godlike figure, thus
raising the atheistic content of Marxism to a religious dimen-
sion. However, such an argument would involve an extensive
discussion of the ontological qualities of atheism and of the
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content and nature of Marxist thinking well beyond the scope
of this study. What is important to note of the Marxist orienta-
tion of the March and Study Program during the Long March is
that it provides a foundation for a functional use of Maoist/
Marxism 30 years later during the cultural revolution. We
maintain that any belief system, even an atheistic belief
system, can be utilized functionally as a religious belief
system in a society, regardless of content.
Mao, himself, summed up the significance of the Long
March as follows:
Speaking of the Long March, one may ask, 'What is
its significance?' We answer that the Long March is
the first of its kind in the annals of history, that
it is a manifesto. . . . It has proclaimed to the
world that the Red Army is a army of heroes, while
the imperialists and their running dogs, Chiang Kai-
shek and his like, are impotent. It has proclaimed
their utter failure to encircle, pursue, and ob-
struct and intercept us. The Long March is also a
propaganda force. It has announced to some 200
million people in eleven provinces that the road of
the Red Army is their only road to liberation. Without
the Long March, how could the broad masses have learned
so quickly about the existence of the great truth
which the Red Army embodies? The Long March is also
a seeding-machine. In the eleven provinces it has
sown many seeds which will sprout, leaf, blossom,
and bear fruit, and will yield a harvest in the
future.21
We find the next stage in the foundations of a Maoist
religious belief system observable during the Yenan period,
1937-1947. Mao regarded Yenan as China in microcosm
while he was there.22 Yenan was the training ground for the
future leaders and the laboratory of experimentation for the
ideals of the new Maoist social and spiritual order.
At the communist base in Yenan, Mao further developed
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the tenets of a belief system. Mark Selden describes the
theme of the period as the Yenan way:
. . . the Yenan way represents a distinctive
approach to economic development, social transforma-
tion, and people's war. Its characteristic features
included a heavy reliance on the creativity of the
Chinese people particularly the peasantry and a
faith in the ultimate triumph of man over nature,
poverty, and exploitation. . . . Underlying this
approach was a conception of human nature which held
that men, all men, could transcend the limitations
of class, experience, and ideology to act creatively
in building a new China.2 3
This approach described above had been implemented to such
a degree that by 1939, Snow observed after a visit in the
Yenan area:
The Yenan government had built up an intelligent
and prosperous community life. Free compulsory primary
education was introduced, and middle schools, technical
schools and colleges, including a College for Women,
were established. . . . There was a public health serv-
ice and several hospitals. There were many industrial
co-operatives and also some state-owned industries,
but private trade also flourished. Peasants in this
'Shen-Kan'Ning' region opened up over 600,000 acres of
new land and with government help tens of thousands of
refugees from occupied China were settled here. Opium
was extirpated. In the areas I saw prostitution and
child slavery were effectively prohibited, and there
were no beggars. The idle were put to work.24
While at the Yenan base, Mao drafted three articles most import-
ant in the recognition and understanding of a Maoist religious
belief system. The first, "In Memory of Norman Bethune,"
written in December, 1939, paid tribute to a Canadian doctor
who travelled to China, eventually settling in Yenan, to
assist the communist forces in their struggles against both
the Japanese and Kuomintang (KMT) forces. Dr. Bethune's
martyrdom highlighted the Maoist concept of selflessness:
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Comrade Bethune's spirit, his utter devotion to
others without any thought of self, was shown in his
boundless sense of responsibility in his work and
his boundless warm heartedness towards all comrades
and the people. . . . We must all learn the spirit
of absolute selflessness from him. With this spirit
every one can be very useful to the people. A man's
ability may be great or small, but if he has this
spirit, he is already noble-minded and pure, a man of
moral integrity and above vulgar interests, a man who
is of value to the people.2 5
This notion of absolute selflessness is no less apparent in
Christianity,
In September, 1944, Mao authored "Serve the People," an
article outlining the ultimate dedication of Chang Szu-teh,
an Eighth Route army member, to the people--to the point of
his death. The article not only reinforces the notion of
selflessness identified earlier, it also represents Mao's
attempts to conceptualize and evangelize eschatological
notions of the ultimate.
All must die, but death can vary in its signifi-
cance. The ancient Chinese writer Szu Ma Chien said,
'though death befalls all men alike, it may be
weightier than Mount Tai or lighter than a feather.'
To die for the people is weightier than Mount Tai,
but to work for the fascists and die for the exploiters
and oppressors is lighter than a feather. Comrade Chang
Szu-teh died for the people, and his death is indeed
weightier than Mount Tai.26
Again, we may note the similarities in Christianity--the notion
that the death of a Christian martyr has, throughout western
religious history, been perceived to be more meaningful than
that of ordinary men.
The last article, "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the
Mountains," was written in July, 1945. In this article Mao
presents the aims of the CCP:
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We must first raise the political ccnsciousness
of the vanguard so that, resolute and unafraid of
sacrifice, they will surmount every difficulty to
win victory. But this is not enough; we must also
arouse the political consciousness of the entire
people so that they may willingly and gladly fight
together with us for victory. We should fire the
whole people with the conviction that China belongs
. . . to the Chinese people. 2 7
We find further on in the article, as he relates the Chinese
fable of the Foolish Old Man, the notion of sacrifice to the
point of death, and purposeful death condoned by God, is
apparent:
The Foolish Old Man replied, 'When I die, my sons
will carry on; when they die, there will be my grand-
sons, and then their sons, and grandsons, as so on to
infinity. High as they are, the mountains cannot grow
any higher and with every bit we dig, they will be
that much lower'. . . Having refuted the Wise Old Man's
wrong view, he went on digging everyday, unshaken in
his conviction. God was moved by this, and he sent
down two angels, who carried the mountains away on their
backs. . . , We must persevere and work unceasingly,
and we, too, will touch God's heart.2 8
With regard to the significance of Yenan in the foundations of
a Maoist religious belief system, one author observed:
Chairman Mao observed that the key to survival, as
well as victory, lay in such spiritual qualities as in-
domitable human will personal dedication, self-sacri-
fice, and austerity.2 9
Although not directly related to our present discussion,
it is important to note here that the Yenan period also is
very significant because it was then that the Talks at the
Yenan Forum on Literature and Art were held. It will be use-
ful now to step aside from out path and point out a specific
direction of these talks which willbe discussed in detail in
Chapter VI. The Yenan Forum talks laid the foundations for
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what would become one of the principal mechanisms for politi-
cal socialization during the Cultural Revolution and after.
During the Yenan Forum, Mao presented a raison d'etre for
literature and the arts that went well beyond the groundwork
of the May Fourth movement.30 All art was to be for the people,
by the people and representative of the people's lives. This
latter point served as a basis for Mao's conclusions about
human nature:
Is there such a thing as human nature? Of course
there is. But there is only human nature in the con-
crete, no human nature in the abstract. In a class
society there is only human nature that bears the
stamp of a class. Human nature that transcends classes
does not exist. We uphold the human nature of the
proletariat and of the mass of the people. While the
landlord and bouregeois classes uphold the human nature
of their own classes as if . . . it were the only kind
of human nature . . . what they call human nature is
in substance nothing but bourgeois individualism, and
consequently in their eyes proletarian human nature is
contrary to their human nature. This is 'the theory
of human nature' advocated by some people in Yenan as
the so-called basis of their theory of art and litera-
ture. It is utterly mistaken.31
Mao sought to correct this theory of human nature and
thus the theory of art and literatuer with what he referred
to as "revolutionary realism" and "revolutionary romanticism."32
Combined, they equal revolutionary truth--that is, "life as
reflected in works of literature and art transcended to a
higher plane, more intense, more concentrated, more typical,
nearer the ideal, and thereforemore universal than actual
everyday life."33
First appearing during this Yenan period, the Yang-ko
or local folk songs and dances were the precusors of the
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modern revolutionary operas of the sixties, The Yang-ko
evidently became the mechanisms for experimental interpreta-
tions of revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism
for the peasant audiences. Of the significance of these songs
and dances, Edgar Snow writes, "From 1942, the symbol of
popular culture in the border region (of Yenan) became the
Yang-ko . . . which were redesigned and combined with dramatic
programs to propose social evils and to propagate the virtues
of the new society."34 The later revisions of Traditional
Peking Operas, which resulted in the model revolutionary operas
staged during the 1960's were perhaps based on these experimen-
tations of the Yenan period, With that point we can conclude
our brief diversion and return to the oirginal notions of the
Maoist religious belief system presented in this chapter.
What is of particular importance when reviewing the
period of the Long March and Yenan and its impact on the
origins of the Maoist religious belief system is the martial or
military context of the period, Throughout this period Mao was
continually involved in planning military strategems and
mobilizing the Chinese masses in military tactics against the
Kuomintang and the Japanese. One must then ask: What impact
on Maoism as a religion did its military origins have on its
content and functional character? The immediate response to
this question is that it had significant impact. At the level
of functional character military needs, and more specifically,
the strategic need for extensive popular participation in the
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rural areas, demanded that Mao integrate the various plural-
isms (both religious and non-religious) of China's rural
masses into a cohesive, effective, military force against his
domestic and national political enemies. Implicit in this
function is the notion of bureaucratic hierarchy. We find
such organizational structures both in a military and a
religious context. Bureaucratic hierarchy identifies the
leadership from the mass even in the case where the two groups
must function cooperatively as a whole. Thus integration
occurs around an established focal point with clear authority
patterns.
Whether one chooses the Crusades or the T'aiping rebel-
lion, as examples, the effectiveness of religion as a societal
integrator, which establishes a bureautic hierarchy, is appar-
ent. Functionally, religion also contributes significantly
to delineating clearly the virtuous self from the evil foe
and provides an intense emotional commitment (perhaps it could
be argued an intensity beyond that initiated by nationalism
or political ideology) based on sacred righteousness, to achieve
victory. Again historical examples, both Western and Chinese,
demonstrate the effectiveness of religion in this instance.
That the Maoist religious belief system originated in a mili-
tary context meant that functionally, and most critically,
its role was to integrate, mobilize and incite, rather than
to integrate and pacify the Chinese masses.
At the level of content, we can alsoseesignificant
influence of the military aspect on the Maoist religious belief
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system. In many cases, the discipline requirements between
religious belief and practice and military involvement are
similar. Consider the slogans: "soldiers of Christ," "Onward
Christian soldiers, march to victory" and the like, Most
critical to the discipline training in both religious belief
and military participation is a commitment to unqualified
self-sacrifice to the point of death. Every soldier is
disciplined to give up his life unflinchingly in combat to
contribute to defeat the foe. Similarly, training in most
religious belief systems dictates an individual commitment
to suffering and death to contribute to the defeat of the
evil forces. To combine these discipline training orientations
is to create a self-perceived invincible military force, which
believes that death does not constitute an end for the
believer but contributes to the eventual demise of the unsacred
enemy: thus the transition from hero to martyr, Because of
the military weak position of Mao and his forces during the
twelve-year period of the Long March and Yenan, the notion of
self-sacrifice and martyrdom was vital to any hopes for suc-
cess, In the major portion of Mao's writings and teachings
during this period self-sacrifice and martyrdom are emphasized.
In 1957, Mao wrote:
We the Chinese nation have the spirit to fight
the enemy to the last drop of our blood , ,
and in 1944:
This army has an indomitable spirit and is determ-
ined to vanquish all enemies and never to yield.
No matter what the difficulties and hardships, so
long as a single man remains, he will fight on. 36
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and, again in 1944, Mao wrote:
Wherever there is struggle there is sacrifice,
and death is a common occurrence. But we have the
interests of the people and the sufferings of the
great majority at heart, and when we die for the
people, it is a worthy death.37
What we see emerging during the period of the Long March
and Yenan are a series of themes which characterize the Maoist
religious belief system and seem to have their basis in the
military context of the period. The first and perhaps most
significant theme is one of suffering, self-sacrifice and
martyrdom discussed above. A second theme, also discussed
above and closely related to the first, is a sense of the
virtuous invincibility of self based on sacred righteouness
and the evil, destructable foe. Chinese accounts of the super
human feats of the Mao-led army during the Long March illustrate this
theme.38 The third theme we find arising from the warfare
content is one of comradeship, brotherly love and cooperation,
coupled with a structured organized hierarchy. With reference
to the need for comradeship and brotherly love, Mao wrote:
We hail from all corners of the country and have
joined together for a common revolutionary objective.
. . . Our cadres must show concern for every soldier,
and all people in the revolutionary ranks must care
for each other, must love and help each other. 39
The fourth and final religious theme encompasses the
elements of the orientations to lifeacriteria discussed
earlier in this chapter. The arduous military struggle for
the Mao-led communist forces took its toll on the standard of
living andbasic lifestyle in communist (Soviet) areas. All
resources had to be channeled to the war effort--a war effort
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whose end was not in sight. Individual perseverance and frugal-
ity were critical for survival of Mao's forces as a group.
In addition, to instill a sacred commitment to the ultimacy of
a Marxist Communist society, Mao's followers had to exemplify
correct communist behavior and its rewards in the same way
that a Christian exemplifies correct Christian living to
instill a sacred commitment to the ultimate rewards of Heaven.
Thus in the origins of the Maoist religious belief system we
see a thematic emphasis on a commitment to a severe, puritan-
ical life-style which included virtues of frugality, persever-
ance, diligence, humility and a ministerial vocation to spread
the "word" of Mao, through exemplary living. We see evidences
of this theme throughout Mao's writing of the period:
We must be modest and prudent, guard against arro-
gance and rashness, and serve the Chinese people
heart and soul. 40
If you become conceited, if you are not modest
and cease to exert yourselves, and if you do not
respect others . . . then you will cease to be
heroes and models. 41
It is not hard for one to do a bit of good. What
is hard is to do good all one's life and never do
anything bad, to act consistently in the interests
of the broad masses . . . and to engage in arduous
struggle for decades on end. That is the hardest
thing of all. 4 2
The origins of the Maoist religious belief system with
this military content had developed by the mid-1940's so that
we can construct rules for being a "good"communist which are
not too far removed from any rules for being a "good Christian":
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Ten Rules for Being a Good Communist 43
1. A communist . . . should be staunch and active,
looking upon the interests of revolution as his
very life and subordinating his personal inter-
ests to those of the revolution; always and
everywhere he should adhere to principle and
wage a tireless struggle against all incorrect
ideas and actions . . . he should be . . . more
concerned about others than about himself.
2. A communist must be ready at all times to stand
up for the truth.
3. A communist must be ready at all times to correct
their mistakes.
4. Selfishness, slacking, corruption, seeking the
limelight . . . are most contemptible . . . (a
communist) should have selflessness, working with
all one's energy (and) whole-hearted devotion to
public duty, and quiet hard work.
5. A communist should be the most far-sighted, the
most self-sacrificing, the most resolute and the
least prejudicial in sizing up situations.
6. A communist should set an example in study.
7. The exemplary vanguard role of the communist is of
vital importance. . . . A communist . . . should
set an example in fighting bravely, carrying out
orders, observing discipline, doing political
work and fostering internal unity and solidarity.
8. A communist must never be opinionated or domineering,
thinking that he is good in everything while others
are good in nothing; he must never . . . brag and
boast and lord it over others.
9. A communist must listen attentively to the views
of people outside the party and let them have their
say. If what they say is right, we ought to welcome
it, and we should learn from their strong points; if
it is wrong, we should let them finish what they
are saying and then patiently explain things to
them.
10. As for people who are politically backward, a commun-
ist should not slight or despise them, but should
befriend them, unite with them, convince them and
encourage them to go forward.
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The above ten points seem to represent an ascetic, almost
puritanical way of life expected of everyone calling himself
a communist in the 1940's. In 1941, Mao addressed an assembly
of representatives from the Shensi-Kausu-Ningsia Border Region
(Yenan) saying:
We communists are like seeds and the people are
like the soil. Wherever we go, we must unite with
the people, take root and blossom among them.44
In the New Testament we read of the parable of the seed
sower recounted by Jesus to a gatheringofpeople, and note
the parallel between a good communist and the Word of God:
A sower went out to sow his seed and, as he
sowed, some fell along the road . . . other seed
fell on the bedrock . . . (some) seed fell among
the thorns . . . (and still) other seed fell on the
good soil and grew up and yielded a hundredfold
. . . the seed is the Word of God . . . the seed in
the good soil (represents) those who listen to the
word and retain it in a vod and well-disposed heart
and steadily bear fruit.
During the twelve year period of the Long March and
Yenan, we also see the beginnings of the coalescence of the
historically conflicting strains of Confucianism and the more
popular traditional religions, such as Taoism, in these
initial stages of the Maoist religious belief system. That
is to say, we can observe the merger of the notions of
individual "goodness" as the basis for "societal goodness,"
respect for societal rules and laws of propriety (li), social
conformity, and model emulation which are prevalent in
Confucianism, with concepts of self-sacrifice, willpower,
and brotherhood allegiance (loyalty) which are found in
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traditional popular religion strains (particularly those asso-
ciated with religion-based secret societies), in the Maoist
doctrines formulated between 1934 and 1946. We will develop
this observation further in the chapter which follows.
Between 1947 and 1965, just prior to the Cultural Revo-
lution, Mao experienced a "seesaw" political career, while
attempting to stabilize the Community Party, and subsequently
a new People's Republic. During the early 1950's, emphasis was
placed upon economic stabilization and social reform. A new
marriage law was promulgated which equalized the relationship
bewteen men and women and land reform laws were adopted and
implemented. Communism and cooperation were introduced through-
out China. Maoist ideology vis-a-vis the Party was rectified
through a number of purges and campaigns. However, in 1956,
Maoism, as a socio-political ideology, came under sharp critic-
ism from literary circles as a response to Mao's solicitation
to "let a hundred flowers bloom." The party bureaucracy also
chose this time to suggest its disenchantment with the
thoughts of Mao by neglecting to include any references to
them in a Party statute drafted during that year. Mao shifted
his emphasis to discourses on contradictions among the people
in which he moralized about the continual conflict between
good and bad that results in contradictions, all necessary
for the continuiyt of life. In January, 1958, Mao resigned
at Chairman of the People's Republic, thereby relinquishing
his position of national political leader, or "Son of Heaven."
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The Great Leap Forward, launchedin 1958, proved itself
fo be a failure in both theory and practice by 1960. Mao
had envisioned a total nation self-sacrificing and arduously
working with only frugality as a reward, to catapult China to
economic and technological superiority. Such virtues had
been successfully fostered during the Long March and at Yenan.
Yet, now the nation was not so inspired. From the early 1960's
on, Mao's emphasis shifted to exposing and denouncing "revision-
ism"--reverting to the old ways, re-establishing old loyalties.
At the Tenth Plenum, held in September, 1962, Mao urged attacks
on revisionism on all fronts and a resumption of a class
struggle, under the auspices of the Socialist Education Move-
ment.4 6
Although China began a rapid economic stabilization
period from 1962 on, the groundwork for a Maoist belief system
which would lead China to a new social order and an ethereal
"Great Harmony," that had been previously established, now
seemed in jeopardy. The events, beginning in November, 1965,
would initiate a process of reversal.
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CHAPTER IV
THE MAOIST RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM: STRUCTURE
. . .considered in its essence and its principles,
communism as it exists, . . . is a complete system of
doctrine and life which claims to reveal to man the
meaning of his existence, to answer all the fundamental
questions which are set by life, and which manifests an
unequalled power of totalitarian inclusiveness. It is
a religion, and one of the most imperious quality:
certain that it is called to replace all other religions;
a religion of atheism, for which dialectic materialism
supplies the dogma, and of which communism as a rule
of life is the social and ethical expression. 1
Jacques Maritan
In our identification of the structure of a Maoist
religious belief system, we are initially concerned with the
framework of interrelationships of the parts or elements of
the whole. However, from a functional viewpoint, it is
important to first establish the context within which the
function occurs. We will therefore begin our discussion
here with a brief review of the political environment of
China during the first stages of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution (1965-1968).
The four years of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revo-
lution were a period of exaggerations in China, politically,
culturally and socially. These exaggerations brought certain
essential features of Maoism into focus. What had in the past
been implicit in the thoughts and teachings of Mao became
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explicit. Yet, however helpful these exaggerations of the
period are in focusing our observations and study of Maoism,
we do not see the Cultural Revolution as a "pure" ideo-relig-
ious experience. Rather, the Cultural Revolution had a
fundamental political-power-aggression-conflict dimension
totally "secular" in context. However, it is exactly this
"secular" political power struggle dimension that is import-
ant to review because it in some very basic ways colored and
shaped the manner in which Maoism functioned as a religious
belief system. In the previous chapter we saw how the
Chinese interpretations of the Long March as an extraordinary
event contributed a semi-military, warrior element to Maoism
in its functioning as a religious belief system. Here, we
wish to ascertain that the "secular" political power struggle
dimension of the Cultural Revolution introduced a sense of
intense, uninhibited "struggle" between "good" and "bad,"
between the "two lines" of contention. The ideological
struggles between "Red" and "expert" escalated or, were
escalated by youthful Red Guard and their supporters into
intense, exaggerated emotional battles between the "good"
Maoists and the "evil" Liu Shao Chi'ists. In addition, this
period of the Cultural Revolution is important in that we
find (we argue not so coincidently) an emergence of a cult
of Personality surrounding Mao which suggests divine quali-
ties to Mao outside of the realm of political leader, and,
consequently, provides foundation for Maoism to function as
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a religious belief system during the period. As we shall see
in the development of this chapter the Cultural Revolution dur-
ing which both the "secular" power struggle and the cult of
Mao with its suggested religiousness emerged introduced cer-
tain themes which shaped the Maoist religious belief system
and its function in the political socialization process of the
period.
After our review of certain key events of the Cultural
Revolution, we will proceed with a detailed identification of
the structure of the Maoist religious belief system during
this period. Finally, we will conclude this chapter with a
preliminary analysis of the function of the Maoist religious
belief system in the political socialization process during
the Cultural Revolution.
Events of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1965-1969
The history and events of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution have been reviewed by many writers.2 However,
for the purposes of our study here we will only briefly
refresh the reader's memories of the main events of the Cul-
tural Revolution and illustrate, where appropriate, the
influence or impact of the context of the Cultural Revolution
period on the functioning of the Maoist religious belief
system.
The extraordinary events of the Cultural Revolution were
coupled with amazing emotional outbursts from the population,
particularly the middle school through college aged youth.
Idealism and "revolutionary romanticism"3 prevailed. -The ram-
paging purges by the Red Guard, the frenzied worship of Mao,
the proselytizing attempts of pro-Maoists all contributed to
heightening emotionalism during the period. It is this
"exaggerated" emotionalism that has facilitated our identifi-
cation of the functional characteristics of the Maoist religious
belief system during the Cultural Revolution. We will expand
this discussion further on in this chapter.
Although it has been established4 that the organizational
beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution occur-
red at the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee in 1962 under
the guises of the Socialist Education Movement, the immediate
cause of the Cultural Revolution is attributed to an article
published in the Shanghai Wenhui pao on Novmeber 10, 1965
entitled, "On the New Historical Play Hai Jui Dismissed from
Office." The article was authored by Yao Wen-yuan, a Shang-
hai party member, perhaps with the help of Mao's fourth wife
Chiang Ching. During a working conference of the Central
Committee held in late September, Mao had called for a
criticism of the play Hai Jui Dismissed from Office, written
by the vice-Mayor of Peking, Wu Han. This action indicated
that the play represented an attack on Mao's dismissal of
PlengTeh-huai from his post as defense minister in 1959.
P'eng Chen, the Mayor and Party Secretary of Peking, led the
Peking Party Committee in refusing to launch a counterattack.
As a result of the events surrounding Yao's article, the
stage was set and the lines of conflict established for the
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ensuing battle between Mao and P'eng. It is important to note
here that the conflict surrounding the Hai Jui play was an
esoteric struggle between the ideologues, pro-Maoists, or as
we observe the "theologians" and the materialists, anti-Mao
pragmatists. Ostensibly the arguments appeared to engulf the
"correct" interpretations of Marxist-Leninist ideology. How-
ever, at a more fundamental level, the conflict surrounded
the dogmatic validity of Maoism and its subsequent functional
implementation within the socio-political environment of
the People's Republic. The next two significant events at
this stage of the Cultural Revolution further delineated
these fundamental antagonisms
On May 10, 1966, Yao published another article, this
time attacking Teng T'o, Peking Vice-Party Secretary and
suggesting a conspiracy between Wu Han, Ten T'o, P'eng Chen,
and others to undermine the revolutionary directives of Mao
by refusing to attack Wu Han's play. On May 16th, the
Central Committee, under the direction of Mao, issued a
circular to all Party organizations (even at the local, rural
level) criticizing P'eng Chen for his failure to maintain
control over his subordinates (Wu Han) and emphatically reit-
erating the need for revolution:
The whole Party must follow Comrade Mao Tse-tung's
instructions, hold high the great banner of the Pro-
letarian Cultural Revolution, thoroughly expose the
reactionary bourgeois stand of those so-called 'academic
authorities' who oppose the Party and socialism, thor-
oughly criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois
ideas in the sphere of . . . journalism, literature and
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art and publishing, and seize the leadership in these
cultural spheres. To achieve this, it is necessary
at the same time to criticise and repudiate those
representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked
into the Party, the Government, the army and all
spheres ofculture. . . Above all, we must not entrust
these people with the work of leading the Cultural
Revolution. (P'eng Chen headed a group of five respon-
sible for the Cultural Revolution.) In fact many of
them have done and are still doing such work and this
is extremely dangerous. 5
A week later, at Peking University, Nieh Yuan-tze, a philo-
sophy student, and six of her classmates posted a Big Character
Poster (Da zi Bao) attacking university officials
who had refused to allow debate either on the campus or in
classes, on the Wu Han play.
By 'guiding' the masses not to hold big meetings,
not to put up big character posters, and by creating
allkinds of Taboos, aren't you suppressing the
masses revolution, not allowing them to make revolu-
tion and opposing their revolution? We will never
permit you to do this!6
Nieh's attack took the struggle beyond the realm of political
power conflicts to a tension between students and faculty
and administration over correct versus corrupt leadership.
Although the conflict in this academic context was just as
"secular" as the political power struggle at the top, the
nature of the conflict introduced the notion of evil, corrupt
leadership at the popular (though still elite) level. This
spirit, as we shall see, sparked the religiously, revolu-
tionary zeal of the Red Guard to exorcise China of the evil
anti-Maoists.
Lu P'ing, the president of Peking University, Secretary
of the Party Committee on campus and principal antagonist
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named in the big character poster, organized a large number
of students to accuse Nieh and her comrades of being rene-
gades and counter-revolutionaries who had openly attacked
the CCP on campus. The accusers were in turn ostracized and
verbally attacked by students and faculty. Nieh's poster had
been published in the People's Daily and braodcast on Peking
Radio by June 2. On June 4th, an editorial in the People's
Daily announced that classes had been suspended at Peking Uni-
versity and that Lu P'ing had been removed from his position
as Party Committee Secretary to be replaced by a work team
directed by two party members from North China, to reorganize
the Peking Party Committee.
On the campus, students were forced to stay in their
rooms and study Liu Shao-chi's How to be a Good Communist.
All student demonstrations or rallying were forbidden and the
university was closed to all outsiders. This situation
continued until the end of July, when student groups at
Peking University, and middle schools and factories all over
China, began to organize themselves into Red Guard units
(Hong Wei Bing), identifiable by red bands worn around their
upper arm. These Red Guard youth assumed the responsibility
of studying and espousing the thoughts of Mao and furthering
the cause of the Cultural Revolution by any means necessary.
Local Re-d Guard units carried out investigations into the ideo-
logical inclinations and activities of their teachers and
local government officials--party and non-party alike.
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Collier, a first hand observer of much of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, concluded that "an important aspect of all this activity
was the erosion of the concept of the all-powerfulness and
sanctity of authority, so deeply established in Chinese
history."8  He goes on to observe that, "the slogan of the
day was 'It is justified to rebel!' which was closely related
to the slogan 'Serve the People!' and to the notion of "being
modest, dedicated to the common good and living a simple
life of hard struggle. "9
Mao convened the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee
of the CCP on July 2 3rd, during which he presented a direct-
ive (later known as the Sixteen Points) which outlines the
direction the Cultural Revolution was to take:
At present our objective is to struggle against
and overthrow those people in authority who are taking
the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the
reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the
ideology of theibourgeoisie and all other exploiting
classes, and to transform education, literature and
art and all other parts of the superstructure not in
correspondence with the socialist economic base so as
to facilitate the consolidation and development of a
socialist system. 10
On August 18th, a million Red Guard youth gathered in Tien
An-men Square to proclaim Mao as their leader and demonstrate
,support for the Sixteen Point directive of the Central Commit-
tee. Mao, in turn, dramatically displayed his support for
the Red Guard by donning a red armband inscribed "Hong Wei
Bing." Throughout 1966, the Red Guards swept over China
spreading Mao's Cultural Revolution, chiefly in the cities
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and by "dragging out"conservative (anti-Mao) Party officials.
The rampaging youth shook China with their Purification Cam-
paigns designed to rid China Of the evil demonic anti-Mao
forces. The campaigns surfaced under the guises of such
slogans as "sweep out the monsters and ghosts" (a very ether-
eal concept for a society supposedly so bound by materialist
Marxism); "Destroy the four olds" (old ideas, old culture, old
customs, and old habits); and "great exchanges of revolution-
ary experiences." The impact of the Red Guards was such that
by January, 1967 Mao was forced to call on the People's
Liberation Army (P,L,A.), headed by Lin Piao, to maintain
order. The PL,A. was instructed to avoid physical repres-
sion at all times and channel the energies of the youthful
Red Guard into study sessions on the thoughts of Mao and
the significance of revolution in contemporary China, but
this proved an impossible task for many months in many
locations. 11
The Wuhan Incident in July, 1967 climaxed the events of
the Cultural Revolution, and placed the contending forces on
the brink of civil war. The episode began when unrest broke
between youth and steel-workers pro-Mao and party officials
In the Wuhan steel mills. The former group organized them-
selves into two organizations called "the three steels"
and the "400,000 strong" and ideologically attacked the party
leaders at the mills. Ch'en Tsai-tao, the commander of Hunan
province military district, organized a rightist group, cal-
ling themselves 'The Million Heroes', and they, together with
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the local garrison, Independent Division-8201, physically
suppressed the pro-Mao group.
The Central Cultural Revolution Committee sent two of
thir public security ministers, Hsieh Fu-chih and Wang Li,
to Hupei to investigate the causes of the incident and quiet
the disturbances. The two ministers examined the details and
determined that Ch'en had erred in deploying local militia
to violently suppress the student/worker group. Ch'en had the
two committeemen arrested for being suspected of espionage and
detained incommunicado. When news of the arrest reached Peking,
Chou En-Lai was instructed to fly to Hupei to secure the
release of Hsieh and Wang, However, as his plane approached
the landing field in Hupei, Chou noted that the airfield was
surrounded by troops of "Million Heroes" and local militia
armed with tanks and automatic weapons. Chou ordered that
his plane be rerouted. He gathered troops, including a naval
unit dispatched up the Yangtze and parachute troops airlifted
to Haukow, Wuchang, and Hanyang, and marched by land towards
Hupei,
Chlen, realizing the odds were not in his favor, released
Hsieh and Wang and surrendered himself to Chou before any
serious fighting broke out. Ch'en was immediately escorted
to Peking for re-education. It is fairly probable that, if
fighting had erupted in Hupei, escalation would have been
inevitable and the Cultural Revolution would have abruptly
become a violent civil war, fought primarily by China's youth.
The Wuhan Incident added a significant eschatological
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dimension to the ensuing Maoist religious belief system. What
was critical was not just the imminent threat of escalation
to a civil war, but that the civil war would be within and
between the Communist forces. Such a violent internal erup-
tion would have been unthinkable in Marxist and Maoist think-
ing. The threat of such a cataclysm introduced an apocalyp-
tic element to the Maoist religious belief system. There was
an urgency that Maoist inspired virtue prevail to prevent an
immense "blow up" the aftermath of which would be unfathomable.
In late Fall of 1967, Mao began to seriously question
his activities and 'ideological purity' of his Red Guard, so
much so that one morning at three o'clock,he summoned five
Red Guard representatives to his residence and reprimanded
them for disunity in their actions and "failure to measure
up to his 'revolutionary standards.'" 12 "You have let me
down," he reportedly criticized, "And, what is more, you
have disappointed theaworkers, peasants and soldiers of
China ,13 Mao's reversal of his previous uncompromising sup-
port of the Red Guards was directly related to the seemingly
uncontrollable and, most important violent frenzy of Red
Guard activities throughout China. His proselytizing
disciples had taken China to the verge of anarchy in one
short year, precipitated by the attack on the corrupt
Party leadership. From Mao's perspective, revolution would
eventually bring abouthis ideal utopia anarchy would not.
His only option was to disclaim the young demon-purgers
as demons in their own right. Mao issued a directive
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authorizing the Army to suppress Red Guard 'Rebels' (physic-
ally if necessary) 4 and survey and control the hanging of
posters and Red Guard publications.15 In addition, Red Guard
youth were dispatched to the countryside "to learn from the
peasants." Their lessons were to consist of hard work,
frugality, simplicity of life and all the virtues derived
from an arduous life style. By December an estimated
3,190,000 students and youth had been sent to the country-
side for re-education. The fighting and ideological clashes
between pro- and anti-Mao groups lulled during the winter of
1967 and early spring of the following year. However, by
summer, 1968, fighting and violent ideological clashes
between rampaging Red Guard units and workers, local officials
and peasants had again escalated in some areas. One report
of unrest in Canton reads:
The chaos in the city was reported to have been
caused mainly by 3,000 Red Guards who under pretext
of hunting "counter-revolutionaries" were terrorizing
the inhabitants, and by 10,000 youth who had swarmed
into the city after being sent to work on farms and
supported themselves by robbery. Clashes between
northern and southern Red Guard organizations and
between Red Guards and workers--particularly the rail-
way and transport workers--added to the confusion. About
100 people were reported to have been killed and 1000
injured in fighting between Red Guards and railwaymen
16
on July 26. . ,
During August, 1968, "Mao-Tse-tung's Thought Propaganda
Teams," consisting of PLA members, workers and peasants were
set up and immediately sent into the universities and middle
schools to curb ultra-leftismaiamong students and faculty.
Throughout China, all attempts were being made, per Mao's
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orders, to reverse Mao's revolutionary struggle that had been
carried on by the Red Guard.
By October, 1968, the Red Guards had been broken up or,
at the very least, were being controlled and delimited by
the intervening P.L.A. Revolutionary Committees were estab-
lished in all provinces and the Revolutionary Committees were
established in all provinces and the Cultural Revolution
seemed to be at an end. These commitees (triple alliances)
were made up by selected representatives from the Revolution-
ary Rebels (reeducated Red Guards), Revolutionary cadres
(former Party members who had been purged, "remoulded" and,
as a result espoused their devotion of Mao), and P.L.A.
(People's Liberation Army) representatives. Their purpose
was to bring together the contending forces (Party, students
and army) and thus create an organization equilibrium that
would continue the cultural revolution at the local level
but in a totally controlled and non-violent format.
The Ninth National Congress of the Chinese National
Communist Party was convened in Peking on April 1, 1969 to
formally announce the conclusion of the "successful" Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution. A new Constitution of the
CCP, adopted by the Ninth Congres contained a statement
which justified the Cultural revolution and re-established
the priorities for post-1969 China: "It is essential to
create a political situation in which there are both central-
ism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity
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of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness."17
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has been called
everything from a power struggle to a civil war. However, what
is most impressive to us is the overt attempt to deify Mao
Tse-tung during the four year struggle, in a personality cult
and, more particularly, the emergence of a Maoist functionary
as a religious belief system serving as a basis for the poli-
tical socialization process during this period. We are
concerned here with how the "secular" transcends to or can
influence the "sacred." We have described the Cultural
Revolution as a political-power-aggressor struggle. Yet the
dynamics of this struggle observably influenced the structural-
functional characteristics of the Maoist religious belief
system. It reinforced the themes of self-sacrifice, martyr-
dom and personal virtue originated during the period of the
Long March and Yenan and, particularly under the auspices of
the cult of Mao, introduced new (additional) thematic relig-
ious variations to the Maoist religious belief system. We
will examine these Cultural Revolution generated thematic
variations more closely as we turn our attention here to the
structure of the Maoist Religious belief system as it developed
during the years 1965-1969.
The Structure of the!Maoist Religious Belief System
In our review of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolu-
tion we identify six themes which were most important in
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shaping Maoism as a functioning religious belief system.
These are: 1) "Miracles" attributed to Mao during the
period, These "miracles" range from Mao's 9 (nine) mile
swim of the Yangtze River at age 72 to "secondary healings" 18
such as that of the removal of the "45 Kg. tumor" recounted in
Chinese media sources during the period; 2) faith in the
power of Mao's thoughts and their ability to give supreme
strength to the believer and to reverse natural or man-made
calamities; 3) the need to preach (as disciples) Mao's
thoughts; and 4) to bring about confession and conversion of
non-believers; 5) the necessity for self-sacrifice and
martyrdom as a demonstration of belief in Mao's thoughts;
and 6) the infallibility of Mao's thoughts and the belief
that nothing is impossible. These themes come out of a
"secular" context of Mao's interpretations of Marxist revo-
lutionary struggle. Yet, their nature, particularly their
functional nature, is, in most cases, "spiritual" or beyond
the realm of human capability.
We will look more closely at each of these themes, as
well as examining how these themes (and those identified in
the previous chapter) fit into the broader functional struc-
ture of the Maoist religious belief system. This latter
discussion will focus on our three analytical criteria for
identifying religious belief systems functionally (eschatol-
ogy, orientations to life, and religious experiences).
However, as we indicated in the previous section, the themes
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emanating from the periodof the Cultural Revolution are most
observable under the auspices of the cult of personality
surrounding Mao. We will briefly turn our attention here
to an examination of the cult of Mao and its influence or
contributions to the "deification" of Mao and consequently
the functionally religious character of the Maoist belief
system.
The Personality Cult of Mao Tse-tung:
Milton Yinger defines a cult as "the purely personal,
non-institutionalized religious experience of a group of
people tied together only by common religious emotions and
needs." 1 9 This definition provides a fairly accurate
description of the cult of personality of Mao Tse-tung
which reached its height during the period of the cultural
revolution. We cannot and do not claim that "religious
emotions and needs" were the only thread that bound the
Chinese people during the Cultural Revolution. Nationalism,
cultural traditions, societal norms, and political events
(all admittedly secular) functioned similarly during the
period. However, what is important here is the cult and
its functional significance for an understanding of the
socio-political environment of the Cultural Revolution.
Although only vague remnants of the cult remain, in
post-Mao China today,20 there is no doubt that it did exist.
Mao, himself, in an interview with Edgar Snow, acknowledged
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the existence of a cult glorifying his person. Mao is
quoted as speculating that "Probably Mr. Khrushchev fell
because he had no cult of personality at all."21 Whether
Mao was intimating that Khruschev failed to elicit a
"religiously" emotional commitment from his Soviet popula-
tion or not is not pertinent to our discussion, although such
a speculation is plausible and interesting from the analytical
level of Chinese perception of the Soviet Union. What is
clear and germane to our discussion is the fact that Mao
both recognized the existence of a cult of personality sur-
rounding his person and its critical significance in main-
taining political efficacy and legitimacy.
The ground was seemingly set for a cult idealizing Mao
in the early 1960's, before the outbreak of the Cultural
Revolution with such publications as Lei Feng's Diary (1963)
in which we read.
November 8,1960
This is a day I shall never forget, the day on which I
gloriously joined the great Chinese Communist Party, the
fulfillment of my loftiest ideal.
My excited heart could not calm down for a single
moment. . . . Our wise Chairman Mao! Only when we have
you can we have a new life. When I struggled for my
life in the abyss of fire, I hoped for enlightenment.
It was you who saved me, who gave me what I eat and what
I wear, who sent me to school, who trained me to be
worthy of the red emblem. . . . 22
However, the sentiments expressed in this passage were not
shared by Mao's followers, particularly the youth, until
1966, when an official cult of Mao was recognized by those
both inside and outside China.
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What is important about the cult of Mao during this period
is its impact on the masses of Chinese people, during a period
of tumult and chaos. The cult seemed to mobilize the masses
to accomplish amazing feats in the name of Mao, In addition,
as Yinger's definition suggests, it unified Mao's followers
in attitude and in spirit. Lucian Pye observes: "On the
surface the cult of Mao's personality seemed to be all-
pervasive, Everywhere he was being extolled, and the power of
his thoughts was associated with all manner of achievements,
from the raising of better watermelons to the winning of
table tennis matches,"23 Another author described the cult of
Mao thusly; "to read him (Mao's thoughts) brought illumina-
tion, to see him was a joy, to speak to him transfigured one:
love for Chairman Mao was deeper than love for one's father
and mother. . , ."24
In July, 1966, Mao, whether knowingly or unknowingly
significantly contributed to the glorification of his name
and allusions to his superhuman powers with a spectacular
nine mile swim across the Yangtze River. At 72 years of age,
such a feat for a non-professional, non-active swimmer would
certainly imply superhuman powers for many traditional
animistic and mysticial Chinese population. The swim
received extensive press and television coverage, as did the
5,000 Red Guard youth who accompanied Mao to the shores of
the Yangtze cheering him on with banners proclaiming him
"the only Sun in Our Hearts." Mao, having fallen from the
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public eye, while in "retreat" in Wuhan, returned to Peking
triumphantly after his swim to lead his forces in the
Cultural Revolution. Passages from another diary published
in Peking Review in 1968 demonstrate the evolution of the
cult two years after the Yangtze swim:
Always think of Chairman Mao, obey him under all
circumstances, closely follow him at all times and do
everything for his sake, Great as are the heavens and
earth, what we owe to Chairman Mao is greater, Dear as
are father and mother, Chairman Mao is dearer. Without
Chairman Mao I wouldn't be alive today. Without
Chairman Mao, there would be no emancipation for all
the working people. 25
It is interesting to note here two separate instances where
respect and love for Mao, as a supreme being, was to super-
sede respect and love for one's parents. This dogma is not
alien to that found in Taoist influenced secret societies where
brotherhood within the society was to supersede family ties.
The sequel to this dogma is also found in most Western
Christian religions where one is admonished to respect one's
parents but to love God and place this loyalty above all.
At the height of the cult, the religious superhumanness
of Mao was further affirmed when thousands of high school
and college Red Guard broke into the Roman Catholic Church
building in Peking and tore the crucifix from the altar,
replacing it with a plaster bust of Mao.26 From one perspec-
tive, this act could be seen as a "secular" iconoclastic
(antiereligious) attack on Catholicism by these Red Guard
Youth, However, from our perspective, we observe this to be
1) an indication of the intensity of emotion (perception) of
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the cult of]Mao and 2) an outward display (respQnse) of
an attempt to "deify"--replace a symbol of one god with a
symbol of another. From this perspective, the impact as well
as religious symbolism of the cult of Mao on these youth is
clear.
The little red book, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-
tung,also contributed greatly to the cult of Mao during the
Cultural Revolution years. It was reported that in an
eleven month period from January to November,1968, seven
hundred forty million volumes of the little red book were
printed and distributed in the Chinese population.27 The
book was presented as, and was perceived to contain, the
ultimate truths and the keys for life, All Chinese were
expected to read selections daily from the book. In addi-
tion, it was to be referred to and, Mao's instructions fol-
lowed in time of need:
We must study Chairman Mao's words every day. If
we miss one day problems will pile up. Let two days
pass, and we start slipping backwards. Three days
make it impossible for life.28
The little red book containing Mao's thoughts seems to
have been perceived and used as a spiritual and technical
reference source in all manner of life's problems from
surgical removal of a tumor to numbing one's senses to the
continual irritation of inhaling "cow-dung." 29 Further, it
became the symbolic representation of Mao's spiritual
infallibility which nurtured the following conviction:
. My aim in life is to apply Mao Tse-tung's thought,
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and in death, too, I will die for Mao Tse-tung's thought. "30
In its simplest structural form a religious system
should, at the very least, consist of, a doctrine or set of
principles which address eschatological matters and provide
orientations to life, have a following or group of believers
who place their faith in the truth and legitimacy of the
doctrine, and commit themselves to the ultimacy of the
belief system. That is to say, without believers there can
be no belief system, or, as observed by Carl Gustav Jung,
religiousness is a "peculiar attitude of the human mind."31
We might expand on Jung's observation by saying that the
peculiar attitude takes man beyond the realm of himself
and yet, in some way, attempts to define and conceptualize
humanity. During the period of the Cultural Revolution in
China there is an observable religious belief system emerg-
ing and cult of believers surrounding the person of Mao, as
indicated above,
Although we have focused much of our attention on the
structural elements of a Maoist religious belief system, we
feel it useful here to momentarily examine the content of
the Maoist Religious belief system, particularly vis-a-vis
an expanded discussion of the themes we have identified
above within the framework of the Maoist religious belief
system and, secondarily the identification criteria intro-
duced in our initial focus on the term religious.
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The Content of the Maoist Religious Belief System During
the Cultural Revolution
As we have indicated at various points previously, the
thematic content of the Maoist religious belief system was
influenced or determined by the contexts of the evolution of
Maoist Chinese communism from at least the period of the Long
March to the events leading to and during the Cultural Revolu-
tion. A review of these themes will provide a basis for
increased understanding of the nature and function of the
Maoist religious belief systemiin the political socialization
process during the Cultural Revolution.
Taking into consideration the overlap found in the
thematic variations introduced,;above, we have arrived at a final
count of five thematic categories found in the Maoist religious
belief system, which incorporate all the themes mentioned in
this and the previous chapter. We will briefly explore
each of these categories below,
Theme One:- Miracles
We use the term miracles here to mean superhuman acts
or events which go beyond the realm of current scientific
knowledge and logic and which can be performed only by divine
figures or under the auspices of a divinity.
Throughout the period of the Cultural Revolution the
Chinese media was inundated with personal accounts of people
who had experienced or observed "miracles" attributable to Mao
or, more frequently his thoughts or images. These media
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accounts furthered the cult of Mao significantly. As an ex-
ample of the genre of these personal accounts we refer to a
New China News Agency (NCNA) report, published in 1969,
in which we read where a worker in a farm tools plant suffered
an injury which severed his right arm near the shoulder. The
amputated section of right arm was additionally severed in
two sections only held together by fragments of skin. The
worker was rushed to the hospital where surgeons were "determ-
ined to rejoin his severed arm and restore its functions by
relying on invincible Mao Tse-tung thought."32 In the media
account of the sugery, the first operation joining the upper
arm section to the shoulder proceeded well. However, the
forearm sections presented a problem. The sections had
remained in an "unreviewed" state for eight hours, two hours
longer than Chinese medical sources indicated as critical for
successful reviving and rejoining.-of severed limbs. The surgery
team proceeded reportedly asserting that "men armed with Mao
Tse-tung thought can work miracles."33 The worker's arm was
successfully resoterd such that five months later, after
therapy again directed by Mao Tse-tung thoughts, he wrote
with his restored arm "Chairman Mao has given me a second
right hand."
It is apparent that by media accounts such as the one
cited above, Mao Tse-tunq and his thoughts were elevated to a
position above the realm of man. The references to the
"miracle" of the surgery, explicitly by the surgery team and
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implicitly by the worker, indicates perceptions of Mao as a
suprahuman, divine being.
Theme Two; Faith (in the Power and Infallibility of Mao Tse-tung
Thought
In the author's opinion, faith is a complex, multi-dimen-
sional concept. Its definition--an unquestioning belief in the
existence of and power of the "unknown," the "sacred" or the
"suprahuman"--is found6d in religious thinking. Yet, one cannot
simply offer such a description without including a focus on
the function of faith as an interpretative connector between
the believer and the believed. By interpretive connector we mean
a link which is predetermined, and therefore biased by man's
perceptions of the unknown, sacred or divine and through
which all of man's information and feeling about the divine
are passed. Within this function is implied a loyalty and
trust granted uncompromisingly once belief has been established.
There is also an observable feeling of invincibility generated
by the believer's faith in the power of the unknown, divine
force.
Throughout the period of the Cultural Revolution we observe
a faith in the power and infallibility of Mao Tse-tung thought
which is unquestioning and uncompromising. We also observe
in the "believers" a feeling of invincibility when armed with
Mao Tse-tung thought. Again, we find instances of this theme
throughout the official media releases during the period. For
example, a 1966 NCNA article which attributes the invincibility
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of the CHinese table tennis team to an application of Mao Tse-
tung thought to their match competitions.34 And throughout
1969 reports flourished citing how faith in Mao Tse-tung
35 36thoughts brought bumper crops, conquered cancer, protected
capsized fishermen from a raging storm37 and so on. In all
instances, victories or successes are attributed to the power
of Mao Tse-tung thought. One is reminded of the popularized
Taoist belief in magic found in traditional China. The next
three thematic categories establish who the Maoist believers
are and how they live their lives in accordance with the Maoist
religious belief system.
Theme Three:- The Virtuous Life of a Maoist
As we have seen previously, the true Maoist was expected
to lead an exemplary life which would serve as a model for
"would be" Maoists. Again we find a continuity from traditional
China where the Confucian ethic demanded that one live one's
life as a model for others to emulate. The specific thematic
virtues (most of which were founded in the military context
of the origins of the Maoist religious belief system as we
introduced in the previous chapter) are 1) frugality; 2) per-
severance; 3) diligence; 4) humility; 5) brotherly (class)
love; 6) ministerial vocation;and 7) selflessness. Also
included in the Maoist virtuous life style were the themes
of self-criticism and confession and, most important 6f all,
the themes, self-sacrifice and martyrdom. These latter themes
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will be addressed further on as separate thematic categories.
On the surface, these virtues do not appear to be
"religious" as such. However, that same could be said of the
virtues typifying good Christian living. The similarities
between the two virtuous life styles (Maoist and Christian)
should be apparent to the reader. What in fact makes each
of these virtuous life styles religious rather than ethical
social codes, is that in each case the virtuous life style
is expected to somehow link the believer to his perception
of the "unknown" or "sacred." In the Christian context, a
virtuous life style emulates Christ's life and allows the
Christian to identify with the Christ/God figure. This life
style is rewarded by the believer joining God in heaven after
death. In the Maoist context, a virtuous life links one with
the thoughts of Mao (which as we have previously established
were perceived as "suprahuman" with powers outside the realm
of man's capabilities)and identifies one as a follower of Mao.
Further, the Maoist virtuous life style made on a contributor
to the eventual "ultimacy" of Mao's Great Harmony, a state
which, though admittedly secular, envisions a heaven-like equili-
brium and tranquility on earth. What we are saying then is
that the sub-themes within the virtuous life style of the
Maoist religious belief system are religious in that there
is a perceived link with the "sacred" Maoist thoughts, and
as we can see below, with Mao himself. We cite as an
example of the themes within this category an account published
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in NCNA of a committee member who, after one late evening
meeting, was offered a ride to his home sothat he could rest
for the following day's manual labor he would perform. Refusing
the ride, he said, "Chairman Mao wore straw sandals when he led
the people of the Chingkang Mountains in crossing mountains
and rivers (the Long March) to make revolution. Following
Chairman Mao, we should travel on foot to break a path and
create a Red new world."38 In this passage we find the virtues
of frugality, diligence and humility and indications that
there is a perceived link with the mental image of Chairman
Mao on the Long March.
We have seen earlier in this chapter how the Red Guard
youths during the Cultural Revolution, perceiving themselves
as Mao's disciples, scoured China preaching the thoughts of
Mao. This theme of ministerial vocation had its roots in
Yenan and flowered during the period of the Cultural Revolu-
tion. In addition to the activities of the Red Guard, all true
Maoists were expected to "preach" the teachings and thoughts
of Mao at every opportunity. Again in the media we see where
nine year olders were sent into the fields to recite Mao's
thoughts to the farm laborers.39 In addition we hear
stories of "story tellers" who create revolutionary stories
based on their "ardent love for Chairman Mao, (and) Mao
Tse-tung thought and travel throughout China proselytizing
Maoism. One such preacher/storyteller reported that he had
153
"told revolutionary stories on some 820 occasions within a
few months to a total of more than 180,000 people."40 one
can ask how does "storytelling" enter the realm of the
religious and sacred. In the case of the "storytellers" during
the Cultural Revolution, the source for the stories was Mao
Tse-tung thought which, as we have established at various
points now throughout this chapter, as a direct result of
the cult of Mao, was perceived as suprahuman, invincible,
miraculous and therefore, we maintain, "sacred" or "religious."
Therefore the "storytellers" though "secular" performed the
religious function of a preacher. Our next thematic category
explores some of what the "storyteller/preacher" and the
Red Guard "disciples" preached in their "missionary"activities
during the Cultural Revolution.
Theme Four Confession and Conversion
The themes of confession and conversion were perhaps the
most pronounced of all the themes emerging from the period
of the Culutral Revolution. The term confession, where
applied to a religious context, can be defined as either a
profession of faith or an admission of guilt, sin, or wrong-
doing. During the Cultural Revolution, self-criticism functioned
synonomously primarily with the latter understanding of con-
fession, although, in some cases, the self-criticism included
or was followed by a profession of faith in the thoughts of
Mao. Most illustrative of the nature and function of self-
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criticism as a confession of wrongdoing was an article pub-
lished in Peking Review in 1968 at the height of the Cultural
Revolution. We read of a young woman who describes self-
criticism sessions conducted by her family and the impact
of these sessions on the individual. She first confesses her
wrongdoing (being inconsiderable and selfish in not participat-
ing in household chores to help her mother-in-law):
Mother, I really have been doing too little housework.
I knew you were annoyed, but I thought . . . I've
been working in the daytime and going to meetings
or doing propaganda work at night. I get all tired
out, but when I come back I have to face your
unhappy looks. Sometimes, I thought: We might as
well call it quits.. . . . Of course, this way of
thinking was wrong. Chairman Mao teaches us . . .
"UTTER DEVOTION TO OTHERS 'WITHOUT ANY THOUGHTS OF
SELF." But I didn't do that . . . I thought of myself
before thinking of others. 41
The article continues with similar self-criticisms by other
family members. The article then concludes with the young
woman's assessment of the experience of a self-criticism
session:
This is an instance of how my family regularly airs
thoughtsof self-interest and fights against them.
Sometimes such revelations and criticisms make one
blush with shame. I think this is what is called
touching one's soul. 42
Initially, this account of a self-criticism session does not
remind one of a religious confession. However, when the young
woman admits that this wrongdoing is contrary to the teachings
of Mao and then likens the session to "touching one's soul"
the session leaves the realm of the secular and must be re-
garded as an experience of "religious" confession.
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The theme of conversion can be treated similarly. The "re-
education" of purged anti-Maoists can easily be likened to
the "religious" conversion to a faithful believer. Although,
the concept of "re-education" as it was applied during the
Cultural Revolution might be regarded as a type of "brainwash-
ing" in the sense that the person being "re-educated" had to
relinquish old loyalty-trust patterns that were seen as tradi-
tional or bourgeois, the re-educated person had to espouse
Maoism with the total commitment of any religious convert.
Theme Five: Suffering, Self-Sacrifice and Martyrdom
This final thematic category was perhaps the most critical
underlying current of the Maoist religious belief system during
the Cultural Revolution. As we introduced in the previous
chapter, the military context of the Long March and Yenan neces-
sitated a commitment to suffering, self-sacrifice and martyrdom
by Mao's followers in order to move toward military victory
over the KMT and the Japanese forces. When the Maoist relig-
ious belief system emerged during the Cultural Revolution
these themes were not only still evident but seemed to rest
at the core of Maoist thought. Mao continually stressed the
importance of continuous struggle and revolutionary change
in the progression toward the true Maoist state. The primary
functional role of the Maoist religious belief system was to
facilitate and instill this commitment to struggle at the
popular level. To be a good Maoist was to suffer. To be a
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good Maoist was to self-sacrifice. To be a good Maoist was
to die for Maoism and the people. Throughout the period of
the Cultural Revolution the Chinese media was inundated with
accounts of martyred heroes who willingly laid down their
lives--not necessarily in the grandeur of battle but on a
commune while trying to save three of twenty-nine sheep buried
43
in a cave by torrential rain or in floodwaters from the
Shuang River while trying to save state materials.44 We
read of four such martyrs:
. . . Four of our comrades-in-arms gloriously gave
their lives in the struggle against the almost non-
stop series of rock-falls. In the blood-stained
pocket of hero Lin Kuo-lu, inside a copy of Quotations
From Chairman Mao Tse-tung was a piece of paper--
inserted as a bookmark--before the chapter "Dare to
Struggle and Dare to Win." . . . written on the paper
were the words: "THE SACRIFICE OF THE FEW IS THE
COST OF HAPPINESS FOR THE MANY." These moving words
voiced the common feeling deep in the hearts of all
the martyrs who were determined to live and die for
the people. 45
Articles such as the one cited above indicate the significance
and emphasis placed on martyrdom. However, most significant
is the inference of the inspirational influence of the thoughts
of Mao on the martyr. There are no explicit references to the
religious or sacred in this martyr's account yet the innuendo
is there. One is reminded of the Christian martyr clutching
the Bible as he unflinchingly meets his death. Clearly this
view is from a Western perspective. But, from the Chinese
perspective if one recalls the "spiritual," "superhuman,"
"mystical" quality given Mao's thoughts, particularly during
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the Cultural Revolution the notion of "religiosity" is there.
All of the themes discussed above constitute the content
of the Maoist religious belief system. As can be seen some
themes are more "religious" in nature than others which are
perhaps at some level more philosophical or secular. However,
brought together in a doctrine of thoughts which are perceived
to have powers beyond man's capabilities (e.g., in defying
medical laws, etc.) these themes seem to constitute a system
of religious beliefs. This "religiosity"of the Maoist belief
system will become even more apparent as we further examine
the belief system in terms of our functional criteria intro-
duced earlier.
Functional Criteria and the Maoist Religious Belief System
We have identified thematic categories and specific
themes which we see as prevalent in the Maoist religious
belief system during the Cultural Revolution. Now we must
briefly examine how these themes fit our functional criteria
for identifying a religious belief system. In content there is
a "religiousness" to them. But we are more concerned here
with the extent to which they function "as a religion" societ-
ally.
Criterion One: Eschatological Questions
Eschatology has been defined as the "views which men (hold)
regarding the future, including such matters as the state of
the individual after life (or the meaning of death), . . .
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the end of the world; and the new heaven and new earth which
are expected to follow." 46 The Maoist religious belief
system places much emphasis on these ultimate, eschatological
questions. With regard to the future, Maoism prophesies a
future of "incomparable brightness and splendor"--a "supreme
ideal" 47in this word, a "heavenlike" socialist state where "the Great
Harmony" 48 prevails. We read in the little red book:
The socialist system will eventually replace the
capitalist system; this is an objective law independent
of man's will. 49
That the eventual ultimacy of the socialist state is "independ-
ent of man's will" places it above the realm of man with
inferences to objective laws (of nature) which are controlled
both in traditional Chinese religious thinking (Taoism) and
some Western religious thinking by a suprahuman (Heaven)
power. Socialism, with its egalitarianism, classless, unbiased
brotherly love, etc., is a new Heaven of sorts, though on earth.
It is a secular concept which has religious overtones.
Functionally, it facilitates political learning of
political participation in national development, to infer
that the entire nation can be transformed into a Heaven on
earth. It instills a "religious" response on the part of the
population to achieve that ultimacy--a commitment to the
death. The theme of suffering, self-sacrifice and martyrdom
is important here. To achieve the ultimacy of the socialist
state suffering and martyrdom is needed and expected. As
we mentioned earlier, Mao foresaw the need for continual
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revolutionary struggle in order to achieve socialism. Revolu-
tionary struggle means suffering, self-sacrifice and death.
Through the thoughts of Mao, particularly two of the three
"constantly read articles" (Serve the People and Comrade
Bethuen . . .')50, the theme that would engender a "religious"
response to suffering and death were instilled in the popula-
tion through their daily reading of the little red book.
One could say that at some level, the purpose of the Cultural
Revolution (apart from the "secular" power struggles) was to
instill a religious commitment in the population to suffering
and martyrdom for the sake of Mao's visions of socialism.
Criterion Two: Morals, Values, Orientations to Life
In our use of the termsinorals, values and orientations
to life, it is important to restate that we recognize a
distinction between the philosophical and religious connota-
tions of these terms, particularly, vis-a-vis the concept
of a belief system. From both a philosophical and religious
viewpoint, morals, values, and orientations to life refer to
a set of principles or ethics explaining or addressing the
meaning of life in relation to its environment. However, the
religious usage differs from its philosophical usage in that
religion delimits the connotation to only those morals, values,
and orientations to life which are perceived by the individual
to prepare him for ultimacy--whether or not his notions of
ultimacy incorporate a belief in life after death. In other
words, one might conclude that a philosophical query of morals
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asks the question: What is the meaning of good? or Why are
some men good and some men bad?; whereas a religious inquiry of
morals, on the other hand, would determine that good is any-
thing that brings one closer to one's sacred ultimate (Heaven,
socialism, etc.), and that good men are those who seek or
strive for the (culturally or societally) accepted ultimate
and bad men intentionally do not. The Maoist religious belief
system clearly had religious connotations to morals, values,
and orientations to life, as we will establish below.
The Maoist religious belief system a priori establishes
good/bad on the basis of class. Theoretically, the working
class--peasants and workers--automatically accept the socially
established ultimate notion of a new socialist state and are
striving for or, at the very least, have the untapped potential
51.
to strive for it, and are therefore good. In Maoist terminology
this notion of good is communicated as social morality. But
according to our differentiation between "philosophical" morals
and "religious" morals, because good eventually leads to the ulti-
macy of socialism (almost as a reward), it is "religious."
On the other hand, the class "enemies," the petty-bour-
geois, landlord, revisionist, class, do not accept the ulti-
macy of a socialist state, do not strive for it, and are
therefore bad. It should be noted that the class "enemies"
the petty-bourgeois, landlord, revisionist, class, do not
accept the ultimacy of a socialist state, do not strive for it
and are therefore bad. It should be noted that the class
"enemies" during the period of the cultural revolution were
not, for the most part, considered incorrigible and could
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therefore be converted (another non-secular purpose of the
Cultural Revolution!). The morals, values, and orientations
to life contained in the Maoist religious belief system were
to be applied only within the class group of 'believers."
Within this class group, the true Maoist was to exemplify
the themes in thematic Category Three: self-denial and
selflessness--concern for others rather than self, at all
times; love and self-sacrifice (as has been previously men-
tioned, to the point of death) for one's class brother;
modesty and humility--unpretentiousness about one's accomplish-
ments or abilities; frugality--voluntary thrift and prudence
in one's lifestyle; hard work and diligence--willingly
pushing oneself to one's limit and beyond to accomplish a
task for the benefit of the class; and finally, the notion of
exemplary life--that is, if everyone lives according to the
orientations to live established by the Maoist Religious belief
system, the society will be good. We see examples of or
references to these situations to life throughout the communi-
cation media of the Cultural Revolution period, and most
particularly in the little red book. From reports of a radio
broadcast in 1969 we read:
. . . On 17 May 1968 Comrade Hsieh Chen-hsin, aware
of the dangers of an electric shock, saved the life
of commune member Li Chi-min by absorbing the shock
himself. Sacrificing himself, he rescued his class
brother and also saved other poor and lower-middle
peasants from death. He fulfilled his iron-clad oath
always to be loyal to Chairman Mao and to fear no
difficulties or sacrifices in making revolution.5 2
. . . After being assigned the task of treating (the
patient blinded by cataracts), Chen Chi-chin searched
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through data on acupuncture but could find no example
of a cataract being removed. Spurred on by the desire
to rid his class brother of his anguish, he was
determined to blaze a trail. . . . Standing in front
of a mirror, he experimented on his own eyes. He
inserted the needle between a depth of five fen,
the limit set by books on acupuncture.
As he was doing this, he felt that he might go
blind. But this teaching of Chairman Mao's instantly
came to mind: "Countless revolutionary martyrs have
laid down their lives in the interests of the people,
and our hearts are filled with pain as we, the living,
think of them--can there be any personal interest,
then, that we would not sacrifice. . . .
He thought of Doctor Bethune, a foreigner who gave
his life for the liberation of the Chinese people. Why,
he asked himself, could he not sacrifice one of his
eyes for a class brother? He made up his mind that
even if it cost him his own sight he would restore
the patient's eyesight.53
From Quotations, we read:
We should be modest and prudent, guard against
arrogance and rashness, and serve the Chinese People
heart and soul. . . .54
The principle of diligence and frugality should
be observed in everything. . . . We must not take a
short view and indulge in wastefulness and extravagance.55
These orientations to life found in the Maoist Religious
Belief System of the mid-1960's bear close resemblance to
orientations to life found in many Christian religious belief
systems. For example, the notions of brotherly love and self-
sacrifice found in Roman Catholic and Protestant teachings;
and the notions of frugality espoused by Quaker sects. We do
not draw attention to these similarities here to infer any
content comparisons between Maoism and western Christian religions.
Rather, we intend only to further illustrate the "religiousness"
of the Maoist belief system in understandable terms. What is
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even more interesting to note is that the Maoist religious
belief system seems to be a continuation and a symbiotic union
of the vying religious traditions of China's past, examined in
Chapter Two. We will address this notion in detail further on
in this chapter.
Criterion Three Religious Experiences
Our final criterion for identifying a religious belief
system had to do with the generation of what could be recog-
nized as religious experiences. We identify this to be the
most problematic of our criteria in that experience is a
personal phenomenon that is not easily observable or reliably
interpreted. An individual's experiences are his own emotional
or non-emotional encounters, encompassing all ranges of intan-
gible feelings, with the state of living or with sheer exist-
ence itself. An individual's religious experiences, as James
and Wach56 also conclude, are totally emotional, intangible
and not easily identifiable without direct query of the
individual. As we are not in the position to interview a
statistically significant sampling of the Chinese population
about the Cultural Revolution to ascertain the extent or nature
of religious experience, our discussion here, although based
on written and broadcast accounts of personal experience during
this period should be regarded as interpretive and speculative.
Nonetheless, we do not feel such interpretations decrease the
validity of our criteria or undermine the thrust of our
argument, vis-a-vis the Maoist religious belief system, as we
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can clearly make a quantitative as well as a qualitative state-
ment about the nature of events which had the flavor of relig-
ious experience.
As delineated in our distinction between the notions of
philosophical versus religious with respect to orientations to
life, when we refer to the concept "religious"relative to a
Maoist religious belief system, we refer to a belief that
ideas, actions, values, etc. are related to the ultimate--
that which is beyond man's point of comprehension or control.
In like fashion, in our inquiry into the nature of a religious
experience, our interpretation of the term "religious" will
remain the same. In addition to the notion of a religious ex-
perience as a total emotional response within the framework
of an institutionalized religion, a religious experience can
also be any total emotional encounter--with the state of
living--in which the individual is concerned, in some way,
with the ultimate. This concern can be recognized by expres-
sions of intense feeling associated with either an encounter
with or a reflection about the Ultimate. In the height of
the cult of Mao during the period of the Cultural Revolution,
we find numerous expressions of what can be identified as
religious experiences associated with encounters with the
person of Mao, his thoughts, or his picture.
In a Peking Review article published in 1967 we read:
. . . Mai Hsien-teh was unconscious or semi-conscious
for quite a long time after being admitted to hospital.
. . . The nurse tested his reactions by showing him a
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pictorial magazine. As she turned over the pages she
noticed his lips quivering. His eyes were concentrated
on a picture of Chairman Mao. With great effort he
managed to raise his left hand, which had remained
useless since his admission to hospital, and with
trembling fingers he touched the picture. . . .
He suddenly exclaimed "Chairman Mao!" It was
the first time since he had been in the hospital that
he had spoken so clearly.
The image of the great Chairman Mao and his bril-
liant thought roused Mai Hsien-teh from his stupor.
He became fully conscious and was able to think clearly. 57
We will not attempt to ascertain whether the above account con-
stituted a miracle cure or a faith healing either of which fall
well within the range of a religious experience. What is import-
ant is the experiential response to the image of Mao--that seeing
Mao's picture brought about a revival where medicine inferredly
could not.
In yet another article published in 1969 we read:
. . . When he looked up at Chairman Mao's portrait
on the wall, he called to mind Chairman Mao's teachings
. . . and became even more determined. Though he had
never heard of such a disease, he recalled his experience
during paralysis and inserted a needle into Chang
Li-chung's right leg three times.
Immediately, the patient could move his leg.
Chen inserted the needle three times into Chang's left
leg. He then told the patient: "Old Chang! Try to
stand up and take a few steps." With the help of two
others supporting him on each side, Chang Li-chung stood
up and took two steps forward. Grasping young Chen's
hands and with tears rolling down his cheeks, the
veteran miner looked up at Chairman Mao's portrait and
shouted over and over: 'Long live Chairman Mao!'. . 58
And finally, as recounted in a Peking Radio Broadcast:
. . . Mai A-chi led the whole family to stand before
the portrait of Chairman Mao and made the following
solemn vow: "There are a thousand and one requirements,
but the living study and application of Mao Tse-tung
thought is the primary requirement; there may be a
thousand and one changes, but the Red hearts devoted to
Chairman Mao will never change. . . .59
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Tillich tells us that religious experience motivates a
will to believe.60 In the case of Maoist China during the
Cultural Revolution, we find Tillich's conclusions especially
applicable. Religious experiences initiated by encounters with
Mao, his image or thoughts reinforced the symbolism of the
Maoist religious belief system and served to maintain
intense emotional fervor throughout the Cultural Revolution--
an element Hoffer asserts is critical in a successful revolu-
61tion. We will discuss this thought further in Part II of
this work. We will now first turn our attention to a discussion
of the place of the Maoist religious belief system within the
broader historical structure of Chinese political culture.
We will then conclude this chapter with an initial look at
the structural functional role of the Maoist religious belief
system in the political socialization process during the
Cultural Revolution.
The Continuity of Chinese Political Culture in the Maoist
Religious Belief System
In the previous section, we discussed the thematic content
of the Maoist religious belief system based on our identification
criteria. In addition to the themes cited above we find in the
Maoist religious belief system a basic belief that the
individual, though intrinsically good, always has the potential
for evil (bourgeois and revisionism), but that continual
"re-education"/conversion and a rigorously modeled society
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with set behavior patterns can assume that the individual
stays on the "correct path" to socialism, even given the pit-
falls of life. The underlying assumption of the Maoist religious
belief system is that the actions, thoughts of individuals,
and interactions among individuals in the society make the
society. Operationally this assumption means that in order
to change the society one must change the individuals in the
society. Again we begin to understand the rationale for a
turbulent Cultural Revolution designed to struggle, criticize
and transform from a Maoist perspective. Throughout the Cul-
tural Revolution, models, both symbolic and real, of the ideal
Maoist individual were presented to the population for emula-
tion. Slogans such as "Learn from the P.L.A.," and the care
given to create heroes such as those found in the model revolu-
tionary operas, confirm this observation. Yet, contrary to
official Maoist claims for a new China, with cultural, social,
and political innovations manifest by these above-cited
elements, Maoism during the Cultural Revolution, in addition
to its evolution of Marxist-Leninist ideology, also appears
to be an amalgamation of traditional politico-religious belief
systems which had previously contended with each other for
influence throughout China's history.
As was discussed inChapter Two, although one can identify
a number of religious and mystical influences in traditional
China, there seems to have been a polarization of religious
belief systems into two conflicting, yet complementary groups.
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On the one hand we have Confucianism--the official belief
system--with its system of social ordering of thought and
behavior, emulation of models, belief in an intrinsic potential
for "good" (i.e., proper living) in the individual--and there-
fore societally--and its legitimization of political authority
through association with an ultimate, superhuman notion of Heaven.
On the other hand, we have the popular mutations of Taoism,
as manifest in many religious-based secret societies, with
its codes of brotherly love, self-sacrifice to the point of
death, diligence and commitment in cause, and, most importantly,
its notions of creating a new society after destruction of
the decadent old. In both the official and popular religious
belief system we find at the basis, the notion of a Harmony--
harmony between man and nature and equilibrious harmony in
people's interactions with each other. Yet, as concluded
earlier, the two religious influences conflicted most in their
socio-political notions of the hierarchical ordering of society,
while paradoxically complementing each other in their concepts
of interpersonal relationships--that is to say, the merging
of the Confucian element of respect for authority and the Taoist
element of brotherly love regardless of boundary of efficacy.
Within the Maoist religious belief system, as indicated
in the previous discussion, the elements of the two contending
religious orientations are clearly obvious. Further, Maoism seems
to have blended the principal socio-religious components of
each belief system such that the historical tensions would not
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be manifest in uncontrolled dogmatic clashes between opposing
traditional religious groups, each vying for societal suprem-
acy and influence for their religio-political convictions.
Without struggling on the tenuous ground of establishing
intention or non-intention on the part of Mao or official
Maoist policy, it is nonetheless clear that Mao recognized
how deeply imbued the Chinese cultural tradition (including
reliances on and predispositions to religious custom) was in
the Chinese populations--even given the attempts of the May
Fourth Movement and contemporary pre- and post-49' communist
ideology to sever the culutral limbs with the past. In "On
the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," Mao
observes:
It will take a fairly long period of time to decide
the issue in the ideological struggle between socialism
and capitalism in our country. The reason is that the
influence of the bourgeoisie and of the intellectuals
who come from the old society will remain in our
country for a long time to come, and so will their
class ideology.62
One might therefore assume that during the cultural revolution
Maoism selectively combined the useful elements of the tradi-
tional contending religious belief systems (omitting the
uncontrollable elements of mysticism, sorcery, and the like)
thus becoming the official and only religious belief system
exercising influence in the political system. What we would
have then is not a break with or departure from the traditional
Chinese political culture, with its symbiotic relationship
between religion and politics, brought about by a cultural
revolution; but rather a continuation of the political culture
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where the Kaoist religious belief system legitimized and nur-
'tured political-authority of the pro-Maoist faction during the
turbulent years of the Cultural Revolution.
One could ask at this point why it i's so important to
have Maoism functioning as a religious systemAduring the Cultural
Revolution rather than functioning solely as a political ideology
or nationalist movement, as it functioned during previous struggles.63
The answer to this query is twofold. The first part is found
in the significance Mao placed on the cult of personality when
he attributed Khrushchev's fall to the absence of such a cult.
Earlier in this chapter we identified the functional associa-
tion of the cult of Mao with the Maoist religious belief
system. The cult was also critical, functionally, to the Maoist
religious belief system, and consequently to the maintenance
of power and legitimacy of the pro-Maoist faction throughout
the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution. It created and proj-
ected a superhuman and "spiritual" aura around the person and
thoughts of Mao, such that popular encounter with him, his
image, or his policies always occurred emotionally, rather
than with a combination of emotion and intellect prevalent
in modern requirements for political participation. With the
fervor and total emotional commitment to a Maoist religious
belief system enhanced by the cult of Mao, response to Mao's
political directives was not threatened by a rational analysis
of facts which might have steered public opinion against Maoand
fot Liu Shao-chi, or toward pragmatism and "bourgeois
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revisionism." This may explain why so much emphasis and atten-
tion from the pro-Maoist forces was directed toward the univer-
sities and the educational system in general--the modern train-
ing ground for rational analysis of facts.
The second part of the answer relates to the chaos and
confusion associated with distinguishing the "good guys" from
the "bad guys" throughout most of the Cultural Revolution
period. As Hinton and others have aptly observed in analyses
of the Cultural Revolution, the anti-Mao forces became as
"left" and "red" as the pro-Maoist forces in order to purpose-
fully confuse the issues and the "ideological" camps. Fraudu-
lent Red Guard units were set up by the anti-Maoist forces
all over China. Their espousal of Maoist Cultural Revolution
rhetoric was so convincing, it became increasingly difficult,
as the Cultural Revolution progressed, to distinguish the pro-
Maoist camp from the anti-Maoist camp--the revolutionaries
from the counter-revolutionaries. As Hinton observed:
From the names adopted by various (Red Guard) units,
it was impossible to tell which were rebels and which
were loyalists (pro-Lin). The General Headquarters of
Red Guard from Shanghai Schools and Colleges early
pre-empted the field in that city. It supported the
status quo. . . . Nationwide organizations with such
t.itles as Red Guard Army, International Red Guards,
International Revolutionary Rebel Army, and the May 16th
Brigade turned out to be conservative while the Peking
Red Guard's Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters,
the Red RebselRegiment of the Harlein Military Engineer-
ing Institute, and the ChingKang Mountain Corps of
Tsinghua University were radical units which established
nationwide liaison centers.64
At the height of the Cultural Revolution, the "good guys" had
to be identified by level of commitment, both emotional and
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physical. True Maoist had to exude a "Daniel-in-the-lions-
den" demeanor in all their actions. The youth were continually
called upon, in implicit and explicit Maoist doctrine, to
"fight for the faith" and to fight to purge the wrong-doers,
the reactionary class enemies--the heretics--and deliver China
on the righteous road to Maoist socialism. (One might speculate
that the P.L.A. was held back in the initial stages of the
cultural revolution so that the Red Guard youth could carry
the fight.)
In the little red book, we read: "Everything reactionary
is the same; if you don't hit it, it won't fall."65 And
further on we find the admonition:
A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an
essay or painting a picture, or doing embroidery;
it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle,
so temperatre, kind, courteous, restrained and mag-
nanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act
of violence by which one class overthrows another.6 6
With their instructions from the little red book, the compila-
tion of Maoist dogma, the Red Guard youth were inspired to
violently uphold the thoughts of Mao to the point of martyrdom.
We are reminded here of the religious convictions of the
Crusaders and other groups throughout hitory whose battlecry
was legimitized and nurtured by religious dogma.
As a result of Observations of the unconfined violent
activities and encounters of the Red Guard during the initial
stages of the Cultural Revolution, one might safely speculate
that the P.L.A. was purposefully held back from physically
suppressing the actions of the rampaging youth, so that the
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true Maoist Red Guards could demonstrate the extent of their
belief in Maoism. However, without making further attempts
to substantiate this speculation, it is clear that the Maoist
religious belief system facilitated the political socializa-
tion process amid the major sociopolitical upheaval of the
Cultural Revolution period. We will establish this more
fully in the final chapter of this section and throughout
Part II of this work.
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CHAPTER V
THE FUNCTION OF THE MAOIST RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM IN THE
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
. . . ruling classes do not justify their power exclus-
ively by de facto possession of it, but try to find a
moral and legal basis for it, representing it as the
logical and necessary consequence of doctrines and
beliefs that are generally recognized and accepted. (So
if a society is deeply imbued with the Christian spirit,
the political class will be governed by the will of the
sovereign, who, in turn, will reign because he is God's
anointed . . . the Chinese mandarins ruled the state
because they were supposed to be interpreters of the
will of the Son of Heaven, who had received from heaven
the mandate to govern paternally, and in accordance with
the rules of the Confucian ethic, the people of the
hundred families . . .1
In the previous chapters, we have given considerable
attention to identifying and establishing Maoism as a religious
belief system. In this and the remaining chapters, we will focus
on the function of the Maoist religious belief system in the poli-
tical socialization process during the cultural revolution.
In this chapter specifically we wish to accomplish two things.
First, we will discuss the general relationship between the
Maoist religious belief system and political socialization
within the context of functionalist theory. And second, we
will show how various aspects of political socialization were
reinforced and conditioned in particular by the functioning of
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the Maoist religious belief system during the Cultural Revolution.
We have indicated previously that upheaval and chaos
created by the Cultural devolution made acute the need for an effi-
cient and effective political socialization process. From 1965
through 1969, the Chinese population was continually agitated by
class struggle, political purges, and internal political ideologi-
cal sturggles as to whether politics or pragmatism should take
command. One can attribute the turbulence either to a power
struggle within the CCP between Mao and Lin Shao-chi, or to an
official attempt to politicize the post-1949 generation of youth
to the urgency and continual need for revolutionary class and
ideological struggle! In either case, the fact of the matter
remains that the Chinese masses were required to totally parti-
cipate2 in a political system where factionalism had produced
confusing and conflicting interpretations of the correct politi-
cal attitudes and behavior to be displayed. Whatever the origin
and purpose of the Cultural Revolution, success or victory
would depend on how well the Chinese masses were politically
socialized to hold the correct attitudes and beliefs and how
well the standard of correctness was communicated to the popula-
tion. The Maoists claimed victory at the Ninth Party Congress
in 1969. From our observations and research, their determining
weapon had been a Maoist religious belief system.
A Functional Analysis of the Maoist Religious Belief System
The political system has two very critical objectives to
accomplish in order to increase its chance of successful political
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socialization. First it must generate a standard for correctness
upon which the learning process can be based. And, second,it
must have a motivating external stimulus which the individual
cannot help but regard as critical to his ego comfort and main-
tenance. A religious belief system can function to satisfy these
two objectives. Specifically, the Maoist religious belief system
functioned thusly in the political socialization process through-
out the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. We will examine
this functional relationship and the political socialization
process vis-a-vis political learning in contemporary China in
the paragraphs which follow.
Earlier we identified functional analysis as our method
of inquiry regarding the relationship of the Maoist religious
belief systemin the political socialization process. We pre-
sented an analytic framework developed by Carl Hempel which model-
led the system under study according to the functional inter-
relationships of the components of the system. The inherent infer-
ences of Hempel's analytic model are that the proper functioning
(accomplishment of role) of a structural component or institution
will result in the maintenance of the system. And, further, that
a functional analysis is only valid when a direct cause and
effect functional relationship can be identified. For example,
he illustrates a valid functional statement as follows: "the
heartbeat has the effect of circulating the blood, and this
ensures the satisfaction of certain conditions (supply of nutri-
tion and removal of wastes) which are necessary for the proper
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working of the organism."3 In this illustration the heartbeat
satisfies a "functional requirement" or need which ensures the
maintenance of the organism. Inferentially, then, if the heart-
beat did not (1) occur or (2) did not circulate the blood, the
organism would cease to exist. In the pure sciences, it is
perhaps useful and constructive to restrict a functional model
to a rigorous cause and effect framework. However, in the social
sciences, where behavioral patterns are not predictably consist-
ent or restricted by constant stimuli which always produce the
same behavioral response, to say that a functional relationship
does not exist because the system does not "work properly" or
maintain itself as a direct result of the functioning of one
extrapolated component is to deprive the analyst of an analytical
tool which could, when applied, contribute significantly to a
structural-functional understanding of systemic operations.
From a political science perspective, a functional analysis pro-
vides a systematic and rigorous analytical framework either for
determining what causes a certain political situation to occur
or for establishing the specific role of a given factor in the
results of a political event or occurence. In other words,
whether the political system under study "works properly" or
not, there are still observable structural functions which can
be identified which will contribute to an understanding of how
and why the political system works, or does not work. Within
the context of this study, we utilize Hempel's model to provide
an analytical framework. However, we do not wish to imply that
because we can identify a functional relationship between a
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Maoist religious belief system and the political socialization
process of China, that the Chinese political system necessarily
worked properly during the Cultural Revolution. We can illustrate,
though, that the Maoist religious belief system did perform a
specific function in the political learning process of political
socialization during the Cultural Revolution. By incorporating
our proposition in the Hempel analytic paradigm introduced in
Chapter One, we have:
(1) Political socialization functions adequately during
the Cultural Revolution in China only if a standard
for correctness upon which political learning (with
sanctions, role-models and symbols) exists;
(2) A religious belief system is one item in a class of
empirically sufficient conditions for such a standard
to exist;
(3) If political socialization functioned adequately
during the Cultural Revolution, then a Maoist religious
belief system (among other items in the class of
necessary conditions) can be observed to be present
in the political learning process of political
socialization.
Our only inference here is that the political socialization is
self-regulating, that is, able to produce the necessary condi-
tions for its continued adequate operation, when political
learning occurs. The term adequate does not connote any quali-
tative assessment of the effectiveness or operational efficiency
of the political socialization process, or for that matter of
the political system which is conducting the political socializa-
tion. More specifically, by concluding that political socializa-
tion functioned adequately during the Cultural Revolution in
China, we are not intended to imply that the Chinese population
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was in fact politically socialized (i.e., had learned) to hold
the correct political attitudes and behaviors conceived by the
Maoist doctrine. We are only saying that we observe a process of
political socialization and, within that process, we observe the
Maoist religious belief system operating as one of several possible
functional prerequisites (conditions necessary for a unit to come
into being) for political learning in political socialization.
We are examining a function within a function. That is to say,
we are identifying how the Maoist religious belief system func-
tions in the political learning process--function one--thereby
contributing to the functioning of political socialization during
the cultural revolution--function two. (See Figure 5 ). The
Hempel model is only an analytical tool providing the parameters
and systematic rigor for our examination of political learning
during the Cultural Revolution. Though it aids in presenting
the ideas we wish to express, it does not define or prescribe
our conclusions about the Maoist religious belief system.
In applying a functional analysis to a socio-political
system or process, it is usually useful to determine whether the
function under study is manifest by its operation (that is, in-
tended and recognized) or whether it is latent (that is, unin-
tended or unrecognized, albeit its observable existence). Within
the context of this study, this determination can only be reduced
to a speculation. As we stated in Chapter I, we do not intend
to suggest that Mao or the political leaders during the Cultural
Revolution intentionally established Maoism as a religious belief
System: Maoist Religious Belief System
Setting: Maoist China during the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution
Prerequisite: The addressing of ultimate
eschatological questions of life
and death; a set of values,
morals, or orientations to life;
religious experiences.
Function: To generate a standard for
correct political attitudes
and behavior in the political
learning process.
System: Political
Socialization
Setting: Maoist China
during the Great
Cultural Revolu-
tion.
REQUISITE: A STANDARD FOR
CORRECT POLITICAL
ATTITUDES AND
BEHAVIOR IN THE
POLITICAL LEARNING
PROCESS.
Function: To perpetuate
political correct-
ness in the
populus
Function I Function II
FIGURE 5
THE FUNCTIONAL INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE MAOIST RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM AND
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION VIA THE POLITICAL LEARNING PROCESS
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system. However, it is clear that Maoism was intended, at some
official level, to facilitate the political learning process in
political socialization. The official attempts by Lin Piao to
nurture the cult of personality with the publication of The
Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung ("little red book")
substantiates this observation. So that, at this secondary level,
(,see Figure 5.), we can suggest that the function of political
learning in the political socialization process is manifest.
With regard to the function of the Maoist religious belief system
in the political learning process of political socialization,
we are also inclined to recognize this function as manifest.
Yet, even at the suggestive level, this observation is difficult
to substantiate. Nonetheless we feel this observation is
plausible and as such deserves further attention here.
Although we cannot substantiate any official intentions
to establish a Maoist religious belief system, we observe, as we
indicated previously, in the Maoist religious belief system an
attempt to integrate the traditional religious belief systems
of Confucianism and Taoism into one functionally efficient
belief system. As an examination of the content of the Maoist
religious belief system suggested in the previous chapter, Maoist
doctrine as it can be observed during the Cultural Revolution
seemed to be an attempt to officially merge the self-discipline
and self-exemplary tendencies of Confucianism with the other
directed community self-sacrifice and brotherhood tendencies of
Taoism. The true Maoist is required to hold himself as an
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example for others to emulate; he is to be totally self-disciplined
and proper in all manner of political (and social) thought and
behavior. Concurrently he is required to demonstrate total self-
sacrifice for the common goal an. unbounded class (brotherly)
love. As was discussed in Chapter II, these two traditional relig-
ious belief systems existed simultaneously but not necessarily
symbiotically within the belief structures of Confucian Mandarin
and Taoist peasant alike. In the former instance, the Confucian
Mandarin strove for the contentment of Taoism. The Taoist influ-
enced peasant, on the other hand, was required to incorporate
Confucian virtues in his total lifestyle, paying particular
attention to the rules for interpersonal behavior.
Whether or not we can determine the intentions of Mao in
establishing a Maoist religious belief system or in specifying
the function that the Maoist religious belief system would
serve in the political learning process, we can show that the
Maoist religious belief system which we observe operating during
the Cultural Revolution incorporated Confucian and Taoist morals
and virtues. Further we can show that Mao recognized the need
to politically socialize the post '49 generation of youth who
were not internally motivated to strive for Maoist Communism.
Lucian Pye has observed of Mao's commitment to this end: "Until
the Chinese Communist system is substantially institutionalized,
people will not be automatically inspired by what is taking
place, and special effort to indoctrinate each generation in the
revolutionary ethic will continue to be needed." Whatever the
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official intention, we do observe a Maoist religious belief system
functioning as a standard for correctness upon which sanctions,
role-models, and symbols--initiators and reinforcements for the
political learning process--are based, Let us now present a
general view of the political socialization process relative to
our analytical framework.
The Role of Political Learning in the Political Socialization
Process During the Cultural Revolution
Both political scientists and sociologists alike have ven-
tured to define political socialization. Selectively reviewing
these definitions, we find:
the process by which people learn to adopt the norms,
values, attitudes and behaviors accepted and practiced
by the on-going system.5
the process through which an individual acquires his
own view of the political world.. . the way in which
one generation passes on political standards and beliefs
to the succeeding generations. 6
the process by which individuals acquire the knowledge,
skills and dispositions that enable them to participate
as more or less effective members of the society.7
From these definitions, we find a consistent understanding
of the political socialization process as a learning process
whereby the individual acquires the skills and attitudes which
allow him.to behave within the norm of the political culture.
Within the process the distinction has been made between direct
and indirect political socialization.8 The former is a learning
situation where the content of what is transmitted is specifically
political, thereby producing a political attitude. The latter
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differentiation refers to the internalization of values which are
not necessarily related to politics but which can subsequently
influence the acquisition of analogous values which are political.
Whether direct or indirect, the primary purpose of political
socialization is to promote legitimization of political power.
Structurally the political socialization process can be
broken down into four major components: (1) the learning pro-
cess--how learning takes place and the principles of the process;
(2) the teaching process--who teaches (agents) or coruLunicates
(institutions) what is to be learned and how to communicate it;
(3) the lesson--what is taught, that is the nature of the politi-
cal -culture which is being transmitted; and (4) the impact or
value of the process--the resulting political behavior and
attitudes of the population.
Until recently, political scientists have been more con-
cerned with the last three components leaving the study of how
learning takes place in the political socialization process to
the socialipsychologists. However, many political scientists now
recognize that no analysis of the political socialization process
can be considered complete without understanding how political
learning occurs. Though not exclusively, it is this aspect of
the political socialization process that we emphasize here.
Our primary intent is to selectively illustrate how the Chinese
population learned correct political attitudes and behaviors
during the C.ultural Revolution and to describe the role the
Maoist religious belief system played in this process.
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Learning theorists define learning as the "establishment of
a connection or association between a stimulus and a response
where, prior to learning,.no such association existed."9 They
indicate that learning must be preceded by motivation whether
internally (personal stimulation to learn to acquire or maintain
comfort of ego relative to one's environment) or externally (coer-
cion or external pressure which presuades or focus the individual
to learn in order to acquire or maintain ego comfort relative
to this environment). Learning theory further stipulates that
learning can occur with stimulus-response or through identifica-
tion and imitation; and that learning is a cumulative process,
whereby stimulus response associations are usually transferred
from one situation to another, finally being internalized by
the individual to become his frame of reference from which
attitudes are formed.
Within a political science framework, Richard Merleman,10
integrating learning theory with the theory of cognitive disson-
ance, has categorized this learning process into a six stage
sequence where: (1) un-conditioned reinforcement is provided
by the political regime through means of a stimulus which results
in a positive gain for the population with their compliance;
(2) the political regime then associates itself with the uncondi-
tioned stimulus which evoke positive behavior patterns within
the population, thus resulting in classical conditioning; (3)
the political regime, its association with unconditioned stimuli
firmly imbedeed in the minds of the population, reduces its use
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of the positive material gain associated with the unconditioned
stimulus resulting in intermittent reinforcement; (4) the
political regime then presents another stimulus (the demand for
a new behavior sequence) to the population assuring that a com-
pliant response to the new stimulus will produce the institutional
processes symbolizing the unconditioned reinforcement, thus
creating a secondary reinforcement to the initial stimulus;
(5) the population now receiving only the symbols of the material
gains of compliance (to maintain cognitive equilibrium and ration-
alize responses to contradictory stimuli) automatically reduces
the cognitive dissonance between gaining primarily symbolic
rewards (with infrequent material gain) on the one hand, and
having to learn new behavior sequences on the other; the popula-
tion then converts this positive affect toward government in
general into a grant of legitimacy for the political regime;
and finally (6) the political regime having been granted its
legitimacy by the population begins to signify governmental
processes which provide secondary reinforcement by an elaboration
of a series of condensed symbols which stand for these purposes.
(.See Figure 6.) The decisiveness of an effective use of symbols
and symbolism is nowhere else more apparent than from the above
cited paradigm.
Merleman's model also provides us with another key factor
in the understanding of the political socialization process--
the notion of legitimacy. From a learning theory perspective,
the purpose of political socialization is two-fold. On the
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MERLEMAN'S MODEL OF THE POLITICAL LEARNING PROCESS
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one hand the political socialization process, as we have previously
indicated, should convey to the population the norms for correct
political attitudes and behavior based on the political culture.
However, on the other hand, the political socialization process
should also result in the legitimacy of the authority and power
of the political systems. In other words, if the pupil learns
well and therefore carries with him the skills and disposition
to achieve socially, then there is a strong tendency for the pupil
to regard the teacher and the teaching methods as legitimate.
Legitimacy provides a quality 6f "oughtness" to the learning
process no matter what the methods of the process. And, as
Merleman suggests, legitimacy can be manipulated by the poli-
tical system, by control of the learning process, particularly
at the initial stages of stimulus-response. We will be identi-
fying evidence to further this suggestion throughout the remainder
of this work.
We have devised our own sequentially staged paradigm of
political learning. Our model differs from or perhaps expands
Merleman's, in that we recognize the learning process in
political socialization to be cyclical (once initiated) and,
therefore, self-perpetuating, as well as self-reinforcing.
The cyclical nature of the proces does not necessarily result
in a stagnation or eventual inhibition of the learning process.
Rather it is delineated solely by the cumulative boundaries of
the political culture. Our four staged model for political
learning proceeds thusly:
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Stage One: External Motivation
The members of the population receive external stimulation
from the political system, or agents of the political system,
which motivates them to learnabout and acquire skills to partici-
pate in the political system so that they may acquire or maintain
ego comfort relative to the political environment. The stimula-
tion most apt to promote ego comfort for child or adult (or
immigrating alien) alike is identity--a sense of belonging to
the greater whole. The agents of the political system (family,
school, peer group) indicate that, to gain identity and maintain
it, the individual must participate in the political system. For
example, a child, although automatically an American citizen if
born in this country, is externally motivated to learn how to
participate in the political system in order to maintain the
system, thereby maintaining his or her'Americanness.
During the Cultural Revolution in China political socializa-
tion, though aimed at the entire population, was primarily
directed at the post-'49 generation of youth. This latter
group was to be taught what it meant to be a Maoist revolution-
ary, why it was politically socially and morally crucial to be
"red" first and "expert" second. Concurrently, this generation
of youth were to learn "correct" political attitudes and
behavior. The external stimulation this generation received
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was the message and initiative to engage in "continuous revolu-
tion." To do so was to be identified as a Maoist and to be
recognized as a contributor to the Maoist interpretation of
ultimate Marxist-Leninist communism. This identity stimulus
even transcended the realm of party membership. In fact,
throughout the period of the Cultural Revolution, the "true-
Maoists" youth were directed on a seek-out-and-destroy mission
to rid the Party of anti-Maoist, revisionist, bourgeois. The
group of true Maoists--the Red Guard--was placed above the
highest political (secular) power group.
One has to assume that identification as a true Maoist Red
Guard during the Cultural Revolution was coveted, particularly
among the youth. Membership in this group gave one (at least
temporarily) a chance to supersede authority. (Maoism functioned
as-amandate.) Whether one chooses to regard this mandate as
emanating from Heaven or from Mao, the notion of divine mission
to expunge corruption in authority is observably present.
From this perspective, Maoism can be regarded as functioning
much the same way as Taosim functioned in its "sacred" legiti-
mization of dissent. In contemporary--Cultural Revolution--
China this mandate was a stimulus from the Maoist faction of
the political system to learn "correct" Maoism at both atti-
tudinal and participatory levels so as to "save"/maintain the
Chinese political system, and thereby "save"/maintain one's
(Maoist-defined) Chineseness.
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Stage Two: Stimulus Response Controlled Learning
During this stage, the political system and its agents in
the political socialization process control the learning of
individuals by monitoring and channeling the stimulus-response
activities of the individual into correct political attitudes
and behavior. The political system exercises its control through
two types of stimulus-response reinforcements--sanctions and
role models.
Type One: Sanctions. The individual receives the external
stimulation. Then the political system or its agents monitor-and
dictate the responses with sanctions which reward a correct
response and punish an incorrect response. The type and degree
of sanctions used depends very much upon the ideological type,
stage of development, and perhaps sovereign security of the
political system. For example, in a democratic, developed
political system, where territorial boundaries and an independ-
ent national identity are firmly established, citizens may be
stimulated to participate in an electoral process by voting.
If the individual responds correctly and votes, his identity
with the political system is affirmed or reaffirmed; and he is
told he has the added benefit of placing someone in political
office who shares his views and will look out for his wellbeing.
If, on the other hand, the individual responds incorrectly and
does not vote, his identity with the political system may be
weakened by statements such as "non-voters cause the system to
fail." This would mean a potential loss of the source of his
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identity; and he may suffer the consequences of having someone
ina political office who is not attentive to his wellbeing. In
a developing country where national sovereignty has not been
firmly established, and the population is subject to identity
crises between socio-political traditions and modernity, the
sanctions employed by the struggling political system, particular-
ly by those which discourage incorrect responses, may be more
severe. Utilizing the same example from above, the voter in
the developing country may receive similar reward sanctions
as the voter in the developed country. But the non-voter in
the developing country risks social and political ostracization,
loss of all other social and political material benefits, and
perhaps even death by his negative response.
Within the specific context of our study, the sanctions
determining stimulus-response learning during the Cultural
Revolution were clearly delineated. To exhibit "correct"
Maoist attitudes and behavior was to maintain identity and
therefore ego comfort and, at a more militarily based level,
to be the "attacker" rather than the "attacked." On the other
hand, to exhibit "incorrect" anti-Maoist attitudes and behavior
was to be ostracized, "purged" and subjected to "re-education"
which also meant a loss of social and political material bene-
fits. All of the above negative sanctions were, from the
Chinese perspective, external indications of a "loss-of-face"
which traditionally was the worst fate one could suffer.
The problem, during the Cultural Revolution, was not
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one of delineating sanctions. Rather, it was establishing "cor-
rectness." As we observed earlier, the basis of conflict during
the Cultural Revolution, at one level, centered around which
political strategem (for development), attitudes and behavior
were to be considered "correct." Lin Shao-chi and his supporters
claimed to represent political correctness just as Mao and his
supporters did. Presumably, the solution for the pro-Maoists
was to elevate Maoist political strategy beyond the realm of
secular politics to the transcendental. To be politically cor-
rect, from the Maoist perspective, was to have a "soul." 12
The sanctions then corresponded to this transcendental status
for correctness. For the Red Guard and other Maoist supporters,
political correctness was synonymous with, among other things,
declaring faith that the power of Mao's thoughts could overcome
natural calamity, human weaknesses, political enemies and the
like. To share and live this belief was to be accepted into
the "fold"--to identify as a Red Guard, a Maoist. To deny
this faith was to be denied identity and to risk partaking in
the ultimate Maoist state of "Great Harmony."
Type Two: Role Models. Various role-models representing
correct political behavior and attitudes are selected by the
political system to reinforce proper political stimulus-response
learning patterns. Individuals learn correct political behavior
and attitudes by initiating the thoughts and actions of the role-
models, in their responses to stimulation from the political
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system. Various studiesl3 examining political socialization have
concluded, for example, that attitudes toward voting and voting
behavior are learned from role-models in the family or peer group.
Role models, though usually positive and identified as heroes
by the political system, can also be representative of the
results of incorrect response to the political system. Publici-
ized political traitors exemplify this latter category of role-
model and have been used as negative reinforcements for correct
political behavior throughout history.
Role-models were critical in the political learning process
during the Cultural Revolution. The Maoists took great care
in establishing heroes who demonstrated political correctness.
We shall see evidence of this case in our discussion of the signi-
fiance of certain main characters in the model revolutionary
operas in the chapters which follow.
Stage Three: Automatic Learning/Symbolism
At this stage of the political learning process the
individual begins to automatically transfer previously controlled,
stimulus-response associations from one situation to another.
This process has also been referred to as generalization and
discrimination in sociological theory. Up until now, the individ-
ual whether child or adult, has been motivated by the political
system to learn about politics, and how to participate in
politics, in order to gain or further a sense of identity.
The individual then began to learn, through control of his
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stimulus-response pattern either with sanctions or through imita-
tion of role-models, the advantages of positive response and
disadvantages of negative response to stimuli from the political
system. The resultant effect is the establishment and reinforce-
ment of correct political attitudes and behavior. Now the
individual is able to understand and relate to abstract concept-
ualizations (symbols) of correct political thinking and behavior
generated by the political system, and automatically reacts to
the symbols with the "correct" response. From this point on,
political learning need be only peripherally controlled by the
political system through the use of symbols.
We could argue that automatic learning was achieved, parti-
cularly with the generation of Red Guards, in the political
socialization process during the Cultural Revolution. The
events however of the latter stages of the Cultural Revolution
indicate that if achieved the automatic learning was confused
and perhaps temporary.
Initially, in June, 1966 when Mao indicated his approval
of Red Guard attitudes and behavior by donning their symbol--a
red arm band--it appeared that Mao had given free rein to Red
Guard activities with peripheral control by the Maoist
faction in the political system. One might argue that Mao's
demonstration of support of the Red Guard was intentionally
premature--providing a trust they could live up to. It is just
as likely that Mao was pleased with the level of "learned"
political correctness evidenced by Red Guard activities in
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the early stages of the Cultural Revolution and, as a conse-
quence, gave them his support.
However, as we have also seen in the previous chapter, Mao's
support was short-lived. By late 1967-early 1968 the activities
of the Red Guard youth indicated a problem with how they inter-
preted the symbols generated by Mao and his supporters. They
had difficulty discriminating between correct and incorrect,
Maoist and anti-Maoist. To compensate they became, what might
be called 'Fundamentalist' Maoists.15 They interpreted Maoism
to its extreme and violently purged anyone who demonstrated (or
who they perceived to have demonstrated) behavior or attitudes
below this extreme standard. It was clear by Mao's denuncia-
tions of the Red Guard in 1968 that even Mao himself did not
intend or desire that Maoism be so violently crusaded in China.
The uncontrollable violence and Fundamentalism of the Red
Guard can be explained. Without denying an alternative explana-
tion that perhaps the Red Guard youth suffered from adolescent
(delinquent) frustrations, we prefer the explanation that Maoism
in its functioning as a religious belief system instilled in the
youth an irrationalism associated with the transcendental
sacred. Driven by the intense emotions imparted by their
belief in the righteousness of Maoism, they acted outside of
secular law. All religions at their Fundamental levels place,
"sacred" law above "secular" law and the Maoist religious belief
system was no exception. Mao fostered this by his initial call
to the Red Guard youth to "cleanse" the CCP (the epitome of
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secular law) of its corrupt bourgeois thinking.
In this mode of response, the Red Guard seemed to equate
secular (CCP) law with anti-Maoism. In this confusion they
soght to destroy even some of Mao's supporters who espoused
CCP propaganda during the Cultural Revolution. Political learn-
ing for the Red Guard youth in China did not progress beyond
this stage of automatic learning. Rather than exercise only
peripheral control the pro-Maoist faction of the political
system reverted to full control and supervision of Red Guard
activities.
Stage Four: Internalized Motivation
During this stage of political learning, the individual
inernalizes the political concept and values, as well as
their appropriate symbols associated with correct political
attitudes and behavior, such that correct response to the
political systems stimuli is almost instinctive. Correct politi-
cal thinking and behavior becomes synonymous with ego comfort
relative to the individual's socio-political environment.
Motivation to continue political learning (and participation)
becomes internally, rather than externally generated by the
political system. The individual now qualifies as an agent
for political socialization in the political system.
As we indicated above political learning, particularly
among the Red Guard youth during the cultural revolution did
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not reach this stage of our model. We will discuss why
this happened in the conclusion of this work.
We might illustrate our model of political learning
as described by Figure 7. It should )be noted that through-
out the learning stages of the political socialization process,
the political system strives to maximize the effect of its
stimuli on the political thinking and behavior of the popula-
tion, while minimizing direct material costs (material reward
sanctions of increased benefits). Consequently the use of
symbols and symbolism is important. The sooner correct
positive compliance with the symbols of governmental stimuli
occur, the sooner the political system can decrease the cost
of trading material benefits (social welfare, increased stand-
ard of living, etc.) for increased political and socio-political
participation.
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Figure 8 illustrates our assessment of political learning
during the Cultural Revolution. In this instance the political
learning becomes locked between stages two and three. (We
must remember, however, that according to Mao and his supporters
the Cultural Revolution was declared a success even given the
problems of the Red Guard.) Nonetheless, symbolism was still
considered critical to the developments of the Cultural Revolu-
tion and to political socialization during the period. We will
examine the symbols and the use of symbolism in the chapters
which follow.
At the societal level, we can identify a fifth stage in our
model of the learning process of political socialization which
we call generational acculturation. As individuals, who have
reached stage four, begin to externally motivate other individ-
uals and transfer their intuitive notions of correct political
attitudes and behavior to them, a pattern or manner of political
thinking begins to be established without the society or sub-
sets of the society. As this pattern is transferred generation-
ally, political acculturation occurs. In Chapter I, we indi-
cated that we viewed political culture as cumulative. We meant
by that observation that political culture continues to incor-
porate present patterns of political thinking into the sum of
historical political thinking patterns, generated as a result
of the politically related experiences of the society. Within
the context of our political learning model, the cumulative
process of political generational acculturation is more apparent.
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Individually, members of the society are motivated, first extern-
ally then internally to respond according to the needs and
inclinations of the political system. Societally, the aggre-
gate of individual internal motivations toward complying with
the stimuli of the political system (based upon each person's
perception of his place within the political system) produce a
society-bound pattern of political thinking which is generally
transferred. Thus, as one generation complies with correct
political thinking and behavior, the political system, with a
generation of socializing agents, can increase its political
demands for compliance placed upon the next generation without
the additional cost of increasing the material and emotional
(identity) costs associated with the initial stimulus to the
learning process. In addition, as the needs or larger environ-
ment of the political system change, causing a change in the
initial stimuli generated by the political system, the societal
pattern of political thinking and behavior gradually changes to
maintain compliance (and individual ego comfort) and broadens
the dimensions of the political culture. Thus incorporating
this fifth stage of political learning, generational accultura-
tion, into our model we have the resultant diagram in Figure 9.
In this model of generational political socialization and
acculturation, the political system has two options. It can
either: (-1) introduce symbols of response compliance at an
earlier stage in the political learning process, thus decreasing
its political socialization costs further; or, if its broader
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environment changes creating new needs (war, revolution, dramatic
increase in national production of resources), the political
system can (2) maintain its individual stimulus-response
political learning generationally, while increasing initial stimu-
lus demands without incurring tremendous increase in political
socialization costs. The assumption here is that, as each genera-
tion is socialized to hold correct political attitudes and to
comply to government demands with correct political behavior,
the correct responses act as building blocks as they are trans-
ferred to the succeeding generation.
For example in Figure 10generation one is motivated to
learn that voting is expected by the political system as a
correct political behavior and learns to vote to maintain ego
comfort. Generation one then transfers the knowledge of voting
as correct political behavior to generation two. Generation two
then begins the political learning process with the assumption
that voting is correct political behavior. In the external
motivation stage the political system can then demand of this
new generation that citizens, who participate in the political
system by voting, are concerned enough about the well-being of
the system (i.e., ego comfort through the maintenance or the
identity source) to participate in a military draft. Although
this stimuli-demand is potentially a much more costly form of
correct political behavior to the individual who complies than
voting, the political system does not necessarily have to
intensify positive or negative sanctions, or to generate new
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symbols to reinforce correct learning. Using the cultural propen-
sity to vote as a basis for symbols reinforcing military draft
should be enough. By the third generation, the assumption is
that, if you vote, you will also fight for your country; and
the previous generation of role models who voted and fought for
the country should be enough to perpetuate voting and military
service in the political culture.
Although outside the scope of the use and applicability
of this model in this study, it should be noted that our model
for political learning can incorporate negative, as well as posi-
tive political attitudes and behaviors into the political culture.
Political apathy can become a part of the political culture
in the same way as a propensity toward voting, when, during
stage one, the individual does not associate ego comfort with
identity within the political system or with any other external
motivation generated by the political system to stimulate cor-
rect political learning. In other words, external motivation
depends upon the success that the external party has in inter-
preting critical factors for ego maintenance to the individual
in such a way that theindividual is impelled to learn in order
to attain or retain these factors. If the individual does
not recognize the externally generated motivating stimuli as
necessary for ego comfort and maintenance, the learning process
in general, and political learning in particular, will not begin.
One can ask the question at this point if political
learning during the Cultural Revolution did not progress beyond
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stage three of our model for a significant portion of China's
population.16 Can we observe a generational acculturation of
correct political attitude and behavior as a result of the
function of the Maoist religious belief system during the Cultural
Revolution. This query is at the core of this study and will be
answered in some detail in our conclusions. Let it suffice here
for us to assert that generational acculturation did occur as a
result of the function of the Maoist religious belief system during
the Cultural Revolution, but it was acculturation perhaps not
foreseen or intended by Mao and his supporters, as we shall see
later.
The last topic we wish to address before presenting our
data taken from the texts of the model revolutionary operas is
the character of the political learning process utilized during
the Cultural Revolution. More specifically we are interested in
introducing the theatre as a primary tool in the learning pro-
cess and in the adequate functioning of the political socializa-
tion process during this period of chaos.
Political Learning During the Cultural Revolution
We have indicated, at various points throughout this work,
that in order for political learning to occur a standard for
correctness upon which the learning process can be based must
exist. There must be some measure against which correct and
incorrect political attitudes and behaviors can be distinguished.
With an operational standard for correctness functioning sanctions,
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role-models and symbols can be utilized by the political system
as motivations and reinforcements for the political learning
process. The Maoist religious belief system functioned as such
a standard during the Cultural Revolution.
Throughout the period of the Cultural Revolution the chaos
in the political leadership at the party level made it difficult
to determine who was considered to have the correct political
attitudes. As examples, we observe the ideological heresies of
Lin Shao-chi, Vice-Chairman of the Party; P'eng Chen, First
Party secretary and Mayor of Peking; his vice-mayor, Wu Han, who
authored Hai Jui Dismissed from Office; and Teng Hsiao-ping,
Secretary General of the CCP (who recently reappeared in top
party leadership in 1973). However, their supporters in school
and government who managed to avoid Red Guard purges continued
to launch counter-attacks attempting to sway public opinion away
from the Maoist camp. Because of the disruptions in universities
and middle schools (which caused many to close their doors
until well after the official end of the Cultural Revolution)
and the social disruptions which resulted in the breakup or
separation of family units,the role of socializing agents
was primarily assumed by pro-Maoist government leaders. The
vehicle that was used to externally motivate political learning
throughout the population was the theatre, particularly the tradi-
tional Peking Opera. Long before the outbreak of the Cultural
Revolution, even before Yenan, Mao had utilized the theatre to
promote correct political thinking in the Chinese population.
Edgar Snow reported in the 1930's that whenever the Red Army
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marched into a new area they would immediately set up a stage and
enact a play or opera depicting the ideological thinking of Mao.
Snow writes:
there was no more powerful weapon of propaganda in the
communist movement than the Reds' dramatic troupes'
and none were more subtly manipulated. A flow of almost
daily programs, 'Luring newspapers' used military,
political, economic and social problems as dramatic
material in a humorous, understandable way for the
skeptical peasantry. . . Where the Red occupied new
areas, it was the Red theatre that calmed the fears
of the people, gave them rudimentary ideas of the Red
Program, and dispersed great quantities of revolutionary
thoughts to win the people's confidence . . .17
Mao and his revolutionary forces employed this avenue of politi-
cal communication with the population because it had been proven
successful throughout China's history. In traditional China
dramas depicting political events or intrigues were being per-
formed to peasant audiences.
During the Cultural Revolution, the Maoist forces exercised
complete control over the theatre. Chiang Ch'ing, Mao's fourth
wife and a former actress, was a member of the National Cultural
Revolution Revolutionary Group (Wen-ge) and was given sole
responsibility for supervising the rewriting and staging of
Peking Revolutionary operas. The resulting model revolutionary
operas, which were the only dramatic works staged in China
throughout the Cultural Revolution, served as the primary vehicles
for political learning. Referring to our model of political
learning earlier in this chapter (Figures 9 and 10) the model
revolutionary operas became the channels for the external
motivation, controlled learning and automatic learning stages in
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the socialization process. And the actors or characters in the
operas became the primary political socialization agents, replac-
ing or superseding the influence of teachers, parents and peer
group. Great care was obviously taken to revise the opera
scripts so that they incorporated the virtues and morals of
Maoism (which we have identified as a Maoist religious belief
system) and so that they presented the sanctions, role models
and symbols necessary to motivate and reinforce political learn-
ing. They presented the Maoist religious belief system as the
standard upon which correct political attitudes and behaviors
could be distinguished and learned.
Within the texts of these staged microcosms of Maoist
Chinese society, we can observe the functioning of the Maoist
religious belief system in the political learning process.
The remaining chapters will present these observations. The
discussions will incorporate the Hempelian analytical model to
structure our observations. To accomplish this, we will demon-
strate how the Maoist religious belief system functions as a
standard for correctness in the sanctions, role models, and
symbols which motivate and reinforce political learning, thereby
causing political learning to exist and political socialization
to function adequately.
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tional authority. In the context of the Cultural Revolution
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olds" (old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits).
At the crux of these "four olds" was Confucian authority.
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CHAPTER VI
THE MAOIST RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM AS A STANDARD
FOR CORRECTNESS: SANCTIONS AND ROLE MODELS
Throughout the preceding chapters, we have attempted to
identify and discuss the origins and structural components of
a Maoist religious belief system. In addition, we have pre-
sented our model for political learning within the political
socialization process emphasizing the function that a religious
belief system can serve in the learning process. Within the
framework of this latter discussion, we identified three
functional requisites for Kthe political socialization process--
sanctions; role-models; and symbols. Through the use of the
model Revolutionary Peking Operas cited in our introduction,
our purpose in this and the remaining chapters is to illustrate
how the Maoist religious belief system functioned as a standard
for correctness in the political learning process of political
socialization during the Cultural Revolution, by serving as
a basis for sanctions, role-models and symbols. We will
accomplish this task by surveying the texts of the Peking
operas to identify instances where sanctions, role-models,
and symbols occur and can be attributed to components of the
Maoist religious belief system. In addition, we will be
highlighting passages in the texts where Maoism:
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seemingly attempts to incorporate some components of the
traditionally contrasting religious belief systems--Confucian-
ism and Taoism--into one functional religious belief system.
As we mentioned in our introduction, in our approach to our
data source, we have made every attempt to let our conclusions
flow from the texts, rather than utilizing the texts to substan-
tiate previously drawn conclusions.
We will begin this, and the following chapter, with a
brief discussion of the specific role of our three functional
requisites in the political learning process of political
socialization. We will then proceed directly with our examina-
tion of the specific texts, interjecting any discussions of
the background of the individual Peking Opera, characters, or
period of the background setting of the opera where we deem
necessary.
Sanctions and Role-Models as Requisites for Political Learning
When we examine the political socialization process, we
are concerned with how the individual learns or is conditioned
to respond with attitudes and behaviors consistent with the
norms of the political culture and considered correct by the
political systems. Critical to an understanding of the politi-
cal socialization process is an examination of how the politi-
cal system conveys to the population what is politically
correct as well as what is politically incorrect. As we
indicated in our political learning model in the previous
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chapter (Figure 7 of Chapter V), we view sanctions and role-
models as two factors which convey the standard for correct-
ness in the initial stages of the political learning process.
Each (i.e., sanctions and role-models) can be utilized as
reinforcements of the learning process, either individually
or in concert. We will discuss them briefly before turning
to the "model" texts to cite examples of their occurrence and
function.
We define a sanction as any stimulus which either rewards
or punishes an individual (or group) for a previous behavior
or response, thereby establishing the boundaries for attitud-
inal and behavioral learning within a social environment.
Sanctions can be presented to the individual in the form of
material gain or loss (i.e., increased money or decreased food
supply) or in the form of non-material gain or loss (i.e.,
reinforced identity with the social environment or acceptance
by it; or, conversely, rejection by the social environment).
However, no matter what its form, the primary function of a
sanction is to establish the boundaries for learning.
Within the political environment, the function of a sanc-
tion remains the same. However, not only is the form either
material or non-material, the sanction can be directly political
(i.e., political security or lack of political representation)
or it can be non-political (i.e., increased standard of living).
In either case, the sanction as a stimulus can produce correct
or compliant political attitudes and behavior in an individual
222
or in the society as a whole.
In the learning process of political socialization, roles
and, most particularly, role models serve a critical function
in establishing the boundaries of behavior in much the same
way as do sanctions. Roles specify and determine the pattern
of behaviors by which the individual interacts with his environ-
ment. Whether individual-to-individual, individual-to-group,
individual-to-social system, or group-to-group roles establish
the position of the individual's ego (identity) relative to
his environment. Roles are usually learned by observation of
persons or groups who have been established or are perceived
as role-models within the individual's frame of reference.
Identification with a role-model both establishes the individ-
ual's position in society and establishes the modes of thinking
and behavior for the individual, based on the cultural and
social norms of the society. Thus, the role-model can be
recognized as the tangible personification of the standard
for correctness. As such, role-models function as agents in
the socialization process in that they initiate and facilitate
the external motivation which gives the individual the incentive
to learn (see Figure 7 of Chapter V). Within the social
sciences, parents, teachers, peerrgroups, and authority figures
have all been cast as role-models or agents of the socializa-
tion process. It is important to note that, for the most part,
persons who are in the position to exercise power over the
individual (whether child or adult) are recognized as role-models.
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This observation is important in that the role model is per-
ceived to have influence and efficacy in establishing the
individual's position in society, thereby significantly contribut-
ing to the individual's ego comfort. With this magnitude of
potential influence on the individual, it is important that the
role model represent the correct pattern of interaction and
behavior for the individual. Unfortunately sociological and
psychological studies have indicated that the role-models can
be the subjects or motivators of negative learning as well as
positive learning. For example, the child can learn social
prejudice and discrimination by observing the parent interact
with persons the parent perceives to be at a lower level on the
social stratum. In addition, unlike sanctions which always
imply controlled learning, the learning which occurs as a
result of identification or imitation of role-models can be un-
controlled and involuntary. Expanding our previous example,
the parent in the position or function of role-model need not
deliberately espouse lessons on social prejudice and discrimina-
tion in order for the child to learn social prejudice and dis-
crimination as apattern of behavior. The child merely imitates
attitudes and behaviors observed in his parent, presuming that
they are correct. In this case, the parent may be completely
unaware that he has functioned as a role-model in the learning
process of socialization.
As we found in our discussion of sanctions, the function
of role models does not change significantly in our more specific
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context of political socialization. Within the political
environment, the role-model usually personifies the standard
for correctness within specific boundaries. In addition, the
role-model establishes the individual's position in and his
interaction with his political environment. However, given the
inherent influence of the role-model on political learning,
from a system maintenance point of view, it is important that
the political system exercise control over what correct politi-
cal learning will be. The political system cannot afford to
have role-models which initiate or motivate negative political
learning, either intentionally or unintentionally. For example,
the sociological role-model of the father can result in the
son learning political apathy rather than political participa-
tion, as a result of observing his father's political attitudes
and behaviors. To assure correct political learning then, the
political system--unable to completely control parents,
teachers, peer groups, and personal authority figures, as
role models and agents of political socialization--can identify
and establish their own role-models as agents. In the case of
Maoist China during the Cultural Revolution (and traditionally),
as evidenced in the "model" revolutionary works of the periods,
heroes have been utilized in this position.
With regard to our approachin this chapter, we have
chosen to discuss sanctions and role-models together for two
reasons. First, according to our model for political learning
presented in the previous chapter, both sanctions and role-models
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occur in the initial stages of political learning, and func-
tion similarly in the political socialization process. Second,
and equally important, sanctions and role-models can be utilized
simultaneously by the political system in the controlled learning
stage of political socialization and can reinforce each other
as functional requisites of the political learning process.
That is to say, sanctions, particularly non-material sanctions,
can be presented to the population via the role-models or
established political heroes, as the population observes how
the role-models are treated and revered by the political system.
The population can therefore aspire to achieve the same defer-
ence and distinction as accorded the hero role-model for his
political attitudes and behavior. Sanctions and role-models
also combine in what socialization theorists, notably Robert
Merton,2 call anticipatory socialization--that is, the individ-
ual begins to take on the attitudes and behaviors of a particular
role with the anticipation that he will one day occupy that
role, In this instance, the role-model is observed and
initiated voluntarily by the individual;.:and compliant or
"correct" attitudes and behavior are sanctioned by the individ-
ual's positive identification with that projected role; whereas
non-compliance results in non-identification.
During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in
China, the Maoist religious belief system functioned as a
standard for determining which political values and norms were
correct and which were incorrect. The sanctions generated by
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the Maoist religious belief system were clear and easily
distinguishable. If the individual held the correct political
attitudes and behavior--self-sacrifice, class love, frugality,
diligence and hard work, etc. (see Themes Category Three in
Chapter IV) all for the achievement of a Maoist communist
state--then he was rewarded by being recognized or sharing in
the identity of Mao's "masses". In addition, the compliant,
"correct" Maoist individual shared the short-term gratification
of being included in the social welfare programs provided by
the political system; i.e., employment, child care, secondary
education,3 and the like. The negative sanctions were equally
effective and distinguishable. If the individual demonstrated
incorrect political ,attitudes or behavior, he was either ostra-
cized and rejected by his immediate socio-political reference
group (family, commune, factory, school, etc.); or, at the
harshest degree, he was purged and removed from his socio-
political reference group (a loss of identity and resultantly
ego comfort) and taken away for "reeducation".
Not just during the Cultural Revolution but traditionally,
the Chinese have placed great importance on "saving face" and
group identity. So much so that, as Solomon and Hiniker4
have separately observed, the Chinese individual will, more
often than not, "feign" compliance with the perceived.iauthority
or socio-cultural norm; rather than run the risk of losing face
within the social reference group, or being ostracized or
rejected by the group with which he is identified, Both
227
sanctions and role-models were important in the determination
of the norm .and identity with which the individual would
choose and identify. The individual in traditional China
learned from sanctions, administered by the political system,
which attitudes and behaviors complied with the prevailing
socio-political, Confucian belief system.and cultural norm
and which did not. Role-models, often heroes, were used to
reinforce or supplement this learning process. In Confucian
China, in particular, it was well established and understood
that the political leader was to act as the role model for the
son; the husband, the role model for the wife; and so on. The
more powerful or accepted;the role-model in perceived status,
the more it was assured that compliance (again, whether feigned
or real) would be forthcoming from the individual.
During the Cultural Revolution, although this tendency
probably was often manifest, the general confusion coupled
with the propaganda strategies utilized by both sides (i.e.,
the pro-Maoist, pure ideological "reds" versus the pro-Liu
pragmatist "experts") would have made it difficult for the
average individual to determine which side merited compliance,
again, whether true or feigned. The rampaging Red 'guard
youths who scoured the country attempting to physically and
verbally proselytize their interpretations of Maoism added
significantly to the confusion. We can only surmise that it
was for this reason that so much emphasis was placed on drama
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(the traditional communication link between the political
system and .the population), and, specifically, on who controlled
drama. Whoever controlled the manner of communication could
control what was communicated--what sanctions existed and
what role-models were correct figures to emulate. In this
light it is understandable that the Cultural Revolution should
be sparkediby a controversy over the contents of a play.
The pro-Maoist faction, under the direction of Mao's
wife, Chiang Ching, took control of the theatre early in the
Cultural Revolution.5 Chiang Ching reviewed all of the Peking
Operas being performed in Peking, Shantung (her native province)
and Shanghai (the center for leftist Mao support). In 1963,
Mao, based on Chiang's findings, sharply criticized the
Department of Cultural Affairs, calling it a "department of
emperors and generals, useless scholars and sickly maidens."6
At this point, Chiang assumed sole responsibility for reviewing
all theatrical and dramatic works for their ideological content
(a responsibility formerly resting with the Department of
Cultural Affairs) and making revisions where necessary. The
first dramatic work to engage Chiang's scrutiny was the
Shanghai Opera Sparks in Reed Marshes which depicted guerilla
activities during the war of resistance against Japan. The
opera was revised by the Opera Troupe of Peking under the
close supervision of Chiang and was eventually staged at the
First Festival of Peking Operas on Contemporary Themes held
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in Peking in Summer, 1964. Mao, who was present at the perform-
ance, was so pleased with the results of the content revisions
that he renamed the opera Shachiapang. In a speech presented
at the Festival Chiang described the melthods that had been
utilized to revise the opera:
First the leadership set the theme. Then the
playwrights went three times to acquire actual life
experience. . . . When the script was written, many
leading members of the Kwang Chow military command
took part in discussions of it, and after it had been
rehearsed, opinions were widely canvassed and revisions
made. In this way, by constantly asking for opinions
and making revisions, they succeeded in turning out
in a fairly short time, a good topical play reflecting
a real-life struggle.7
The symbolic importance of portraying real-life struggle on
stage and the emphasis this criteria received should be noted
here and will be discussed in more detail in the next Chapter.
Their success with Shachiapang led the Opera troupe,again with
the close scrutiny of Chiang Ching, to revise the script of
the Shanghai opera The Red Lantern and adapt it as a Peking
Opera during the 1964 Festival.
By August, 1966, during the height of the Cultural Revolu-
tion turbulence, all stage productions and performances of
traditional Peking and Shanghai operas had been halted, except
for seven productions we have previously identified as the
"Model Revolutionary Works." These works, four of which we
examine here (Shachiapang, Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy,
On the Docks, and -The Red Lantern) dominated the stage
throughout the Cultural Revolution and served as the communication
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channel for the Maoist forces in disseminating the correct
attitudes and behaviors by presenting sanctions and role-models
(based on the Maoist religious belief system, which, as we
illustrated earlier are (necessary) functional requisites in
the political learning process of political socialization).
Through "revolutionary realism" combined',with "revolutionary
romanticism" on stage, the Maoist faction attempted to politi-
cally socialize the Chinese masses into Maoist Communist men,
women, and children who would deny themselves, their individual
needs and desires for the good of Maoism and the presumed
eventuality of a Chinese Communist state guided by the CCP.
In order to promote this voluntary self-denial, it was neces-
sary to motivate the individual to learn to transfer his
identity frame of reference from himself to a politically defined
class group, recognized by the Maoists as "the masses of Chinese
people." Eric Hoffer, uncognizant of the Chinese context
during the Cultural Revolution, wrote of mass movements in
1951: ". . . to ripen a person for self-sacrifice he must be
stripped of his individual identity and distinctness."9 "The
most drastic way to achieve this end," Hoffer continues, "is
by the complete assimilation of the individual into a collec-
tive body, 1 0 As we shall see later in this chapter, the
ultimate self-denial that was expected of "a member of the
Chinese masses was self-sacrifice, if necessary, to the point
of death. Theatrical drama, as Hoffer points out, is critical
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in provoking this, otherwise avoided tendency in individuals:
Dying and killing seem easy when they are part
of a . . . dramatic performance. . . there is a need
for some kind of make-believe in order to face death
unflinchingly. To our real, naked selves there is
not a thing on earth or in heaven worth dying for.
It is only when we see ourselves as actors in a staged
(and therefore unreal) performance that death loses
its frightfulness and finality and becomes an act of
make-believe and a theatrical gesture.ll
As we shall see, the "model revolutionary operas" attempt
to carry the audiences into a "realistic"' world of "make-
believe". Such a world, Hoffer12 maintains, is the most
necessary and most enduring factor in igniting and controlling
a mass movement. He has further observed that "when faith and
the power to persuade or coerce are gone, make-believe lingers
on, "113 The operas combine those seemingly contradictory ele-
ments of realism and make-believe in their time setting and
characterizations. Although the content of each of the model
operas is supposed to present the real life struggles of the
masses, the time frame of three of the four is set well previous
to the 1960's and the period of the Cultural Revolution. Both
Shachiapang and The Red Lantern take place during the war of
resistance against Japan in the mid-to-late 1930's. Taking
Tiger Mountain by Strategy highlights P.L.A. activity against
warlords and bandits in Northeast China in 1946, just prior
to the civil war between the Communists and the Kuomingtang.
On the Docks, is the only "model" revolutionary opera with a
time setting in the 1960's. Yet, even in this instance, the
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audience is led into a world of make-believe, as they ponder
the struggles of their international "class brothers" in Africa.
Consequently, both adult and youth audiences had to leave their
time frame of reference to identify with the lives and charac-
ters in the plays. For the adults in the audience, the journey
was into their memories of times past. For the youth, not
coincidently, the main targets of the political socialization
process during the Cultural Revolution, the journey went beyond
any experiential cognitive reference points. The youth in the
audience had to search in their imaginations for what "it must
have been like" and couple this image with what was being pre-
sented to them. For both adults and youth, once the journey
into memory or imagination began, the individual entered into
a realm of "make-believe" while viewing the theatrical pro-
duction. This journey was facilitated on stage by the play-
acting feats of the role-model heroes and symbolic uses of
color and imagery (as we shall later see). According to
Chairman Mao, this unnatural combination of "revolutionary
realism" with "revolutionary romanticism" led to "revolutionary
truth." The sanctions and role-models presented through the
mediumoof the model revolutionary operas were to be regarded
and.;accepted by the audience as real, tangible evidences of
the truth and validity of the Maoist religious belief system.
The use of symbols and symbolism, as we shall see later, was
to reinforce and eventually cause internalization of this
political learning process,
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Before we begin our discussion of the examples of sanctions
and role models found in the model revolutionary operas we will
present a synopsis of each opera to provide background and con-
text for the reader.
Synopses of Model Revolutionary Operas
Shachiapang:
Shachiapang is a ten scene opera set in Changshu County
of Kiangsu Province during the War of Resistance (1934). The
plot concerns the cooperation of Communist and peasant revolu-
tionary forces and their successful efforts to prevent Japanese
and Kuomintang forces from taking over the town of Shachiapang.
The major characters can be divided in two opposing
groups. The protagonists are Kuo Chien-kuang, political
instructor of the New Fourth Army; Sister Ah-Ching, underground
worker of the CCP, who owns and runs the local tea house as a
cover; Cheng Chien-ming, secretary of the Changshu County
Committee of the CCP; Aunt Sha, peasant activist; and her son,
Sha Szu-lung, ta member of the ShiachiapangJ peasant militia;
and Ah-fu, another revolutionary peasant. The chief antagonists
are Hu Chuan-Kuei, the commander of the KMT "Loyal and Just
National Salvation Army" and his chief of staff Tiao Teh-yi;
and Kuroda, the colonel of the invading Japanese army.
In scenes one and two, a group of eighteen wounded
New Fourth Army soldiers arrive in Shachiapang, assisted
through Japanese lines by Sister Ah-Ching. Once in town,
Aunt Sha and other villagers take care of the wounded soldiers.
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Some two weeks later, Sister Ah-ching learns of a Japanese
"mopping up" campaign that is headed toward Shachiapang and
relays to Kuo instructions from the County Committee of the
CCP to hide his wounded men in the marshes surrounding the
town until the Japanese leave. The wounded troops are evacuated
from the village with boats and provisions provided by the
villagers. The Japanese "mopping up" campaign reaches Shachia-
pang just as the evacuation is complete. Their commander,
Kuroda, angered that his "mopping-up" has not uncovered the
New Fourth Army wounded, sends orders to the KMT "Loyal and
Just National Salvation Army" to continue the search for the
wounded communist forces.
Scene three outlines the collaborative meetings between
the Japanese Imperial Army and the KMT "Loyal and Just National
Salvation Army". Hti, the commander of the KMT "puppet forces,"
and Tiao, his chief of staff, agree to seek out and destroy the
New Fourth army forces, including the known wounded soldiers.
The KMT forces arrive in Shachiapang in scene four as the
town recovers from the raid by the Japanese Army. Sister
Ah-Ching wisely halts the attempt to bring the New Fourth Army
wounded back from the marshes, but worries about their low pro-
visions. Realizing that the KMT forces are acting as puppets
for the Japanese, she decides to first find out as much as she
can about the size and strategies of the KMT and Japanese
forces. Earlier in the war of resistance Sister Ah-ching had
saved Hu's life by hiding him, ironically enough,
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in the tea house cellar, from the Japanese Imperial forces who
sought to destroy his nationalist forces. He arrived still
expressing his gratitude to Sister Ah-ching, unaware that she
was an underground worker for his internal enemy, the CCP.
Tiao, though, was doubtful of her loyalty to the KMT, and
inferentially accused her of hiding the wounded New Fourth Army
soldiers just as she had hidden Hu. An enraged Sister Ah-ching
demands that they immediately search her teahouse. Tiao's
accusation had been just an attempt to expose his suspicions
about Sister Ah-ching to Hu.
In a survey of'the area, Tiao determines that the wounded
soldiers are hiding in the marshes. He plots to trick the
communist soldiers by sending the villagers out in fishing
boats (with his men camoflagued in the boats) to give the
appearance that the KMT troops have left and life is back to
normal. This, he concluded, would draw the wounded men out.
Sister Ah-ching, strategizing that the wounded men would not
be fooled and would maintain their cover if they heard gunfire,
throws a brick covered with a straw hat into the lake to draw
the KMT troops' fire. Realizing that his plan would not work
after the gun shot warnings, Tiao threatens to starve the
wounded troops out of the marshes in a waiting tactic.
Scene five finds the wounded soldiers almost out of
food and medicine and drenched by a rainstorm. However the
eighteen men now know that they can "hold out till victory"
through thunder, starvation and death, armed with Chairman Mao's
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thoughts. Kuo sends two scduts in disguise to row to the
town and get supplies from supportive villagers.
As scene six opens, Sister Ah-ching attempts to send two
villagers to the marshes with food and medicine under cover of
night. The villagers are discovered by the KMT guard and
narrowly escape capture by swimming back to shore. Sister Ah-
ching devises another plan.
This time Aunt Sha's son will appear to be seriously ill
and they will go to Hu and request a boat to take the boy to
a doctor for treatment. Just as the plan is in action, CCP
commander, Cheng, arrives in town disguised as a doctor. In
treating the "ill" boy he learns of the situation. Cheng
whispers to Sister Ah-ching that the main communist forces
will be arriving soon to wipe out the KMT forces and that the
wounded troops should be removed from the marshes to the
Stone village nearby.
As the KMT forces leave to prepare for Commander Hu's
marriage (to the Japanese interpreter's daughter!) Aunt Sha's
son voalunteers to swim under a boat (so that it will appear to
be empty and drifting in the wind) and deliver the new instruc-
tions to the wounded soldiers. Although Tiao notices the boat
and realizes its meaning, his men are not in time to stop
the evacuation of the wounded troops.
Scene seven opens with Tiao and Hurordering torture for
Shachiapang villagers in order to find out who the undercover
communists are and who helped the wounded New Fourth Army men
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escape. Some villagers are executed shouting as they fall,
"Long live Chairman Mao and the CCP." Tiao orders that Aunt
Sha be brought in for questioning and again voices his suspicions
about Sister Ah-ching to Hu. Although Hu has already invited
her to assist him in his wedding plans, he agrees reluctantly
to set a trap for Sister Ah-ching.
Sister Ah-ching arrives at Hu's headquarters hoping to
get information to pass to the approaching communist forces to
complete their strategies. She is cautious but seemingly unaware
that she is walking into a trap set by Tiao. The three (Hu,
Tiao and Sister Ah-ching) are chatting casually about Hu's
wedding arrangements when Aunt Sha is dragged in.
Aunt Sha seeing Sister Ah-ching there realizes that she
is being used as bait to trap Sister Ah-ching and determines to
protect Sister Ah-ching even if it costs her her life. When
questioned Aunt Sha denounces the enemy KMT puppet forces.
Hu orders her taken away to be shot, but Tiao signals to the
guards not to follow through with the order. Sister Ah-ching
unaware of his signal suggests that Hu not shoot her and save
her for a "bigger catch." "Surely the New Fourth Army men will
come to rescue her." Her scheme works. Hu decides not to
have Aunt Sha shot, More importantly, Tiao seems more trustful
of Sister Ah-ching's loyalty and asks that she escort Aunt
Sha home and keep an eye on her. Aunt Sha is brought in again and
the two women leave.
Tiao sends some of his men to follow them as a last check
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on Sister Ah-ching. If they whisper while walking it will mean
they are in collusion and his initial suspicions of Sister Ah-
ching would have been correct. The guard returns excitedly
reporting that the two women are fighting. The two women
have again outwitted Hu.and Tiao. Hu orders Aunt Sha jailed
as Sister Ah-ching later recounts how the old woman attacked
her calling her a "Traitor". Tiao is finally convinced that
Sister Ah-ching is loyal to the KMT.
Scenes eight through ten highlight the surprise attack
launched by the New Fourth Army (as Hu's wedding celebration is
in progress) and the final victory and the liberation of Sha-
chiapang by the New Fourth Army. In the final scene Sister
Ah-ching faces the captured Hu, and accuses him of being a
Japanese imperialist traitor, and declares herself openly a
member of the CCP.
Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy:
Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy is set in the Peony
River Area of Northeast China in the Winter of 1946. The
ten scene opera depicts the cooperation of the People's Libera-
tion Army (PLA) and local villagers to destroy a bandit brigade
of KMT forces holed up in a stronghold on Tiger Mountain.
There are three categories of characters--PLA soldiers, local
peasants in the village surrounding Tiger Mountain who have
suffered the bandit raids, and the KMT bandit troops. Yang
Tzu-jung is the chief character in the first category and
stands out as the principal hero of the opera. Hunter Chang,
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his daughter Chang Pao and Li Yung-chi, a peasant railway
worker are key peasant characters. The principal bandit char-
acters are Vulture, bandit Chieftain of Tiger Mountain and
leader of the KMT's "Fifth Peace Preservation Brigade of the
Eastern Hulungkiang !Region" (hereafter referred to as the KMT
Brigade); Luan P'eng, bandit Chieftain of Breast Mountain
and Horse Cudgel Hsu, liaison adjunct for rival bandit.
The opera opens with the PLA in a "continuous march" in
pursuit of Vulture through the snowy mountains in the Northeast.
Yang, who had been sent out as a scout, returns to informithe
Chief of Staff Lthat with the help of a mute boy (who he and the
other scout rescued from a ravine) and his father, they
trailed Vulture to Black Dragon Valley. Vulture and his bandits
having pillaged'this valley were now holding back to their
Tiger Mountain base in Chiapi Valley. The PLA soldiers prepare
themselves to march on, determined to have the cold snow and
fatigue to "Be resolute, fear no sacrifice and surmount every
difficulty. . .
Scene two briefly depicts Vulture's pillage of Chiapi
Valley. Vulture and his bandit chief of staff discuss the
whereabouts of Luan Ping, who has absconded with Horse Cudgel
Hsu's contact maps for the entire area. With this map they
can control the area. While Vulture and his chief confer, his
bandits burn and kill in the village. Li Yung-chi's infant son
is snatched from Li's wife's arms by a bandit and thrown over
the cliff. Li lunges to attack the bandit, but is shot in the
left arm. As he lies on the ground, Vulture enters and aims
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his gun to finish Li off but Li's wife flings herself to cover
him and is killed by Vulture's bullet. Li is taken prisoner
as he vows to avenge these deaths with Vulture's blood.
In scene three Yang seeks out the Hunter Chang and his
"mute" son whom he rescued earlier to ask their assistance in
locating Vulture's mountain hideout and the various approaches
and defenses. Chang is reluctant to trust Yang, but the child (a girl)
remembers his kindness and blurts out their story of tragedy
at the hands of Vulture and his bandits.
When Vulture first attacked their village, he killed the
young girl's grandmother and captured her mother and father.
An uncle took care of her. Shortly after his capture, Hunter
Chang escaped and came to get his daughter. His wife who
could not escape threw herself over a mountain cliff rather
than be victim to Vulture alone. Chang had dressed his little
daughter as a boy and she acted as a mute to maintain her dis-
guise. This way she would be protected from capture and mis-
treatment. Yang is moved by the story and vows to destroy
Vulture and avenge these wrongdoings. Huter Chang tells Yang
of a dangerous trail down the back of Tiger Mountain that is
unguarded and describes the bandit stronghold defenses. He
also tells Yang of a bandit visitor (Howling Wolf) and a woman
who sought rest in their cabin and of a contact map they had.
Yang realizes this map is important and after leaving his ration
of food for Hunter Chang and his daughter sets out with his men
to find Howling Wolf.
By scene four Yang finds and kills Howling Wolf. Along
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with the contacts maps Yang seizes a letter from Vulture to
Howling Wolf requesting his attendance at a Hundred Chickens
Feast to celebrate Vulture's birthday. Yang volunteers to dis-
guise himself ias a bandit and infiltrate the bandit den in
Tiger Mountain. From within, he can familiarize himself with
the layout of the stronghold and lead the attack. The Chief of
Staff agrees to let Yang 2arry out the manoeuver. It is determ-
ined that he will take the contacts maps to Vulture as evidence
of his new loyalty to Vulture.
Scenes five and six recount Yang's infiltration into
Vulture's bandit den. On the way up the mountainhe encounters
bandit sentries. As they question Yang, a tiger approaches.
The two bandits cower in fear. Yang shoots the tiger through
the head. In his initial meeting with Vulture, he successfully
utilizes all the bandit jargon and (using information provided
by his captured bandits) answers all Vulture's questions concern-
ing fellow bandits and their strongholds. In the end, Yang
produces the contacts map Vulture so coveted. Vulture is con-
vinced and Yang, as Vulture's newly appointed bandit chieftain,
sets out to "case" the Tiger Mountain stronghold.
In scene seven we find the PLA Chief of Staff and Li
Yung-chi attempting ways to arouse the peasants in the villages
surrounding Tiger Mountain to join the PLA in an attack on
the bandits den. When the peasants realize the benevolence and
sincerity of the PLA they willingly volunteer. Yang manages to
leak out information to the Chief of Staff about the strategic
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defenses and tunnels in the stronghold, and in scene nine the
PLA and the villages prepare for the attack. Pao pleads to
be included in the attack so that she can personally avenge her
family's past tragedies and is brought along as a medical assist-
ant.
In the final scene the Tiger Mountain Stronghold is suc-
cessfully attacked during the Hundred Chickens Feast. The
drunken bandits have been taken off guard and are unprepared
to defend the stronghold. During the attack Yang triumphantly
confronts Vulture as a member of the PLA. As the curtain closes
Pao attempts to stab Vulture to death but is restrained by the
PLA medical orderly.
On the Docks:
On the Docks is set in contemporary post '49 China. It
is a seven scene opera that depicts the application of inter-
national brotherhood (defined and interpreted by Mao Tse-tung
thought) on dockwork. The list of major characters includes:
Fang Hsi-chen Secretary of the CCP branch of the dockers'
brigade; Kao Chih-yang, team leader of the dockers brigade
and Chao Chen-shan Chief of the Dockers' Brigade, both branch
committee members of the CCP; Ma Hung-liang, a retired dock-
worker; Han Hsiao-chiang, a young dockworker who is a middle
character (torn between the virtues of Maoism~and uselfishness);
and Chien Shan-wei, the only central antagonist character.
Scene one opens with a depiction of a dock on the
Huangpu River in Shanghai in the Summer of 1963. The dockers
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under the supervision of Kao are loading eight thousand sacks
of rice seed for export to Africa which is due to be shipped
in two days. There are also two thousand sacks of export wheat
also eventually to be shipped to Africa stored on the docks,
Chien, arrives on the scene with a rush assignment to loadaa
shipment of fiberglass onto a Scandinavian ship.
As Chien and Kao (joined by Chao) discuss which sipment
takes priority, Party Secretary Fang arrives from a district
Party committee meeting as Chien leaves. New orders have been
issued which mean that the shipment of rice seed must be
advanced one day to avoid an approaching typhoon. All outgoing
ships must haul anchor early the following morning. These new
orders mean that in a period of less than twenty-four hours,
eight thousand sacks of rice must be loaded on the Africa-bound
ship, two thousand sacks of wheat must be moved into the ware-
house so that they will not be destroyed by the impending rain;
and a shipment of sacks of fiberglass must be loaded on the
Scandinavian ship. There must be no damage or mixup of any
sack.
The dockers are determined to accomplish this seemingly
impossible task ledhby Mao Tse-tung's thought: "Be resolute,
fear no sacrifice and surmount every difficulty. . . ." Office
workers have volunteered to assist. They will use the machinery
to load the rice seed and the dockers' youth brigade will load
the wheat on their shoulders.
In scenes two and three wheat from a spilled sack is
discovered by Kao on the dock area and in the spilled-.wheat
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some fragments of fiberglass. An investigation is called to
discover who spilled the wheat and how spilled fiberglass
got into the area where the wheat was being moved. What Kao,
Fang and the other dockers do not know is that a young dock
worker, Han has spilled the sack while discussing his disappoint-
ment with dock work with Chien. Chien, (who had some fiberglass
fragments that he had swept up from the other loading areas
in a dustpan) offered to cover for Han and swept up the spilled
wheat. He swept the wheat into the dustpan with the fiber-
glass and (intentionally)dumPed both into the wheat sack while
Hanwas not looking. He maliciously suggestedthat Han take
another sack to the wheat storage area while he minded the torn
sack. The sack Han unknowingly took was rice seed. Chien
advised Han to forget the spilled sack, not mention the occur-
er-ce to anyone and to go to a movie when his eight hour shift was over.
Later,during the investigation, Han is questioned and denies
knowledge of the incident. Wien he is asked to stay on duty
until the spilled sack is found, he retorts that he is free
to go when his eight hours are up and rushes off angrily.
Fang and Kao are upset at his attitudes and behavior but determ-
ines that the first priority is to find the spilled sack to
avoid an international bad reputaticn for China. (All export
must be perfect in accordance with Mao's teachings.)
The investigation and search continue through scenes four
and five, Fang has communicated the incident to the district
Party committee and they have concluded that "an acute and
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complex class struggle" is the source of the trouble. The
Committee had also determined that the wheat must be shipped
in the morning to avoid the typhoon. Fang, Chao, and Kao
confer and determine that Chien may be the culprit. But they
cannot determine the level or extent of his involvement. The
challenge for Fanig and the dockers has intensified. They must
count the number of wheat sacks to make sure allare accounted
for;load.the wheat sacks from the warehouse, back to the dock
and complete the loading of the eight thousand sacks of rice
seed. They must find the spilled sack of wheat; and finally
uncover the class struggle which is determined to be the
cause of the trouble. They must accomplish all this is about
twelve hours.
Ma, the retired docker, who had just come to visit,
decides to help in the search and the loading. A youth dock
worker is sent to bring Han back to the docks. Han reappears
on the docks just as Chien is plotting to find the rice seed
sack in the wheat storage area so that it will not be found by
Fang and the dockers. Chien reprimands Han for his return
and attempts to frighten Han by recounting the discovery of
fiberglass fragment in the spilled wheat. Han is surprised
about the fiberglass, and out of fear, takes Chien's advice
to flee -the docks.
As they talk, Fang and Ma appear. When FangA.and Ma
question Han again he insists on a transfer to another dock.
When Fang,.refuses, Han tears up his dock identification card
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and idefiantly declares he "quits" the dock. Fang and Ma are
shocked and try to talk sense into the youth. As Ma takes
Han off, Fang turns to question Chien. Chien stumbles under
the examination and Fang's suspicions are reinforced. She
orders a docker to watch his movements.
In the meantime, the dockers have not found the spilled
wheat sack in the warehouse. They determine it was never
taken to the warehouse. Two dockers step up and recount that
they reloaded a sack which had apparently fallen from a cart
of rice seed which was to be loaded. Fang rushes to the loading
platform to check the sacks. They are filled with rice seed.
She determines that a switch has been (intentionally) made and
that the spilled sack of wheat is on the lighter transport
boat bound for loading on the foreign freighter for Africa.
Kao volunteers to brave the storm and take a launch out on
the lake to stop the transport and retrieve the spilled sack
of wheat from the rice seed shipment, declaring that "even
if the sky starts falling," they will prop it up. Fang adds
"we will not disappoint Chairman Mao!"
In scene six, Ma and Fang talk to Han. When Han
finally realizes his wrongdoings and that he has been mali-
ciously "used" by Chien he confesses the spilled sack of
wheat. He asks that his request for transfer be nullified
and vows uncompromising belief and adherence to Chairman Mao's
Thoughts.
In the final seventh scene, Kao returns with the spilled
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sack of wheat having conquered the storm in his little boat; and
Chien is captured by Chao as he tries to escape taking with him
"a letter of recommendation from his American boss, an offer
of contract from his Japanese boss, and an appointment docu-
ment issued by the Kuomingtang." All of the sacks were loaded
on schedule, the freighters set sail to their respective
destinations and the dockers stand on the docks with Fang,
Kao, Chao, Ma and Han as a red sun slowly rises in the early
morning.
The Red Lantern:
In eleven scenes, this opera depicts the story of a
revolutionary family and the struggles they encounter attempt-
ing to aid the communist guerrillas on Cypress Mountain who
are fighting the Japanese. The setting is in Northern China
during the war of resistance. The major characters are the Li
family (father Li Yu-ho, a railway worker; his daughter Tieh-
Mei and his mother Granny Li); their neighbors who assist them
in their struggles, Hui-Lien and her mother-in-law Aunt Tien;
Hatayama, Chief of the Japanese Gendarmerie;and Wang Lien-chu
an underground communist who turns traitor under the torture
of the Japanese.
In the first two scenes the Li family receives a secret
code from a liaison man and accepts the task of delivering it
to the communist guerrilla base on Cypress Mountain. Wang has
witnessed Li's initial contact with the communist liaison man
at the railway station and, when he cannot escape the Japanese
patrol,shoots himself in the arms to give the appearance that the
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liaison man shot him. Meanwhile when the liaison man and Li arrive
at Li's house, Li tests the liaison man's identity with a red lantern
as Granny and Tieh-Mei look on from the background. The liaison man
gives the correct pass words, passes the test, and delivers the code
to Li. Li is to deliver the code to the local Knife-Grinder (also
an underground Communist) the following day.
In scene three when Li attempts to rendezvous with the Knife-
Grinder at the gruel stall the Japanese gendarmie approach. To pro-
tect the secret code, Li covers the slip of paper in his lunch box
with a serving of gruel while the Knife-Grinder overturns his cart
to divert the enemy's attention. The transfer of the secret code
is aborted.
In scene four Wang, who has been brought in for questioning
and tortured by the Japanese Chief, Hatoyama, confesses his
alliances with the Communist Party and identifies Li as the accom-
plice who met the Communist liaisoin man with the secret code. As
a result, Li is arrested for questioning in scene five. However,
before Li had returned home and was arrested Hatoyama had sent a bogus
liaison man to the Li house in an attempt to trick Li's mother
and daughter into turning over the secret code. Tieh-Mei answers the
door and is fooled by the man's disguise and use of secret pass words
she has heard earlier. She goes to pick up the red lantern as a
final test but is stopped by Granny, who picks up a kerosense lamp
instead. The bogus liaison man does not recognize this final test and
is thrown out of the house by Tieh-Mei who is angered that she
was so easily fooled.
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After Li's arrest, realizing the entire family is in
danger, Granny tells Tieh-Mei the real story of her family
so that she may understand the seriousness of the revolutionary
struggles and carry on if anything happens to Granny and Li.
Tieh-Mei learns that her real parents and Granny's husband
(also a(.railway worker) had been murdered during a demonstra-
tion of workers on the Peking-Hankow Railway seventeen years
ago. A young comrade (Chang Yu-ho, now Li Yu-ho) of Teih-Mei's
real father rescued Chen's one year old daughter and took her
to Granny to be raised as her own grandchild. Chang also took
on Granny Li's surname and was reocgnized as her son and Tieh-
Mei's father. Hearing this story of her past, Tieh-Mei under-
stands the struggle and.is determined to carry it on to
avenge her family tragedies.
In scene six Li is quesioned, and tortured by Hatoyama.
Wang is brought in to destroy Li's cool composure. Li denounces
Wang as a traitor but does not divulge the whereabouts of the
secret code.
In scene seven, the Knife-Grinder attempts to make
contact with Grannny to get the secret code. However, when
he approaches the house and sees that the red paper butterfly
(a signal to the underground communist forces) is not in the
window he leaves. (Granny has taken the butterfly down to
avoid further suspicion from the Japanese). Granny sends Tieh-
Mei out through a loose stone in an inner bedroom which leads
to the neighbor Hui-lieu's house, to find the Knife-Frinder.
However, while Tieh-Mei is out, two Japanese spies come to
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the house to question Granny. When they notice Tieh-Mieh's
absence they ask her whereabouts. Granny says she is ill in
the next room. They push Granny aside and lift the door
curtain. A voice cries out, "Granny, who's there?" Convinced
that it is Tieh-Mei the spies leave. Hui-lieu comes out of
the room and tells Granny she came into the room when she heard
Granny being questioned. As they talk, Tieh-Mei returns
through the hole in the wall and recounts her unsuccessful
attempts to find the Knife-Grinder. Hui-lieu returns to her
house just as the Japanese gendarmie come to gather Granny
and Tieh-Mei for questioning. They do not divulge the where-
abouts of the code to Hatoyama.
In scene eight Li, Granny and Tieh-Mei are briefly
reunited. Hatoyama gives them one last chance to turn over
the secret code, then orders them executed. The three stand
firm. Three gendarmes raise their guns, but only two shoot,
leaving Tieh-Mei standing. Hatoyama demands she hand over the
code. She glares at him. He releases her, hoping that she will
lead him to the secret code.
In scene nine, Tieh-Mei returns home angered and vowing
to be a revolutionary, avenge her grandmother's and father's
martyrdom and deliver the secret code to the communist guerrilla
base in Cypress Mountain. Her neighbors, Aunt Tien and Hui-
Chien come to comfort her. Realizing that spies wait outside
the door to trail her every move, Hui-lien changes clothes
with Tieh-Mei (Tieh-Mei is reluctant as she does not want to
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get them in trouble) and goes out the door quickly, followed
by the gendarmes. Tieh-Mei slips through the hole in the wall
and leaves Aunt Tien's house as Hui-lieu with the secret code.
and a red lantern in a basket on her arm.
In scene ten she finds the Knife-Grinder (remembering
the Red Lantern test) and tells him of the Tien help. The
Knife Grinder orders some guerrillas to go help the Tiens move
to a safe place and to escort Tieh-Mei to the mountain base
while he and another group of guerrillas go to fight an approach-
ing group of Japanese gendarmes. In the final scene, Tieh-Mei,
escorted by the Knife-Grinder, hands the secret code over to
the guerrilla leader and holds the Red Lantern high.
Sanctions and Role-Models in the Model Revolutionary Operas
In each of the texts of the four "model" revolutionary
operas we examined, we found sanctions being utilized as either
initiators or reinforcers for the political learning process.
The sanctions or rewards, given to the characters in the operas
as they exhibited positive and correct political attitudes or
behaviors, were usually extra food or clothing representing
material gain or identity and acceptance by class, party, or
politically correct (communist)groups. In Shachiapang, Aunt
Sha, an elderly peasant woman takes care of the wounded New
Fourth Army soldiers by unselfishly tending their wounds,
washing their clothes, cooking for them, and most importantly,
holding the correct political attitudes toward the CCP:
The Communist Party is like the bright sun/ . . . Without
the Party my whole family would have died long ago.14
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In return for her unselfish display of brotherly (class) love
and of correct political attitudes Aunt Sha is given (rewarded
with) extra food: "Go and hide Aunt Sha's grain in the jar
buried behind her house." 15 A:;similar sequence is presented
in Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy,when old hunter Chang
and his dauahter are given food by the two P.L.A. officers in
return for help in tracking down the bandits.
Negative sanctions (punishments) are equally important
in establishing the correct political attitudes and behavior
for the political learning process. As we have mentioned
earlier, in the Chinese frame of reference, the most dramatic
and effective punishment any individual could recieve is to
"lose face" or suffer public disgrace for a thought or action.
According to his Confucian tradition, the average Chinese
individual would do anything, including compromise himself to
avoid losing face in his family, peer group, or, while inter-
acting withaperceived authority figure. One can only assume,
as the political system did during the Cultural Revolution,l6
that vestiges of this Confucian past still influenced the
thinking and dispositions of contemporary Chinese.
In all of the model revolutionary operas, we find the
villain oronegative role-models suffering the disgrace of
loss of face. However, in On the Docks and The Red Lantern,
the negative sanction functioning in the political learning
process is most striking. In both of these model Revolutionary
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Peking operas, we find loss of face being used as a negative
sanction to highlight incorrect political thinking or behavior.
As we shall see, the loss of face occurs when the individual
is displaying attitudes or behaviors unbecoming a true Maoist.
That is, they have committed the ultimate "sin" of selfishness,
class betrayal, or disloyalty to the Maoist Communist cause.
Each of these transgressions against the Maoist religious
belief system was tantamount to politico-religious heresy.
In On the Docks both negative characters Chien Shou-wei,
the archvillain, and Han Hsiao-chiang, the young dockworker
cajoled by Chien, suffer loss of face. The character, Chien,
having been caught by the Party Secretary in his wrongdoings
projects confusion, embarrassment and nervousness (all
external signs of loss of face) to the audience as the dialogue
continues:
Fang:. . . I know you pay great attention to changes in
weather. You've been doing this for a dozen years,
haven't you?
Chien (noticing the insinuation behind her words, tries
to cover up for himself): It's all for the good of
the work. I contact the weather station every day.
Fang: Oh? . . . then you knew about the coming of the
typhoon?
Chien (in confusion): Uh . . . no . . . no . . . I slip
up sometimes. For instance today (embarrassed) I
forgot to contact the weather station.
Fang: . . . So that is why you left two thousand sack of
export wheat out in the open, eh? So that is why
you schanged the loading plan and wanted us to load
the Scandinavian ship and leave the seed rice behind,
eh? If we had done as you wished, then once the typhoon
254
started the foreign freighter wouldn't be able to
set sail and the seed rice would miss the sowing
season (for Africa). What a serious consequence
that would bring.
Chein (flabbergasted and sweating profusely): that . . .
Fang: You've had a busy day. Go home now and rest..
Chien: (unwittingly): No . . . no . . . I must find Han!
Fang: So?
Chien (frightened by his own slip): No . . . no .
I mean I must go back to the dispatcher's office!
(turns to go . . .)
Fang: Chien Shou-wei, the dispatcher's office is over there!
Ohien: . . . (slips out of the warehouseinutter confusion). 1 8
Further on in the opera Han, realizing he has been fooled
by Chien, and, as a result, has caused near calamity by his
incorrect political thinking and behavior (demeaning his class
of dockworkers, selfishly asking for a transfer to become a
sailor, and not owning up to his mistake of dropping the sack
of wheat), declares (with remorse): Tve been a fool."19 And
at another pointhe sings with (shame and remorse in his heart):
I've been infected by bourgeois ideas,
How wrong of me to look down on dockers' work.
I should not have let down my elder's hopes,
Nor lightly believed that black-hearted Wolf (Chein).
Now I've brought trouble to us all,
I can hardly be forgiven,hardly be forgiven! .
Mixed feelings of remorse and shame
Bring tears to my eyes . . .20
In this passage, in addition to seeing an example of theme
four-confession and conversion (see chapter IV) as illustrative
of the functioning of the Maoist religious belief system, we
also see vestiges of the Confucian ideal of filial piety--"not
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letting down one's elders"--a virtue which had to be incorporated
into a Maoist religious belief system. It was to function in
the political socialization of the younger generation who had
not experienced pre-1949 China, butwho were beingcalled on,
nonetheless, to carry on the revolution; and to also indicate
the suffering of their parents and all the generations of
Chinese people before them. One can only imagine the impact of
these negative sanctions on an audience having to return to
the real world of the Cultural Revolution, where, at any time,
a person could be singled out and criticized (or worse yet
purged) for thoughts or -actions considered politically incorrect
or unbecoming of a "true Maoist." The use of role-models in
the model revolutionary operas was probably equally effective
in the political learning of the audience and deserves close
attention here.
In general, role-models are particularly important factors
in the political learning process in that they personify, in
tangible terms, correct or incorrect political attitudes and
behavior. As we mentioned previously, role-models simplify
learning through identification and imitation. The individual
learns correct political attitudes and behaviors by imitating
the attitudes and behaviors of the role-model. Equally signi-
ficant, the individual learns to avoid incorrect political
attitudes and behavior by observing and identifying with the
fate of the negative role-model as a result of his wrong doings.
We have also notedthat the role-model most accessible to the
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political system is the hero (or the villain). From the
official attention given to scrutinizing all aspects of the
political and individual psychological personalities of the
main characters (role-model/heroes) in the model revolutionary
operas, it is clear that the pro-Maoist forces, under the guid-
ance of Chiang Ching considered the functions of the role model/
hero and role-model/villain crucial to the political socializa-
tion process during the Cultural Revolution. Lois Snow has
observed of the function of the hero in contemporary China:
"Heroes in socialist China have little in common with
capitalist-grown varieties. Model revolutionaries are people
revered by the masses for having led--and most often lost--lives
dedicated to service beyond the call of socialist duty, and
who are meant to be emulated in daily life. They are not apart
from ordinary citizens." 21 We observe further evidence of
the significance of the hero in the model revolutionary operas
in an article written by the "Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy"
group of the Peking Opera troupe of Dbanghai describing the
"remoulding" of the hero Yang:
In the text it is explainedithat the original script
(until changed in 1963) 'blatantly clamoured for
prominence' to give Yang Tzu-jung 'dare-devilry and
dashing roughness', that is 'bandit-like airs'. It
called upon the hero 'to hum obscene ditties on his
way up the mountain to the bandits' stronghold.' We
criticized and repudiated this erroneous trend and
made great efforts to achieve a typical portrayal of
Yang as a hero in the image of the proletariat. The
original script did not make the least mention of Yang's
contact with the masses, to say nothing of describing
the flesh-and-blood relationship and the Class feelings
between him and the working people.
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We cut out the two scenes about superstitition and
murder which were specially written to play up the
negative roles (of the villains). These were replaced
by a new scene, 'Asking about Bitterness', purposely
designed to demonstrate the fish -and-water relationship
between our army and the people and the flesh-and-blood
relationship between the working people and Yang Tzu-jung
who relies on the masses and conducts propaganda among
them.
Thus the two essential sides to his character--
class love and class hatred--are clearly defined. With-
out this, it would be impossible to detect the class
traits in the hero's inner world and Yang would remain
a reckless adventurer divorced from the masses . .
Without accentuating Yang's political consciousness
due to his being armed with Mao Tse-tung Thought, the
audience would not know what ideological force propels
him to go deep into the enemy's stronghold, and would
not even feel worried about him or even doubt if he
could succeed in his mission.22
The character of the hero Yang presents a role-model of a dash-
ing--minus the roughness--courageous P.L.A. officer who
personifies the Maoist virtues of self-sacrifice, class-love,
and determination base (seen in theme three, chapter IV). In
the revised script of the model opera, the new Yang's virtues
are reviewed by the Chief of Staff while consideration is
given to the choice of who will infiltrate the bandit's den:
Yang has all the qualifications to shoulder this load
Born of a hired-hand peasant family,
From childhood he struggled on the brink of death;
Burning with hatred, he found his salvation
In the Communist Party and took the revolutionary road
He joined the army, vowing to uproot exploitation
If I send him -n this dangerous mission alone,
I'm sure, with his heart red as fire,
A will strong as steel,
He'll surely overcome Vulture. 23
In both Shachiapang and The Red Lantern, the main heroes
are more realistic than Yangand, yet must still romanticize
the virtues of Maoism in political struggles. In every way,
they conform to the functional requirements for all dramatic
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heroes who "must now radiate revolutionary optimism and faith
in Mao's concepts of communism. 4 As role-models, they appear
more human. Theirlives, although set during the struggle
against Japanese aggression in the 1930's, could be identified
with by both young and old alike in contemporary China. Self-
sacrifice to the point of death, such as that experienced by Li
Yu-ho in The Red Lantern, was a continual commitment expected
of every true Maoist, particularly during the Cultural Revolu-
tion. In Shachiapang, Kuo Chien-kuangtmounts to the task of
maintaining morale and the fighting spirit in his wounded
soldiers and outwitting the enemy--tasks again not uncommonly
expected of Maoist participants in the Cultural Revolution.
Despite his realistic, non-dashing nature, Kuo has all the
characterisitcs of,;a hero role-model:
A soldier born of the people . . . loyal to Chairman
Mao, devoted to his people and motherland, and full
of wisdom, courage and resourcefulness, he is the
responsible, dedicated leader, a fierce fighter when
he meets the enemy, an affectionate, pleasant young
man when he relaxes and jokes with Aunt Sha. That he
has reached the height of political maturity is stressed
constantly.25
Throughout all four model revolutionary operas, we find
heroic characters. In our examination of the opera scripts,
we have identified four types of hero characterizations. These
are peasant hero, worker hero, army hero, and party hero.
Each character type seems to represent a necessary socio-politi-
cal element within the Maoist defined and accepted class referred
to, in Mao's writings and speeches, as "the people." Within
the context of political socialization during the Cultural
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Revolution, each hero character type seems to represent some
socio-political role to which individual within the Maoist
Cormunist system should aspire, in order to comply with the
stimuli generated by a political system influenced by Maoism.
The peasant and worker roles are presented as the backbone
of the revolution--indeed the society. Tbe ideal peasant or
worker, once imbued with Maoist Communist doctrine, is to
epitomize the Maoist virtues of self-sacrifice, frugality,
exemplary life style, class (brotherly) love, humility, and
diligence. Their primary political function is to assist the
Army and Party (proletariat) in whatever they design to be
the correct road to "ultimate" Maoist socialism. We glimpse
the significance of this association and function in On the
Docks as Kao Chih-yang defiantly sings in response to the query,
Can dockers really run the docks?
A tossed stone raises a thousand ripples,
My heart is turbulent as the Huangpu.
I am reminded of the past . . .
Before liberation battleships and freighters
Flying the stars and stripes, sailed haughtily,
Bringing weary dock workers only
Tears of blood and aching wounds.
Then the cannon of the P.L.A.
Dispersed the clouds that hid the sun,
And a powerful hand grasped the revolutionary seal
The Party calling on the dockers to rely on their own efforts
Show their strength, do a good job,
And win glory for our land.26
Characterizations of peasant or worker heroes are through-
out the model opera. The character of Aunt Sha in Shachiapang
displaying the virtuous attributes of Theme V (suffering, self-
sacrifice, martyrdom. See chapter IV) pledges self-sacrifice
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at the hands of the enemy in order to protect the Party under-
cover Agent Sister Ah-ching:
Even if they break my bones, I won't care!
Shoulders back, I face the foe--
What's Sister Ah-ching doing here?
It's most likely the enemy's putting her to test.
I must protect her and face everything myself! 27
Or, the dock workers in On the Docks who work three shifts
straight with no rest in order to find a missing sack of spilled
wheat that may have been mixed with spilled fiberglass fragments.
Or, finally, the peasant neighbors of the Li's who help the
young girl Tieh-Mei escape the Japanese gendarmerie and deliver
a secret code to communist guerrillas in the hills without care
for their own safety.
The Army heroes share much of the characteristics of the
peasant and worker hero types. However, in the texts of the
operas, emphasis is placed upon courage against impossible odds
(with Maoism as the primary source for the courage), as well
as class consciousness and class love. In a discussion above
concerning the importance of heroes in the model revolutionary
operas, we described the two outstanding army heroes, Kuo
Chien-kuang and Yang Tzu-jung, the dashing P.L.A. platoon
leader who bravely goes into the bandits den, disguised as a
bandit and singlehandedly outwits the enemy, bringing about
their defeat at the hands of the P.L.A. Yet, there are lesser
army heroes, whose significance as role models in the political
learning process cannot be understated. For example, the P.L.A.
Chief of Staff in Taking Tiger Mountain who, although an unnamed
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character ih the opera sings a very important proclamation for
Maoism, ultimacy, and political correctness based on Maoism:
We're worker and peasant soldiers, come
To destroy the reactionaries and change the world.
With the Party and Chairman Mao leading the way,
A -red star on our army caps . . .
Where the red flag goes dark clouds disperse . . .
The People's Army shares the people's hardships. 28
And, the wounded, young New Fourth Army soldier, Wang, in
Shachiapang, who makes light of his serious wounds and refuses
to take medicine to heal his wounds because medicine is scarce
and should be kept "for more serious cases" (which the textual
and dramatic inferences suggest and, we must assume the audience
realizes, should include Wang).
The Party heroes are by far the most dramatic and out-
standing in the model operas.29 As role-models, they seem to
personify the epitome of the Maoist religious belief system
actualized within a political environment. In addition to
exemplifying the Maoist virtues found in the other three hero
types, Party heroes are also characterized as cool-headed and
witty with the enemy and patient with others who aspire to be
true Maois~t, but seemingly falter along the way. This hero
type seems to exemplify all of the themes (excluding Theme
Four, Confession and Conversion) subsumed in the Maoist religious
belief system (see chapter IV). They perform the miracles, they
display the-uncompromising faith in the power of Mao Tse-tung
thought, they lead flawless virtuous lives, and express the
commitment to suffer, self-sacrifice and die for Maoism.
In all scenes where the Party hero appears, the
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character takes center stage. In times of crisis, all char-
acter heroes and role-models look to the Party hero for solu-
tions, strength, etc. The Party hero seems to represent the
"anticipatory" role30 of the proletariat--the political role
to which most Red Guard youth during the Cultural Revolution
aspired. In Shachiapang, Sister Ah-ching personifies class
love as she "helps the old" and "guides the young" peasants
of the village and boldly enters the "tiger's den" (Kuomintang/
Japanese local headquarters run by the puppet army villains) not
knowing that a trap may await her. The characters, Fang Hai-
chen and Kao Chih-yang, in On the Docks, share the bill as
Party heroes. Kao risks death to take a small boat out in a
raging typhoon to catch a freighter set sail for Africa with
one sack of spilled wheat in a shipment of rice seed. (It
should be noted that the wheat was eventually being shipped to
Africa as well.) Fang,on the other hand, delivers the soliloquy
which highlights the importance of hero role models:
A gale of revolution is sweeping the world,
The hearts of awakened people are closely linked.
Mao Tse-tung Th1ought is conveyed
On the wings of east wind . . .
Steel-strong heroes tempered in a blaze . . .
Bravely they advance,
Displaying a militant internationalism.
Heroes by the thousands we have without end;
From them we must learn
To dedicate ourselves to the world revolution,
To be a never-rusting cog 31
In the great revolutionary machine.
And, finally, in The Red Lantern, we find the Party hero Li
Yu-ho, who like Sister Ah-ching, boldly enters the enemy's trap
and willingly undergoes torture and finally submits to death,
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rather than divulge information:
Brought up by the Party to be a man of steel,
I fight the foe and never give ground.
I'm not afraid
To have every bone in my body broken,
I'm not afraid
To be locked up until I wear through the floor of my cell
However hard the road of revolution, 32
We must press on in the steps of the glorious dead.
We have mentioned earlier the expectations of self-sacri-
fice to the death in the Maoist religious belief system (see
Theme Five, chapter IV). Although each character hero type in
the texts at some point avows his/her willingness to die, only
two main heroes actually face martyrdom33 and only in one model
revolutionary opera--The Red Lantern. Both peasant hero types,
Granny Li, and Party hero type, Li Yu-ho, face death unflinch-
ingly shouting "Long Live Chairman Mao!" We find it inter-
esting to note that of all the hero types we have identified,
the peasant and Party hero types are used to characterize the
drama and glory of.;a martyr's death. One is reminded here of
an analogous situation in early Christianity where within a
classification schema of Christian-disciple-saint, it was the
Christians and the saints upon whom the plight of martyrdom
most often fell. We do not intend to infer here that the
workers and army were not expected to voluntarily give up their
lives should the occasion arise in revolutionary China. Rather
we wish to emphasize the importance Mao placed on the peas-
ants and Party in achieving his "ultimacy"--the Great Harmony
of Maoist Communism.
Although we have given much attention to the hero as a
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role model in the model revolutionary operas, we cannot neglect
the minor role-models who promote correct political learning
through their characterizations. We refer here specifically to
the youth role-model and, surprisingly enough, the negative role-
model or villain.
As we have mentioned earlier, much emphasis was seemingly
placed on politically socializing the youth of China during
the Cultural Revolution. Consequently it was particularly
important in their political learning process to have youth
role-models in the model revolutionary operas with whom 'China's
youth could identify and emulate. Each model opera has a
youth role model. However, the two most striking, and perhaps
most representative of China's youth during the Cultural Revolu-
tion are Tieh-Mei, Li's daughter in The Red'Lantern and Han
Hsiao-chiang, the young dock worker in On the Docks. Tieh-Mei
is immediately introduced to the audience as a "poor man's
child." We are told that because of her class birth right she
is a "good girl" and "competent in all she does."35 With
regard to the function of the Maoist religious belief system
in the political learning process, the lesson is simple.
Correct class identification and class consciousness equals
"goodness". We see here a basic tenet of the Maoist religious
belief system--the inherent "goodness" of the masses, the
peasant and working lower class. Yet, amidst all the goodness
of Tieh-Mei, we are struck by her naivete. She displays an
innocent nonchalance about the struggles of revolution and the
nature of the seriousness of the plight of her nation. As her
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father and granny prepare to receive an undercover communist
Liaison Man, Tieh-Mei asks innocently: "How is it I have so
many uncles, granny?"36 When granny attempts to close the
subject of the "uncles," Tieh-Mei responds in true childish
cockishness, "Even if you won't tell me, granny, I know." 3 7
She then goes on to assert her knowledge and understanding,
such as it is:
I've more- uncles than I can count;
They only come when there's important business.
Though we call them relatives, we never met before,
Yet they are closer to us than our own relatives.
Both dad and you call them our own folk;
I can guess part of the reason why;
They're all like my dad, 38Men with red, loyal hearts.
The level of her political knowledge and understanding is
clear. She has an intuitive inclination (presumably as a result
of' her class and upbringing) yet does not fully comprehend the
magnitude of the situation. It is as though she has observed
well, yet has not had the training and insight to put it all
together. Later we learn that this lacking is due to the fact
that granny has "protected" her from the past:
For seventeen storm-tossed years I've kept quiet,
Several times I wanted to speak,
But I was afraid you were too young for the truth. 39
However, this protection from the past almost proves very
costly as Tieh-Mei mistakenly comes close to destroying the
family's cover as underground agents when she is foooled by
the Bogus Liaison Man sent by the enemy to get the secret code.
It is interesting to note here that both youth role models we
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examine (Han in On the Docks as we shall see) blunder and
make mistakes during their political learning process. Further,
it is their contrition in conjunction with the embarrassment
they suffer with "loss of face" for their misdeeds, which
motivates them to begin learning the correct political attitudes
and behavior.
Throughout the remainder of the opera, we watch Tieh-Mei
blossom from a naive, protected child into a young revolutionary
anxious to carry the revolutionary "Red Lantern" and knowledg-
able of all the struggle and self-sacrifice that task entails
After having heard the truth of her background and the fate of
her true parents, she proclaims:
Now I know I was raised in wind and rain . . .
Now with high aims I see my way clear.
Successors must carry foward the cause of our martyrs.
Here I raise the red lantern, let its light shine . . .
My father (adopted father Li) is as steadfast as the pine,
A communist who fears nothingunder the sun.
Following in your footsteps I shall never waiver.
Generation after generation we shall fight on. 4 0
And, at home after having witnessed the execution of her father,
Li, and Granny, we see correct political learning having taken
root in young Tieh-Mei:
Granny, dad, I know what you died for.
I shall carry on the task you left
Unfinished and be the successor to the red lantern .
I'm prepared: arrest me, release me,
Use your whips and lash, your locks and chains.
Break my bones, you will never get the code . .
This is Tieh-Mei's answer.4 1
Tieh-Mei sneaks from under the watchful eye of the Japanese
gendarmie (with the aid and self-sacrifice of her "class"
neighbors), and succeeds in delivering the secret code to the
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communist guerrilla forces in the mountains. One can only
imagine the dramatic and emotional impact of this young role-
model on Chinese youth in the turbulence of the Cultural
Revolution.
Han Hsiao-chiang, in On the Docks, is a youth role-model
much closer to the real life experiences and attitudes of
China's youth in the 1960's and, perhaps as a result, is much
more complex and sophisticated than the character of Tieh-Mei.
Han is a youthful dock worker assigned .to the Huangpu River
platform docks in Shanghai. He represents yet another dimension
of China's contemporary youth in that he is restless and.impatient,
committed to the revolution, but only at an intellectual, eso-
teric.level. He is unhappy with the meniality of dock work
and feels his education should warrant him a more "important"
position in the struggle. This feeling of educational elitism
was apparent among China's youth during the 1960's and perhaps
partially accounted for the intensity of the Cultural Revolu-
tion in schools and colleges throughout China, and for the
eventual "shutdown" of higher education in China during (and
after) the Cultural Revolution.
Another characteristic of :role-model Han, critical to the
political learning of contemporary Chinese youth, was his
inability to determine right from wrong, Maoism from revision-
ism. His malleability at the hands of archvillain Chien results
in his loss of face and responsibility for near political meta--
morphosis. Early in the opera, Han shuns overtime work to "find
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the spilled sack" (which he spilled) in order to go to a movie
about sailors and revitalize his dream of sailing the high
seas to bring about Communist internationalism. In a confronta-
tion with his team leader, Kao, he declares: "When my eight
hours are up, I'm free."42 When he is reprimanded by Kao and
reminded of his class origin, he returns: "What? Me, the son
of a docker, a boy who grew up under the red flag--are you
insinuating that I don't talk like a member of the working
class? Are you claiming I talk like a capitalist?"43 In a
period when, according to Mao and his supporters, youth could
do no wrong and were the stalwarts on the road to Maoist commun-
ism, a youthful character in a model revolutionary opera utter-
ing such heresies is surprising but not unexplainable. It
seems that Mao walked a tightrope with regard to his support of
the youth and Red Guard during the Cultural Revolution. On the
one hand, China's youth were regarded as protected, unaccustomed
to struggle, somewhat selfish, and certainly unprepared for the
ardor of revolution. Yet, on the other hand, the burden of
the revolution would be on their shoulders. They would have
to be all the things they were not. There are two basic
learning principles that can accomplish this end. First, to
(dramatically) point out the student's shortcomings with the
hope that the shock will result in an intensive effort to "catch
up to" the expected norm. Or, second, to describe or perceive
the student as you would have him be rather than as he presently
is, with the hope that the student will put forth an intensive
effort to match his projected image. It seems both principles
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were being employed to politically "educate" youth during the
Cultural Revolution. The role-model of Han presents the
former principle; while Mao's reliance on the Red Guard as
the preachers of Maoism, revolution, and Communist ideals seems
to fulfill the latter principle. In this light, it seems
important, then, to present the role-model Han somewhat nega-
tively in an effort to reinforce political learning much the
same way negative sanctions or punishments function in the
process.
We see evidences of Han's continued brashness and defiance
throughout most of the script. Afraid (as we have seen) that
he will be caught and accused of political sabotage because of
the spilled sack (a fear conjured by Chien to further his
influence and manipulation of Han), Han approaches Party Secre-
tary Fang,t6 ask that his request for transfer (an unthinkable
request of a true unselfish Maoist) from the docks be approved.
He is confronted byMa, a retired yet proud Maoist dock worker,
who admonishes: "I saw through you as soon as I came to the
dock, there's something wrong with the way you think." 4 As
we have seen in our synopsis, to confirm this suspicion, Han
declares he will "quit" when he learns his transfer has not
been approved. Yet, Fang apparently sees through Han's politi-
cal incorrectness (in true Party hero form) as she observes:
Han's attitude is very strange.
Han--
Perhaps someone has cast you adrift alone in a boat,
-You may drown in the murky waters.
An evil wind has shipped up the waves,
I must set out in the storm;
I'll haul your silless boat back to port, 45Setting our course by the revolutionary markers.
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Such a wind analogy might provoke any young impulsive Rod Guard
youth to think twice before choosing sides.
Fang declares her intentions to "reeducate" Han, but it
is Ma, the old retired dock worker, who begins the process. In
an effort to convince Han of the significance of his role in
Mao's revolution, he recounts for Han the history of suffering,
the reason for the death of Han's father, and the significance
of dockers in Mao's China:
Now in our new society,
Thanks to the Party and Chairman Mao,
We dockers have risen, we are now
Proud masters of )our country, care for
And insured against illness and death .
How can you casually toss away
Your red identification book? . . .
Have you forgotten the roots
From which you've sprung? 46
Yet, Han can only respond:
It's hard to let twelve years of learning go to naught,
Making a living with a carrying pole is no good,
Whatever you say. 47
It is only when Fang divulges the negative thinking and wrong--
doings of Chien to Han that he begins to feel remorse for his
part in the accident of spilled wheat and begins to understand
what his role should be in the revolution. Again, as in the case
of Tieh-Mei, it is loss of face and embarrassment which provokes
the motivation to learn political ideas and behaviors based on
Maoism. Han declares:
I've been a fool . .
Mixed feelings of shame and remorse
Bring tears to my eyes.
From now on I must be firm,
Sharp in vision and really determined.
Head high, I'll brave wind and rain
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Battling on the docks, going through trials
To become tempered steel. 4 8
The lesson here provided by the role-model character Han
is much more complex and perhaps more at the roots of the under-
lying impetus for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
In the character of Han, we observe the convergences of the
conflicts deep seated in China's past and present. From the
past, we see the conflict between the traditional religious
belief systems of Confucianism and Taoism--the pull between
self and community, the controversy over the "spiritual" import-
ance of education. In China's present, this traditional con-
flict was being restructured and exacerbated by the pull
between "red" versus "expert"--ideologue versus pragmatist.
And every Chinese individual, particularly the youth who were
to inherit the New China were caught up in the web of conflict,
not knowing which way to turn. During the Cultural Revolution,
as we indicated earlier, the Maoist religious belief system
seemingly attempted to merge the traditional religious belief
systems of(Confucianism and Taoism into one religious belief
system incorporating elements from each. Thus the true Maoist
was to be preoccupiedwith the discipline of self, yet self-
sacrificing for the community of class brothers; educated and
capable enough to carry the country to Maoist communism, yet
spiritual enough to recognize the ultimacy of Mao's communism.
Recent experience and observation of popular and official (anti-
Maoist) trends, however, seemed to indicate that self and
community, education and spirituality, and red and expert could
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not coexist within the individual without self, educational
ealitism, and expertism taking precedence. Han most clearly
epitomizes this fault. The goal of the Cultural Revolution
was to politically resocialize China's population so that self-
lessness, spirituality, and redness would, not eradicate, but
supersede self, education, and expertise, in influencing
individual political atittudes and behavior. In order for this
restructuring of tendencies to occur, a complete shift in the
pendulum was required. The Maoist religious belief system was
to function in this capacity through the vehicle of the model
revolutionary operas. The population had to be all self-
sacrificing, spiritual and red; and the Maoist religious belief
system provided the emotional commitment and standard upon
which this shift could be based. Han, reeducated in his thinking
and disgraced by his display of selfishness and educational
elitism, symbolizes such a shift as he vows: "I definitely will
listen to the teachings of Chairman Mao, remould my thinking,
and be a revolutionary all my life." 4 9
As a result of the characterizations of the role-model
Han and all the other role-models and sanctions carefully.pre-
sented in the model revolutionary operas, the audiences should
have begun to identify with and appreciate what was expected
ofthem as true Maoists with correct political attitudes and
behaviors. Yet, as we indicated in our learning model in the
previous chapter, sanctions and role-models are initial func-
tional requisites in the political learning process and symbol-
ism ((or in Merleman's terminology, a condensation of symbols)
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are necessary to solidify the learning process in political
socialization. We find symbols of the Maoist religious belief
system as correctness in political attitudes and behavior through-
out the model revolutionary operas and will present and discuss
them extensively in the next chapter of this work.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER VI
We do not intend to imply here any intention on the part
of Mao or the Chinese political.leadership to purposely propagate
Confucianism, Taoism, or Maoism as a religious belief system. We
mean here that we observe elements of Confucianism and Taoism
simultaneously operating in what we identify as a Maoist relig-
ious belief system.
2Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure,
The Free Press, New York, 1949, p. 265.
3Even though most secondary schools, colleges and universi-
ties were eventually closed down as a result of disturbances dur-
ing the cultural revolution, the policy of free primary education
for Chinese children remained intact. In fact, during the
Cultural Revolution it was decided that only the children of
poor peasants, workers and party members (Mao's "chosen" class)
deserved the right to attend school, particularly at the higher
levels. While the childrenof families recognized as upper class,
bourgeois or as political enemies were to be denied entrance or
access to secondary or higher education because they didanot have
the "consciousness" to learn "correctly" and apply their acquired
knowledge for the good of the Chinese people and the Maoist state.
4Richard Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political
Culture, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles,
London, 1971, and Paul Hiniker, "The Effects of Mass Communication
in Communist China," unpublished PhD Dissertation, Department
of Political Science, M.I.T., 1966.
5Chiang Ching's attempts or desires to control the theatre
in China may have begun in 1950 when she was a member of The
Film Enterprise Guiding Committee which functioned under the
auspices of the Ministry of Culture and had censorship capacity.
Serving on the Committee as "Madame Mao",Chiang Ching criticized
a movie entiled "Inside Story of the Ching Court" claiming it
was reactionary. Her interest in reforming theatre and drama
continued. In 1964, Chiang spoke at the East China Drama
Festival held in Shanghai calling for the creation of a new
revolutionary theatre and, particularly, reform of Peking Opera.
With this background, it should be clear why Chiang Ching was
a natural choice to assume primary responsibility for creation,
critique and reform of Peking Revolutionary Operas during the
Cultural Revolution.
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6The Chinese Literary Scene, Hsu Kai-yu, Random House
Publishers, New York, 1975, p. 52.
7
"Speech at the Festival of Peking Operas," July, 1964,
reprinted in Chinese Literature, Number 8, 1967, p. 122.
8Eric Hoffer, The True Believer, Harper and Row Pub-
lishers, New York and Evanston, 1951, p. 67.
9Ibid., p. 60.
1 0 Ibid , p. 64.
11Ibid., p. 65.
12Ibid., p. 68.
13Ibid., p. 68.
14Shachiapang, p. 4.
15 Ibid., p. 5.
16We posit this assumption based on the official statements
emanating from the People's Republic thatthe purpose of the
Cultural Revolution was to rid the society of vestiges of the
past-petty bourgeois, traditional thinking. For details see
Peking Review, 1966, 1967.
17Our attention is particularly drawn to the directors'cues
provided in the parentheses indicating how the actor should portray
the character.
ison the Docks, p. 28.
19Ibid., p. 38.
20Ibid., p. 39.
21Lois Snow, op. cit., p. 34.
22Chinese Literature, Number 1, Peking, 1970, p. 15.
23Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy, p. 17.
24The Chinese Theatre in Modern Times, Colin, University of
Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1975, p. 172.
25Lois Snow, op. cit., p. 120.
2 6Ibid., pp. 13-14.
2 7 Shachiapang, p. 41.
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28Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy, p. 35.
29The Party hero type is not found in the model opera
Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy. Although we are struck by
this omission as something that might warrant further research
and analysis, such an undertaking goes beyond the scope of this
present study. Thus we will not take the time here to explore
or present probable reasons for this omission.
30We refer here to the function of anticipatory roles in
political socialization where the individual takes on the
observed attitudes and behavior of a role to which one aspires.
For example, individuals wanting to be doctors or lawyers assum-
ing the observed characteristics of these professions long
before the function in the role. For further explanations or
detail we would refer the reader to: Sociology, Broom and Selznick,
Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1955.
31on the Docks, p.38.
32The Red Lantern, p. 35.
33We find secondary characters in Shachiapang(village
peasants Wang Ft-Ken and Peasant Liu) whosuffer a martyr's
death before a firing squad, Wang, for his refusal to divulge
the names of communist Party members in the village and Liu,
because his son is in the New Fourth Army. However, although
their martyrdom makes them heroes of a sort, they are not major
character heroes and, are therefore not included here.
34Ibid., p. 38.
35Ibid., p. 2.
36Ibid., p. 4.
37Ibid.
38Ibid., p. 5.
39 Ibid., p. 20.
Ibid., p. 22.
41 Ibid., p. 40.
42On the Docks, p. 13.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., p. 24.
45Ibid., pp. 25-26.
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4 6 Ibid., p. 33.
Ibid., pp. 33-34.
48 Ibid., pp. 36 and 38.
4 9On the Docks, op. cit., p. 38.
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CHAPTER VII
THE MAOIST RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM AS A STANDARD
FOR CORRECTNESS: SYMBOLS
One cannot begin to emphasize the importance of symbols
and symbolismiin the political learning process. Previously,
we briefly mentioned the function of symbols in the learning
process, particularly with regard to their role as reinforcers
of political learning. In this chapter, we will focus our
attention on the importance and specific functions of symbols
and symbolism within the context of the Cultural Revolution
in China. Our discussion begins by presenting our definition
and understanding of the terms "symbol" and "symbolism." We
will then present our analysis of the use and function of
symbols and symbolism in the model revolutionary operas as
they relate to the Maoist religious belief system and political
learning during the Cultural Revolution. We accomplish this
analysis by reviewing the use of symbols and symbolism in the
model operas within the framework of the religious themes and
criteria presented in Chapter Four, which assisted us in
identifying the functionally religious elements of Maoism.
Symbols can be defined as tangible or cognitive representa-
tions of reality, past or present, and of abstract concepts
upon which reality can be based. Or, more simply, we can view
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symbols as expressions of a reality beyond symbols. Symbols
are most often objects, but they can also be presented as a
system of representations of an abstract concept. In the
latter instance, the symbol is very much bound to a context
or set of connotative norms present within the society. For
example, in the United States, as well as most other western
nations, democracy symbolizes freedom, while communism
symbolizes a lack of freedom. However, within the context of a
Communist Marxist political system, say perhaps The People's
Republic of China or an Eastern European country, democracy
symbolizes capitalism (a lack of freedom based on class) while
socialism symbolizes freedom. In both cases, the symbolism is
based on either an historical understanding or societal connota-
tion of the abstract concept. Along this regard, Edwyn Bevan2
has identified two types of symbols. Symbols of the first type
are "visible objects or sounds which stand for something of
which we already have direct knowledge." According to Bevan,
the purpose of this type of symbol is (1) to remind us of the
object or concept being symbolized; or (2) to tell us something
about the action or meaning of the object or concept at a
particular moment; or finally (3) to prompt us to act in a
certain way at a particular moment, regarding the nature of
the object or concept, based on an awareness or understanding
the symbol gives us.
The second type of symbols provide information about the
objects or concepts they symbolize. Specifically,regarding the
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nature of the object or concept, they convey to those who
see or hear the symbols knowledge they do not have or perhaps
even would not have, were it not for their cognitive awareness
of the symbol. In the case of the first type of symbols, the
symbol need not resemble the object or concept being symbolized.
However, with the second type of symbol, where new information
about the object or concept is provided by the symbol, the
symbol must resemble the object or concept. In the political
learning process (as well as learning in general), the second
type of symbol often precedes the first.
For example, we first learn that the dove, a non-aggres-
sive, docile bird of the pigeon family is the symbol for peace.
In this learning instance, the peace-like characteristics of the
dove closely resemble the concept of peace which is being
symbolized. However, once this symbolic association has been
made, it is then possible to expand the symbol of the dove to
a more esoteric level. For example, we can begin to symbolize
a politician's predisposition toward war or peace by use of the
symbol dove. During the 1960's, United States Senator George
McGovern was symbolized as a dove due in large part to his
attitudes and disposition toward the Vietnam War. In this
instance, the symbol of the dove tells us something about
the object (i.e., the Senator) without any direct resemblance
of that object. One would not necessarily find any meaningful
resemblance between the man and the bird without prior know-
ledge of the symbolic meaning of a dove. We see here a
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restatement of Merleman's discussion of the condensation of
symbols stage of cognitive learning where the first type of
symbols (non-resemblance to symbolized object) represent
secondary reinforcement of political learning once legitimacy
has been granted the political system.
Whether we define symbols as concrete objects (e.g., a
bird) or intangible objects (e.g., a national ideology), what we
are'in fact attempting to study is an abstraction, an image or
expression of an idea or object which may or may not bear
resemblance to the idea or object being symbolized. The question
becomes, how does one study and comprehend an abstraction? More
importantly, how does one study how men or their societies use
these abstractions which they have constructed from their social,
cultural and religious histories or perceptions.
We know that "men use symbols to 'condition' or 'motivate'
themselves and others.4 We further know that when symbols are
used by men to "motivate themselves, the symbols function as
"triggers to release forces whose power is derived from non-
symbolic sources in nature, the body, or socio-political laws.
. . .15 That is to say, symbols can motivate men to acquire or
express a particular behavior or attitude by initiating inter-
pretations which are bound in the tangible reality of the
individual or group. These interpretations derive their power
to influence or persuade in that they have been previously
established and accepted within the context of the society's
reality.
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With this knowledge then it seems most appropriate to study
how men use symbols by observing the actual symbols used and
the societal contexts in which symbols are used to motivate
other men. In this regard Hadley Cantril in his study of the
Psychology of Social Movements provides insight to this observa-
tion of the function and impact of symbols when he notes:
Symbols, such as flags, insignia, or caricatures of
the enemy, are . . . short cuts crowded with meaning.
People seem to get worked up into a higher emotional
pitch when they are reacting to symbols than to general
programs or ideologies. 6
However, in our understanding of the function of symbols in
the political learning process, before the individual can asso-
ciate a flag symbolically to the nation, he must first learn
symbolically what that nation stands for ideologically or what
it means in terms of its conceptual identity.
In other words, the individual must first understand
symbolically that America stands for freedom and democracy ideo-
logically. This symbolic knowledge can be provided through
historical context or through visual symbolic representations,
such as the fifer and drummer picture of the revolutionary war
which remind us of the fight for freedom and democracy.
Once this level of symbolic association has been reached, the
individual can then learn to associate the symbol of the flag
with his nation and eventually with the concepts of freedom
and democracy. When the individual then sees the symbol of
the flag, he understands that even though a flag does not
resemble a nation, freedom, or democracy, in concrete, tangible
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terms, the flag symbolizes freedom and democracy for him.
What we find here, and in the above discussion of symbols,
is a two-level, hierarchy of the cumulative functioning of
symbols and symbolism in the political learning process. At
the first level, the individual learns to relate to an object
or concept only through symbols which resemble the object or
concept, the symbolic association can be culture bound. There
must also be, however, an obvious or explicit link between the
symbol and the object or concept. At the second level, the
individual learns to respond to symbolic representations of
objects or concepts, where the symbol, not necessarily resembl-
ing the object or concept it symbolizes, may build on or expand
from the individual's previous (level one) understanding of the
symbol. We might represent the two-level function of symbols
in the political learning process as shown in Figure 11.
We have alluded to the importance of symbols in the
political learning process. When the individual is motivated to
conform to certain attitudes and behaviors consistent with
socio-political cultures and norms. We must also emphasize
the importance of symbolic representations in a religious belief
system, which can be observed to be functioningin the political
belief socialization process. That is to say, a symbol asso-
ciated with the religious belief system can also function as
a type one or type two political symbol which generates or
initiates political learning. Gerhardt Lenski's study of the
role of the Catholic Church in the political socialization of
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THE TWO LEVELLED FUNCTION OF SYMBOLS AND SYMBOLISM IN POLITICAL LEARNING
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children in Detroit piovides an excellent example of this dual,
religio-political function of symbols. Lenski found that the
Catholic Church first isolated the children from elements in the
dominant culture which might interfere with or contradict its
symbolic religious doctrine. Once so isolated, the children
were then taught to organize their lives around a particular set
of sacred symbols associated with the Catholic religious belief
system. Once this first level of symbolism (type two-resemblance)
had been achieved, the children's political predispositions (asso-
ciation of political symbols) was dictated by the relationship
of the religious symbol. Thus, according to Lenski's findings,
a Catholic Democrat in Detroit would probably vote against a
politician running on a Democratic platform who was suspected
of communist inclinations, because in the Catholic Church Commun-
ism symbolizes atheism or at least non-belief in an Ultimate Being.
Within the context of a religious belief system, symbols
perform the critical function of providing concreteness to
the abstract. Religion by its very nature is beyond man's
comprehension. Man neither knows or understands what the
Ultimate is, or, for that matter, why an Ultimate need exist.
He only believes that something called the Ultimate may exist
and therefore may have influence or control over his life. This
faith in an unknown is initiated and reinforced through the
symbolic representation of that unknown. In some religions,
the Ultimate Being, God, is symbolized as all powerful and know-
ing. Usually this symbol is presented as a larger than life
face of a father-like figure (the power and wisdom of the authority
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figure) projected in the sky. Yet, in other religions, the
Ultimate is symbolized by nature. Tillich describes the symbolic
characteristics of these religions: ". . . nowhere (else) is
nature worshipped as such. Nature provides the symbols, but
what they signify is not nature." 8 Nature as the Ultimate
Being (or as we shall see, the Communist state as the Ultimate)
provides the symbolic, tangible reality upon which faith and
commitment to the unknown can be based.
Traditionally, China has not been unlike other nations
in its use of symbols and symbolism in the political learning
process. The title of Son of Heaven given to the political
leader, functioned as a type one symbol representing his asso-
ciation of the political system with the ultimate. The symbol
of Heaven, as representative of ultimate power, was first estab-
lished within the many religious belief systems in China's
tradition, including the religious belief systems of Confucian-
ismiand Taoism upon which we have focused throughout this study.
However, this symbolic claim to divine or ultimate right to
political power made by the traditional Chinese emperors can also
be found in societies from Ancient Egypt to the British Empire.
As we have just discussed, what distinguishes these symbolic
claims one from the other is solely the cultural context, parti-
cular to each society, upon which level one (concrete object)
symbols can be based and learned. It is the cultural context
which gives the level one symbols their power to influence and
persuade the population.
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In contemporary China, particularly since the May Fourth
Movementof 1919, symbols and symbolism (both level one and level
two) have been generated and communicated esoterically through
drama and literature. Much of the symbolism, particularly in
drama, has been and is still being based on the traditional
rigid structure and format of Classical Peking Opera and on
China's historical context. Because classical Peking Opera
established basic, level one symbolic associations (as we shall
see below)), it was relatively easy to generate second level
symbols which reinforced the learning of correct political
attitudes and behavior, based on the tenets of the Maoist relig-
ious belief system. In fact, the culmination of second level
symbols in contemporary China occurred during the Cultural
Revolution9 through the medium of the model revolutionary operas,
which, as already mentioned, had their roots in classical Peking
Opera.
The Use of Symbols and Symbolism in Classical Peking Opera
Classical Peking Opera as we know it had its origins during
the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911). Capital operas (Ching hsi', ),
as classical Peking opera was first called, represented an
amalgamation of various provincial styles of song and dance that
had developed in China since at least as far back as the T'ang
dynasty (618-906 A.D.). Throughout its development classical
Peking Opera has been replete with symbols and symbolism. The
actor in classical Peking opera studied six Kto ten years before
appearing on stage. His education consisted of arduous training
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in symbolically representing traditional Chinese characterizations,
moods, and emotions, action, events,,iand the like.
On the stark, paucily propped stage of classical Peking
opera, the actor had the sole responsibility of carrying the
audience through the adventures and plots of the dramas with only
his ability to symbolically convey action, reactions, attitudes,
and experiences through his dance movements, stage entrances
and exits, costumes, and song. The level of symbolism used
spanned basic,,mime movements to subtle intonations and variations
in acrobatic movement. There were four major classifications of
stage chracter: shen, male lead character; tan, female lead
character; ching, painted face character, usually denoting a
warrior or god; and ch'ou, the clown character. Each character
had its particular symbolic meaning, costume, make-up, body move-
ments and song type.
As a result of this rigid and specified symbolism, the
audience could understand the nature of the plot including the
intricacies of interpersonal interaction among the characters,
without any prior knowledge of the drama or its plot. In fact,
it has been observed that the plot was of little importance to
the audience. Rather the audience was critically concerned
with the actor's technical ability in portraying the symbolic
meaning of his role.10 This intricacy of symbols and symbolism,
as presented in classical Peking opera, is alien to the western
theatregoer, and may be overlooked by the researcher or analyst
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using Chinese theatre or drama to gain understanding or insight
into the dynamics of Chinese society and politics (traditional or
modern). We deem it important here to briefly typify the extent
of intricacy of symbolism in the classical Chinese theatre by
discussing the symbolic role of sleeve movements (Hsiu). Although
the discussion, in its detail, will be peripheral to our
analysis of the functions of symbols in traditional Chinese drama,
it will assist the reader in appreciating the importance of
intricacy of symbols in the communication of plot, content and
emotional expression to the audience.
A Brief Review of the Symbolism of Sleeve Movements in Traditional
Peking Opera
Sleeve movements were critical in the symbolic representa-
tion of emotion in classical Peking Opera. These movements were
peformed by the actors and actresses using long cuffs of white
silk (water sleeves, shui hsiu), which were attached to the appro-
priate character costume of the actor and could range anywhere
from one and a half to two and a half feet long.12 Each of the
one hundred and seven movements of these water sleeves performed
by the actors had a specific term and a specific symbolic mean-
ing. There was no allowance for variations in these movements.
We citel3 six such movements as examples: in the 'shuang tou hsin'
sleeve movement,14 used only by the tan character, the actor
raises both arms, with palms inward and sweeps his sleeves
downwards from the chest to the knees and then with a turn of
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the wrist flings the water sleeves back, a little to the right.
This sleeve movement is used to symbolize worry or anxiety.
In the "T'ou hsin sleeve movement, only performed by the Ch'ing
character, the actor flings both water sleeves out either to the
right or left. If to the left, the head looks right and vice
versa. This movement symbolizes making a decision or anger.
An actor symbolizes his helplessness or inability to solve a
problem'by holding his arms slightly bent and allowing the
water sleeves to drop out of the folded position in a movement
called "Chih hsin."
To symbolize sorrow or grief, the actors employs the
"Shuang fan hsin" sleeve movement in which both hands are raised
above the shoulders (a space of two inches only separating the
hands as they perform the movement while the arms are bent)
and the wrists moved in a circular movement which flings the
sleeves upward to hang down the back. In conjunction with this
movement, the foot is stamped twice on the floor. (Where just
the right sleeve is used and the foot is stamped only once,
the movement symbolizes sorrow at being left behind or parting
from a husband or lover.) With the "Che hsin" sleeve movement,
the actor symbolizes embarrassment by holding the right hand
against the chest in an upward direction, while the left arm
is bent with the water sleeve held before the face to conceal
it. The actor's head must be turned away looking downwards
towards the right. And, as a final example of the intricacy
and symbolic subtlety of sleeve movements, we have the "Shuang
Yang hsin" movement which symbolizes happiness or excitement
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where the actor raises both hands with palms. down to chest height
then turns his hands quickly flicking the water sleeves outward.
From this brief encounter with the art and symbolism of
water sleeve movements in classical Chinese operas (along with
the knowledge that similar intricacies existed in like detail
for movements of the head, foot, hand, eye, and of acrobatics),
one can begin to grasp the level of symbolic association that
has become the cultural norm for Chinese theatre goers.
Through classical Chinese theatre the audience was taught to
perceive reality through symbols and symbolism. Abstract con-
cepts, objects, and real life issues and problems were presented
and understood symbolically. One could perhaps speculate that
this cultural history of symbolic learning and association has
placed the majority of China's theatre going population, which
probably approaches seventy-five to eighty percent of the entire
adult population in Contemporary China, at our second level of
learning (non-resemblance of symbols to object or concept).
In any event, we can assume that the contemporary Chinese
audiences viewing the model Revolutionary Peking Operas during
the socio-political chaos and confusion of the Cultural Revolution,
had a theatrical history of associating with and understanding
reality, societal problems, and life's experiences through
symbols and symbolism, which would facilitate their grasp of
the esoteric:-symbolism utilized to convey correct political
attitudes and behavior, based on the Maoist religious belief
system in the model operas.
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The Use of Symbols and Symbolism in the Model Revolutionary Operas
The model revolutionary operas which dominated the stage
during the Cultural Revolution did not contain all of the symbols
and symbolic gestures and movements found in the classical Chinese
theatre. The costumes, scenery and props are much more explicit
representations of reality, and, as a consequence do not warrant
extensive symbolism. We do find, however, an integration of the
same use of the classical symbolisms of make-believe (e.g., the
modern day villain has a greyish-green face much the same as
his theatrical predecessors), acrobatic technique, and the use
of colors. (For example, red was used in classical Chinese
theatre to symbolize strength and honesty; and in the model revo-
lutionary operas, red carries over the same symbolic meaning
although the context and usage is appropriate for the next
context.) Yet, what is interesting is the genre of symbols
and symbolism employed in the model revolutionary operas of the
1960's.
Throughout all four model operas, we find symbols and
symbolism which represents Maoism as a religious belief system
and as a learning tool through which the correct political atti-
tudes and behavior expected of the viewing population are trans-
mitted. We will review the major symbols and uses of symbolism
as we have observed them. Throughout this discussion, we will
also emphasize a secondary function of the symbol in political
socialization--that of the role symbols play in providing a
"definite objective toward which action can be directed."1 5
293
The symbol, as we illustrated in our learning model, no
matter what its type or level, has a primary function to facili-
tate the association and understanding of the intangible or
abstract in relation to objective reality. The symbol is per-
ceived-to represent, and then eventually to be reality. From
a political learning perspective, if the society can be taught
to perceive the same associational relationships between symbol
and reality, then to manipulate the symbol is to manipulate
reality and control the society's understanding of its position
and relationship to reality.
In the case of China during the Cultural Revolution,
control of symbols and reality was critical to the maintenance
of power, and more importantly to the maintenance of legitimacy.
The Maoist religious belief system, as it was presented in the
model revoluiontary operas (as well as in news media and other
means of political communication), provided the symbolic basis
on which correctness vis-a-vis the individual's relationship
to a political reality could be based and controlled. We will
illustrate this, and our other assertions regarding the func-
tional interrelationship of symbols, the Maoist religious system,
and political learning below.
The Model Revolutionary Operas as Thematic Symbolism
Each of the four model revolutionary Peking operas is of
itself a symbolic representative contemporary Chinese political
reality, particularly the reality of the Cultural Revolution.
It is probably safe to assume that this symbolic nature of the
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operas was intentional given the great care and officiall 6
attention concerning their many structural and content (i.e.,
script) revisions. Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy and
Shachiapang provide the symbolic conceptualization of right
versus might. Their thematic contents symbolically emphasized
the power of correct political attitudes and beliefs (based on
the Maoist religious belief system) over the brute force of the
enemy--the anti-Maoist with incorrect political attitudes and
beliefs. In Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy the main character
Yang, a true Maoist communist, boldly and single-handedly infil-
trates the bandits' den, armed only with virtue and righteousness
of the Maoist religious belief system:
A Communist always heeds the Party's call,
He takes the heaviest burden on himself;
I'm set on smashing the chains of a thousand years
To open a freshet of endless happiness for the people.
Well I know that there's danger ahead,
But I'm all the more set on driving forward;
No matter how thickly troubled dlouds may gather,
Revotlutionary wisdom is bound to win.
Like the Foolish Old Man who Removed the Mountains,
I shall break through every obstacle;
The flames that blaze in my red heart 17
Shall forget a sharp blade to kill the foe,
The symbolism found particularly in the last paragraph provides
an excellent example of second level symbolism based on the
Maoist religious belief system and the representation of
political correctness. The symbol of the Foolish Old Man Who
Removed the Mountain is well associated with the Maoist religious
belief system's themes which include the virtues of diligence
(theme three) and faith (theme two) as discussed in Chapter IV.
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Upon this second level symbol is based the symbolic representa-
tion of the strength of a red (symbol of strength and honesty)
heart against the real, and potentially fatal weapons of the
enemy. Here, returning briefly to western religious symbolism,
one might be reminded of the symbolism of the Christians facing
the brute, savage forces of the lions in the Roman ampitheatre,
with only their faith as their shield. Through this use of
symbolism-conveyed by the character Yang, the Chinese audience
learns the invincibility of correct political attitudes and
behavior based on Maoism. Dnring the confusion and panic
caused >by the power strugglel8 within the Cultural Revolution,
no better lesson could be symbolically conveyed to the millions
of Chinese who were to follow the brave role-model Yang into
the enemy's den.
Sister Ah-ching, in the model opera Shachiapang displays
equal symbolic heroismaas she, armed with righteousness of
Maoism, double-deals with the enemy to protect the wounded New
Fourth Army soldiers, and inferentially the entire village.
Although secondary characters (fellow villagers) participate
in the undermining of the enemy, it is made symbolically clear
that it is Sister Ah-ching with her understanding and practice
of Maoist virtue and principles, who singlehandedly sabotages
the enemy right under their noses:
The New Fourth Army is marching back east to smash the
"mopping-up" (of the Kuomingtang)
The sun will soon shine over Shachiapang. .
On instructions we've reconnoitred
All enemy positions except this headquarters
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Now I have a chance to enter the tiger's den
To see what's going on here . .19
Here again the symbolism of right versus might, spiritual right-
eousness (based on Maoism) versus brute force, is reinforced.
Thematically, the other two model revolutionary operas
being examined here have different symbolic emphasis vis-a-vis
the Maoist religious belief system, although their function in
the political learning process does not differ. Tbe revolution-
ary opera,On the Docks, presents a symbolic theme critical to
the Maoist religious belief system, particularly with respect
to its attempted integration of the Confucian and Taoist relig-
ious systems. The spiritual, moral, and political struggle
between community and self, is portrayed within the broader
Maoist political context of class consciousness. Their critical
portrayal is focused around the seemingly secondary "middle
character"20 Han Hsiao-chiang. Young Han, in many ways, typi-
fies the traditional tug between the Confucian virtue of exemplify-
ing self and the Taoist virtue of loyalty and self-sacrifice for
community interests which Maoism, particularly during the
period of-the Cultural Revolution, sought to combine in a func-
tional religio-political belief system. It was important in
promoting total political and social participation in contemporary
China to stress the cultural tendency of exemplary personal
behavior and self-actualization founded in Confucianism and,
yet, to simultaneously stress the cultural predisposition toward
community, family, and brotherhood at the core of Taoist doctrine.
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To combine these contradictory traits without having one, parti-
cularly self, supersede the other was indeed a formidable task
for a functional religious belief system within the context
of traditional Chinese influences. In On the Docks, the Maoist
religious belief system symbolically successfully rises to
the formidability of this task in the "confession and conversion"
of young Han (cited earlier). However, whether this symbolic
success represents reality or is but a manipulation of reality
for political socialization purposes remains a question we will
address in the final concluding chapter of this work.
As was mentioned above, the character Han provides us
with an interesting look into the conflict between self and
community within the symbolism of contemporary Chinese drama.
Han is committed to the community of revolutionary class
brothers, both international and domestic. His internal con-
flict and confusion stems from his misguided illusions as to
how he should serve the community--what his role should be.
He is convinced, especially through the misguidance of the
archvillain Chien, that one's contribution is meaningless unless
it is dashing and exemplary (perhaps like that of Yang Tzu-jung
in Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy). His faulty interpretation
of Maoism was expression of the self for the betterment of the
community (a notion well founded in Confucianism). Toward the
end of the opera, it is revealed that Han's lack of enthusiasm
and commitment is attributable to his feeling that docker's
work does not count at the present stage of socialist
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construction. His "dream" (symbolic reinforcement) is to be
a sailor, a role he mistakenly perceives as being more signifi-
cant and critical for bringing about Maoist "international"
socialism. We are here reminded of Freud's analysis2 of
the symbolism of dreams and their meaning and function in the
actual life experience of the dreamer. Although, in a wakeful
state, Han fantasizes about his interpretations of the actuality
of ta sailor's life. He "displaces" his reality of being a dock-
worker with a fantasy that is more significant--his illusionary
life as a sailor. Caught up in the interpretive symbolism of
his "dream", he righteously rejects the carrying pole which
symbolizes menial and insignificant dock work in his eyes.
He declares:
If I'd been born twenty years earlier I too
would have used that pole on the
foremen and the American gangsters.
But now we're in the middle of
socialist construction. I want to make
an even bigger contribution . . .
I want to be a seaman and deliver
our goods personally to the people
of Asia, Africa and Latin America in
support of their struggle. That is really
great internationalism.22
His dilemma is critical to the Maoist religious belief system
and to the political socialization process, if it is to
result in political participation. And, his character symbolizes
the struggle, the traditional tug-of-war between elements embodied
within the Maoist religious belief system.
The theme of the model revolutionary opera The Red Lantern
has the most direct symbolic reference to the Maoist religious
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belief system. The red lantern used by the Li family to test
the identity of CCP underground members symbolizes the func-
tion of the Maoist religious belief system in testing the
dedication of the Maoist to the causes of revolution and, ulti-
mately, communism. It also symbolically functions as a critical
element in the growth of Li's young daughter, Tieh-Mei, from
a protected, innocent, young girl to a Maoist revolutionary.
After being toldithe significance of the red lantern by her
adopted grandmother, Li:
For many years this lantern has lighted the way for us
poor )people, and us workers. Your grandfather used to
carry this lantern, and now your dad carries it. . . .
We can't do without it at crucial moments. Remember,
this red lantern is our family treasure. 23
Tieh-mei understands the symbolic relationship between the red
lantern and the revolutionary struggle for Maoist communism,
including what her role should be in the struggle:
Granny has told me the story of the red lantern,
The words are few, but the meaning is deep.
Why are my father and uncle not afraid of danger?
Because they want to save China,
Save the poor, defeat the Japanese invaders.
I realize I should act as they do,
And be a person like them.
I am seventeen, no longer a child,
I should share my father's worries.
If he's carrying a thousand pound load,
I should carry eight hundred.2 4
For the youth participants in the Cultural Revolution,
this symbolic representation of the Maoist religious belief
system as the salvation for China and the poor, and as the
weapon which provides invincibility against danger, must have
been a critical lesson in their political learning, reinforced
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by their youthful identification with the character Tieh-mei.
To. further this symbolism of the red lantern representing the
function of the Maoist religious belief system and the expected
role of individual service to Maoism, this is the only model
opera where principle characters actually die a martyr's death
(all major characters in the other three model revolutionary
operas profess their commitment to sacrifice their lives for
the ultimacy of Maoist communism, but are not called upon in the
plot to fulfill their vows).
In addition to the symbols and symbolismof the major
themes of the model revolutionary operas under consideration,
each has a wealth of symbols and symbolism in their respective
texts which contribute to the political learning process by
symbolically presenting correct political attitudes or behaviors
of characters based on the Maoist religious belief system. We
will focus our discussion on secondary, yet critical uses of
symbols and symbolism below.
The Function of Symbols in the Model Revolutionary Opera's
Religious Themes
During the Cultural Revolution correct political attitudes
and behaviors consisted of acceptance and adherence to the
Maoist religious belief system. As was discussed in Chapter
IV of this work,the principle themes of the Maoist religious
belief system (directly related to howMaoisminfluenced
individual behavior and attitudes) included the virtues of
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faith in the power of Mao Tse-tung'thought, class (brotherly)
love, diligence, humility, and a belief in the ultimacy of
Maoist communism as a solution to China's socio-political needs.
To conform to these principles meant total unselfish commit-
ment in political participation. This manner and degree of
compliance was recognized officially (in the pro-Maoist camp)
as political correctness. To reject any one or all of these
principles was officially regarded as bourgeois revisionism,
rightism, or in other words politically incorrect behavior.
in China during the Cultural Revolution, the symbolic
representation of the distinction between political correct-
ness and incorrectness was no less blatant than the symbolism
of the white hat of -the good guys and the black hat of the bad
guys prevalent in the Western adventure tales of the United
States. In the case of China, the symbolic distinction was
between "red" versus "expert." To be "red" was to believe
and participate in Maoism--to place ideology and doctrine
before specialization and pragmatism; to be recognized as a
Maoist, a "good guy." On the other hand, to be "expert" was
to believe and participate in modernization with little if any
consideration for ideology or doctrine--to be pragmatic before
ideological; to be recognized as a supporter of bourgeois
revisionism, a Liu Shao-chist, a "bad guy". To be placed in
this latter category was to be subject to the repudiation and
purge by the Red Guards and other groups of Maoist supporters.
The primary, dual purpose of the Cultural Revolution,
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however, was not only to purge anti-Maoists, it was also to pro-
mote political socialization, particularly among the youth--
to promote learning through experience, revolution through parti-
cipation in political struggle. The model revolutionary operas
were probably critical in their capacity to allow the audiences
to experience vicariously the experiences and political struggles
of the stage characters through symbols and symbolism. One
such example of this use of symbolism is found in The Red
Lantern where the Maoist hero Li engages in a pre-torture dia-
logue with the Japanese archvillain Hatoyama which is full of
religious and political symbolism:
Li (sounding the enemy out coolly): I amaa poor worker
and like to be straightforward. Anything you have
in mind, just speak out.
Hatoyama: Quite frank! Come on, old friend, drink up.
Li: It's very kind of you, Mr. Hatoyama. Sorry, I don't
drink. (Pushes the cup away, takes out his pipe and
lights it.)
Hatoyama: You don't drink? There's an old Chinese saying,
"Life is but a dream." It passes in a flash. There-
fore, as is well said, "Enjoy wine and song while we
can, for tomorrow we die."
Li (blowing out his match contemptuously): Yes listening
to songs and drinking the best wine is the life of an
immortal. I hope you always lead such a life and I wish
you "long life," Mr. Hatoyama. (Throws away the
match sarcastically.)
Hatoyama: Hah . . . (Forcing a smile.) Old friend, I am
a believer in Buddhism. A Buddhist sutra tells us,
"The bitter sea has not bounds, repent and the shore
is at hand."
Li (counter-attacking): I don't believe in Buddhism. But
I've heard the saying "The law is strong, but the out-
laws are ten times stronger."*
Hatoyama: Well said, my friend. But this is only one
kind of creed. As a matter of fact, the highest human
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creed can be condensed into two words.
Li: Two words?
Hatoyama: Right.
Li: VWhat are they?
Hatoyama: "For myself."
Li: For yourself, eh?
Hatoyama: No, every man for himself.
Li: (pretending not to understand): "Every man for
himself"?
Hatoyama: Right. Old friend, you know the saying, "Heaven
destroys those who don't look out for themselves"?
Li: Oh, Heaven destroys those who don't look out for
themselves?
Hatoyama: That's the secret for doing everything.
Li: So there's such a thing as a secret for success in life?
Hatoyama: There's a secret for doing everything.
Li: Mr. Hatoyama, for me your secret is like trying to
blow up a fire through a rolling-pin. It just
doesn't work.
(Hatoyama is taken aback.)
(*Here "law" means the reactionary ruling class while
"outlaws" means the revolutionary spirit of rebellion of
the proletariat and revolutionary people in their struggle
against the reactionaries. In striking back against
Hatoyama, Li YU-ho uses this saying to imply that the
Japanese bandits may ride roughshod for a time, but it
is the revolutionary people who are really strong. The
Japanese bandits are doomed. The Chinese people are sure
to win.,) 2 5
This passage is replete with esoteric symbolic references
to elements of the Maoist religious belief system and its
political function. The audience has already been made aware
of the fact that the character Li is a true Maoist exemplifying
correct political attitudes and behavior earlier in the opera.
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In this instance, Li "leads on" Hatoyama to divulge his here-
tical belief in Tradition (i.e., the old Chiense saying quoted,
the reference to Buddhism, and the Confucian element of self)
to the audience. As Li in his "goodness" is obviously the
opposite of Hatoyama in his "badness", the audience is led
symbolically to understand that Li's convictions and beliefs
are also the opposite of Hatoyama. This use of symbolism is
further reinforced later in Li's encounter with Hatoyama when
the latter declares that his job is to issue passes to Hell.
Li's response is symbolically representative of the role every
Maoist communist should serve against the "devil": "You know
very well what my job is." Li returns, "I'm the one who will
demolish your Hell." The symbolism is strong and the message
is clear. With particular regard to the religious overtones
of the symbolism, one is reminded of the role of Christ and
his Christian followers to fight to devil, and thus in a manner
of speaking to demolish Hell.26
Specifically, from our examination of the model operas,
we find illustrative examples of various symbolic representa-
tions of the major themes we have identified in the Maoist
Religious belief system. We will cite certain of these
examples below:
Symbolic Representation of Theme Two -- Faith in the
Power of Mao Tse-tung Thought:
In our discussions of faith as a religious theme found in
Maoism in Chapter IV we defined faithas an expression of belief
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in the actuality or existence of an object, being or event
where this belief is not founded in knowledge (either experiential
or acquired). Symbols of faith can be presented as expressions
of belief or as declarations of the individual's willingness
to commit himself to a thought, action or deed based on a
presumed belief. Simply, faith is an expression or declaration
of individual perception. Religion, as we have defined it,
consists of man's perceptions of the unknown--interpreted dif-
ferently within various cultural contexts. In religious
terms then, faith is man's declaration of commitment to his
perceptions of the unknown.
We have already illustrated certain perceptions during
the Cultural Revolution which recognized Mao and his thoughts
as divine, sacred or, at the very least, transcendental to
man's reality and capabilities. In this regard we would iden-
tify the cult of Mao (which, at the very least nurtured these
perceptions of Mao) as a level one function of symbolism
promoting the lesson of the absoluteness of the legitimacy
and authority of Maoism. The cult of Mao fostered a faith in
the sacred power of Mao Tse-tung Thought. We cite from the
model operas two examples of the symbolic expression of this
faith. In Shachiapang as Sister Ah-ching attempts to mentally
construct a rescue plan to move eighteen wounded soldiers from
under the scrutinizing nose of the enemy, she symbolically
expresses her faith that the power of Mao Tse-tung Thought will
guarantee her success as strains of "the East is Red" seem to
ring in her ears:
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Chairman Mao/
With your teachings 
. . . 27
I can certainly meet this test and beat the enemy.
Her faith is not explicitly expressed to the audience by direct
declarations of her faith. It is presented in symbolic abstrac-
tion. Without her stating explicitly she has faith in Mao's
teachings, her faith is symbolically implicit in her statement
about them.
We find another symbolic expression of faith in Taking
Tiger Mountain by Strategy. When Yang, as he attempts to slip out
information to the communist forces from his undercover posi-
tion within enemy lines, declares:
I must never forget to be bold yet cautious,
And succeed through courage and wits.
The Party's every word is victory's guarantee,
Mao Tse-tung Thought shines forever.28
We see here the character Yang's declaration of commitment
to his perception of the power of Mao Tse-tung Thought. It is
eternal. And, within any social or cultural context what is
eternal is powerful and, we might add, symbolically expressive
of the sacred or divine.
Symbolic Representation of Theme Three -- Virtuous Lifestyle:
We have established previously, to be virtuous was to be
frugal, diligent, expressive of brotherly (class) love, and so
on. All of the positive role model characters in the model revo-
lutionary operas serve as symbols of this theme. As we have
seen, great care was given to develop positive role models
within the operas; each was exemplary of these Maoist virtues.
307
We have highlighted some of these examples in the previous
Chapter and will do so further on in this chapter in our dis-
cussion of the function of symbols in identifying the criteria
which help us recognize Maoism functionally as a religious
belief system.
However, what we will emphasize here is that care has
been given to making sure that all lesser characters (unnamed
village peasants, dockworkers, and New Fourth Army and P.L.A.
soldiers) also symbolize Maoist virtue. Even at the most
unassuming levels, these characters exude Maoist virtue in
their day to day lives. At various points in the operas, the
main hero refers to these nameless role models as heroes to
symbolize their adherence to and the collective display of
Maoist virtue.
We will present examples of the symbolic expressions of
Themes Four (Confession and Conversion) and Five (Suffering,
Self-Sacrifice and Martyrdom) in the section below. We defer
this discussion thusly, because we feel the symbolic expres-
sions are more illustratively presented within the framework
of our analytical criteria for identifying religious belief
systems.
The Function of Symbols in Identifying Maoism.as a
Religious Belief System:.Criteria
We can begin immediately to cite examples of expressions
of symbols and symbolism which further highlight the applica-
tion of our analytical criteria (i.e., (1) Ultimacy; (2)
308
Orientations to Life; and (3) Religious Experience) on our
study of the function of Maoism in political socialization.
Criteria One--Ultimacy:
Symbolic references to a Maoist notion of ultimacy for
the Chinese state are found throughout the model revolutionary
operas. Most striking are those found in Taking Tiger Mountain
by Strategy, where the hero Yang declares:
Destroy Vulture, and win liberation for the people,
Rise as masters and greet the sun in these deep Mountains
Follow the savior the Communist Party,
And bring the land a new life,
Like our old home in Shantung, 29
Good days will be here forever.
And in The Red Lantern we find Li symbolically alluding to the
ultimacy of the New China and the meaning of his struggle
relative to this ultimacy as he awaits the martyr's death:
. . . The red flag of revolution is raised on high,
The flames of resistance spread far and wide .
Once the storm is past flowers will bloom,
New China will shine like the morning sun,
Red flags will fly all over the country
This thought heightens my :confidence
And my resolve is strengthened. . . .
And finally in On the Docks in the final scene the dock workers
with party hero Fang:sing as the red sun rises slowly in the
background:
We dockers follow our Communist Party, . .
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Tought in our minds,
We march on towards communism.
We shall change the old world thoroughly.
Holding the red flag high, we charge!
In each of these instances the reference to the sun sym-
bolizes Mao. This level two symbol is based on a first level
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symbolism found in the revolutionary song "The East is Red"
where Mao is directly referred to as the morning sun rising
in the east. It is this sun, returning to the above quotes,
that will symbolically bring forth the ultimacy of the "new
life" and the "new China." The symbolism of the red sun and
the "new China" are significantly expressive of the sacred.
We do not view this symbolic reference to the ultimacy of a
"new China" as secular or materialistic in a Marxist sense.
The imagery transcends the secular. The symbols express contem-
porary Chinese perceptions (in this case Mao's interpretive
perceptions) of a sacred ultimate that provides meaning for
the present. Hugh Duncan, in his study of the role of symbols
in societal communication furthers this point:
All goals, ends, purposes, heavens,hells, any ideal
future whose immanence invests action to such a
degree that what is happening now can only be understood
by what will happen then, offer peculiar temptations
to mystifications. Christian eschatology, Marxist class-
less heavens, and Wagnerian erotic immolations are but
a few of these imaginery, yet powerful, futures. . . .
Once the promise (of these futures) is symbolized, and
these symbols become sacred, they are no longer subject
to critical discussion. 32
Duncan sees symbols of ideal or ultimate futures as powerful
in their influence on man's attitudes and behavior in his
present life experience. This relationship, as we have stated
earlier, between the present reality and the hypothetical,
unknown future, serves as a basis for man's perception of
that ultimate future as sacred, no matter what the context.
Further use of symbolism establishes belief in this
ultimacy as correct political thinking. It is the heroes (the
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dockers are also class heroes in their own right) in each case
who declare their belief in this ultimacy of a new Maoist
China. Their role as heroes symbolizes their correctness and
the correctness of their political thinking. Thus the audience
can learn from this use of symbols that belief in and contribu-
tion toward this Maoist ultimacy is politically correct. Again,
referring to the period of the Cultural Revolution, which was
intended to set China ideologically straight on the road to
the Maoist ultimacy, this lesson had to be perceived by pro-
Maoists as critical.
Criteria Two--Orientations to Life
With regard to the symbolic references to the Maoist relig-
ious doctrine establishing orientations to life, we find illu-
strative examples in the model operas. As we indicated in
Chapter IV, six. specific orientations to life found in Themes
Three and Five could be identified in the Maoist religious belief
system. They were 1) selflessness and love for class brothers;
2) self-sacrifice--commitment to the point of death; 3) modesty
and humility; 4) frugality; 5) diligence and hard work beyond
one's capacity, and 6) exemplary life style or setting the
example of good Maoist communist behavior for others to emulate.
Rather than citing examples of symbols for each of these Maoist
virtues in all four model revolutionary operas, we will high-
light examples of symbolism for those themes and virtues parti-
cularly critical if political learning is to promote political
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participation (that is, selflessness, self-sacrifice, and dili-
gence and exemplary life). We will proceed by selecting one
example from one opera: then the second example from another
opera; ;and so on.33
As has been previously discussed, the Maoist religious
virtue of selflessness refers to one's disregard of self and
identity with community and with one's class (brotherly) love.
One illustrative example of a symbolic representation of self-
lessness is found in Scene Ten of The Red Lantern where,
as we cited in the synopsis, Aunt Tien, cognizant of the danger
in which she places herself and her daughter-in-law, persuades
Tieh-mei to change jackets with Hui-lien, so that Tieh-mei
can slip away through the Tien house, and avoid being followed
by Hatoyama's spies as she sets out to deliver the secret code
(red lantern in hand) to the communist guerrilla base in the
mountains. As Tieh-mei objects to this assistance from Aunt
Tien stating "I mustn't get you into trouble," 34 Aunt Tien
replies:
My Child!
None but the poor help the poor,
We are two bitter gourds on the same vine;
We must save you from the tiger's jaws, . . .
We are both working-class families . . .
No matter how risky it is, Imust see
You safely away. 35
Aunt Tien's words symbolize the selflessness expected of all
Maoists. She symbolically relinquishes her identity, and that
of her daughter-in-law, to identity with her poor working class
of brothers. Her compliant behavior with this Maoist virtue is
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politically correct, and represents a symbolic lesson in the
political learning process of Chinese audiences during the
Cultural Revolution.
A symbolic reference to self-sacrifice is found in the
model opera Shachiapang. Our attention is drawn again to a
secondary character, Wang Fu-ken, a peasant villager, who
symbolizes self-sacrifice to the point of death after his re-
fusal to divulge the names of communist underground agents
in the village to the commander and chief-of-staff of the
"puppet" Kuomintang army. As he staunchly faces his martyr's
death before the firing squad he shouts "Long live the Chinese
Communist Party," "Long live Chairman Mao."36 The political
lesson in this symbolic illustration of self-sacrifice is
clear. Politically correct behavior equals self-sacrifice for
Mao and Maoist Communism. The impact of this lesson during
the Cultural Revolution when China's vast population was in the
throes of a power struggle which in the end would legitimize
the political authority of either Mao or Liu can be assumed to
be significant.
In On the Docks we find an example of symbolism used to
denote diligence, and commitment beyond one's capacity. As
team leader of the dock workers, Kuo prepares to go out in a
small boat into a raging storm to stop a freighter, he declares
confidently:
. . Though the thunder crashes in a deluge of rain,
Though the tide rises high in the deep of night,
Though the waves are wild and the current swift,
I shall brave them all and set out in pursuit.
Neither mountains of knives nor seas of flames
Can stop a Communist from doing his duty. 3 7
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Kuo is challenged, beyond human capacity, yet true Maoist
communist that he is, he goes out on his "suicide" mission.
By this act, he averts the political sabotage attempts of the
arch-villain Chien. One cannot help but observe that the
raging storm is symbolic of the Cultural Revolution and that
Chien, who feels technology should replace dockers to improve
production, symbolically represents the major culprit of the
Cultural Revolution Liu Shao-Chi. Whatever, the inference,
it is clear that the audience is presented a lesson through
which it can be learned that political behavior based on the
Maoist religious virtue of diligence is not only correct, but
also results in success against any odds.
Finally, we turn our attention to the symbolic representa-
tion of exemplary life. This Maoist religious virtue is import-
ant for two reasons. First, as we previously discussed, the
example of correct political thinking and behavior provided by
a role model can be the most tangible and identifiable lesson
in the political learning process. And second, with regard to
the attempts of the Maoist religious belief system to integrate
those elements of the traditional religious belief systems of
Confucianism and Taoism necessary for socialist construction,
the Maoist religious virtue of exemplary life style seemingly
attempts to take the Confucian virtue of exemplary role social
behavior and merge it with the Taoist virtue of service to
community discarding the individualism of Confucianisma1and
the anarchic fanaticism of Taoism. It is interesting to note
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that the symbol we found to represent exemplary life refers
to a traditional Chinse proberb--the one regarded by many,
including the author, as one critical basis for Maoism. The
proverb we refer to here, is the Foolish Old Man Who Removed
the Mountain and its symbolic utilization is found in the model
revolutionary opera Taking Tiger Mountain By Strategy. The
symbolism surrounds the hero character Yang as he prepares to
enter the bandit's den on Tiger Mountain. As he gathers the
courage and "revolutionary wisdom" to proceed in his task, he
gains insight through his symbolic emulation of the exemplary
life of The Foolish Old Man:
Like the Foolish Old Man who removed the mountains,
I shall break through every obstacle!
The flames that blaze in my red heart
Shall forge a sharp blade to kill the foe. 38
Here again the lesson for the audience is clear. Yang
owes his exemplary life of correct political attitudes and
behavior to his symbolic emulation of the exemplary life of
the Foolish Old Man. So too, individuals in the audience can
achieve exemplary life by emulating the exemplary life of Yang.
Each of these above cited examples of the use of symbolism
to present Maoist religious virtues or themes are significant.
They are meant to illustrate the functions of the Maoist relig-
ious belief system in the political learning process during
the cultural revolution. We cannot conclude this discussion
of symbols and symbolism however without giving attention to
the element of religious experience in the Maoist religious
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belief system, its symbolic representations in our data, and
its role in political learning.
Criteria Three--Religious Experience:
In our discussion in Chaper IV, we indicated some of the
problems we recognized in identifying religious experience.
Most outstanding is the problem of recognizing religious experi-
ence without having the opportunity to confirnwhether the
experience being observed has all the emotion and sense of
ultimacy (Wach's criteria for religious experiences) in order
to qualify as a religious experience. Our utilization of the
model revolutionary operas as our data source further confounds
this problem. Not only can we not establish through interview
or survey actual accounts of religious experience, we also
face the difficulty of having to infer symbolic representations
of religious experience of an opera character. While we hesi-
tate to make this latter inference, we do feel that many of the
thematic experiences of opera characters (based on director's
cues supplied in the texts) are intended to symbolize religious
experience. For example, the faith in the Maoist religious
belief system, expressed by the heroes and other characters in
the operas, symbolize religious experience, viewing as Tillich
does that faith is a type of religious experience.39 Martyr-
dom is another type of religious experience symbolically pre-
sented in the model operas. That the characters who sacrifice
their lives for Maoismiare referred to in the scripts as martyrs
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rather than simply as heroes seems to substantiate this observa-
tion. There is, however, one instance where we feel this
inference is comfortably supported. Although we highlight this
singular instance of symbolic reference to religious experience,
it is a strong and definite example, and can be regarded as
representative of the less definable yet existent examples of
symbolic religious experiences implicit in the model revolution-
ary operas.
Of all the religious experiences, perhaps the most easily
identified and observed is conversion. The state of conversion
presupposes total emotional commitment to the new belief system
including a belief in the doctrine and concept of the Ultimacy
of the new belief system. Therefore, to identify conversion to
a religious belief systemis to identify a religious experience.
Windermiller, in his study of the similarities of religious con-
version and brainwashing, has provided us with nine criteria
for identifying conversion. He concludes that religious con-
versions are occurences that: 1) are crisis experiences and
problem-solving processes which maintain ego identity and ego
comfort; 2) involve a total emotional upheaval which results
in a changed life style and manner of thinking for the individual;
3) occur most often as a result of group pressures to confess
wrongdoings; 4) occur most easily in highly structured organi-
zations; 5) introduce new vocabularies, values, and beliefs;
6) often occur as a result of exhaustion, surrender and sug-
gestion; 7) are directly preceded by self-criticism, doubt,
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fear and guilt; 8) bring about a feeling of cleanliness, light-
ness, euphoria, relief, gratitude, enlightenment, dedication,
and.zeal in the individual; and finally 9) occur as a result
of one psychic system within the individual is being suppressed while
another replaces it in the individual's consciousness. 40
We observe a conversion of this type, symbolic of Theme
Four, to the Maoist religious belief system in the sixth
scene of On the Docks, where the young dockworker Han realizes
his past transgressions and accepts, or is converted, to the
doctrine of Maoism. As an expression of his conversion, he
declares his total commitment to Maoism and the Maoist notion
of Ultimacy:
Thanks to the help of the Party,
I've come to see the light.
Mixed feelings of remorse and shame
Bring tears to my eyes.
From now on, I must be firm,
Sharp in vision and really determined.
Head high, I'll brave wind and rain.
. . . going through trials
To become tempered steel . . .
I definitely will listen to the
Teaching of Chairman Mao, removed
My thinking and be a revolutionary
All my life. 4
From the acting cues provided in parentheses in the script
we see that the actor who portrays Han must sing the above with
full displays of emotion. This latter factor confirms our con-
clusion that religious experience based on the Maoist religious
belief system is being symbolically transferred to the audience.
Religious experience is important, whether personally ex-
perienced or vicariously experienced through symbolism, in
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the political learning process of political socialization.
Group religious experience (such as that of the audience in
viewing the conversion of Han in On the Docks) can "motivate
the will to believe"42 and can "bind the group together."43
As political socialization seeks to bring about voluntary com-
pliance and participation in the political norm, a society
bonded together by means of religious experience certainly
facilitates this process.
Looking more specifically at the context of China during the
Cultural Revolution, we can observe an intentional attempt
to generate religious experiences within the population based
on the Maoist religious belief system. Paralleling events in
other arenas (i.e., the frenzied, and perhaps even ecstatic,
response of the Red Guard to the teachings of Mao and their
supposed.mission to "preach" Maoism all across China; as well
as the expounding of "miracles" attributed to faith in Mao
presented via official, pro-Maoist controlled media items)
suggest that the model revolutionary operas were also intended
to initiate symbolic religious experiences for their viewing
audiences. These symbolized religious experiences would in
turn motivate the audience to either learn more about the
Maoist religious belief system, thus initiating the political
learning process; or they would reinforce belief in Maoism
thus reinforcing the learning of correct political attitudes
and behavior.
Tillich has observed that "Man's ultimate concern must
be expressed symbolically, because (symbolism) alone is able
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to express the ultimate."44 He further states that it is as
a result of acceptance of symbols that express our ultimate
concern that faith in the ultimate occurs.45 From a political
perspective, Merleman has concluded that symbols represent
a symbolic expression of tangible rewards accepted'by the
population in return for compliant response to stimuli gener-
ated from the political system.46 Included in his conclusion
is the observation that, as the population achieves a stage of
cognitive dissonance where compliant behavior is given to the
political system for mere symbols of material gain, legitimacy
(or faith in the "oughtness" of political authority) is
granted the political system by the population.47
The function of the symbol in each case is quite similar.
So much so that, in a context where the functional interrelation-
ship of religion and politics are an entrenched element in the
political culture, it is quite possible, and perhaps most
effective to use one set of symbols which both represent the
ultimate and, at the same time, reinforce political learning.
The symbols and symbolism presented in the model revolutionary
operas served such a dual function as a result of their founda-
tion in the Maoist religious belief system. The critical
symbols in the dual functions are those which represent the
concept of ultimacy found in the Maoist religious belief system.
We find examples of such symbols in each of the four model
revolutionary operas under consideration here, particularly in
their respective final scenes. In each opera, the symbol of
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ultimacy used for the finale is the color red. As we mentioned
earlier in this chapter, in traditional Chinese Peking Opera,
the color red symbolized honesty and truth. This symbolic
reference is carried forward to the modern revolutionary operas,
but is also expanded to fit the new religio-political context
of the Cultural Revolution. In the model revolutionary operas,
the color red does not just symbolize honesty and truth, it
seems also to symbolize the Ultimate Truth of the Maoist religious
belief system. Set within the context of the struggle between
"red" versus "expert" which predominated the ideological con-
flicts of the Cultural Revolution, this observation about the
new symbolic significance of the color red seems valid.
In the final scene of Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy,
the P.L.A. Chief of Staff and the hero, Yang Tzu-jung claim
victory against the bandit Vulture and his Tiger Mountain
"Fifth Peace Preservation Brigade of the Eastern Heilung-
kiang Region", against a backdrop of a huge red flag which pre-
dominates the stage of actors.48 In Shachiapang, the audience
is instructed that, as aresult of the wipe out of the New
Fourth Army's victory over the Japanese/KMT supporters, the
"people of Shachiapang, under the leadership of Chairman Mao
. . . are rid of the Japanese and puppet troops and once more
see the light of day." 49 As the final curtain falls, the
bright red rays of the sun predominate the scene as well as
the red flags of the New Fourth Army. We find the red sun
with its bright rays predominating the final scene of On the
Docks as well. As the scene ends, the audience sees the Dockers
321
waving red flags singing "Holding the red flag high, we
charge!" 50 The red sun of dawn slowly rises in the background
and "illuminates'both banks of the Huangpu River." 51 The
final scene of The Red Lantern is perhaps the most striking
use of this symbolism for ultimacy of the four operas. It
contains no dialogue. The scene opens with red flags flutter-
ing against the sky. Young Tieh-mei enters with the Knife-
Grinder. They are followed on stage by all the communist
guerrillas. Then the audience views the following: "Solemnly,
Tieh-mei hands the code to the guerrilla leader. Brandishing
their rifles and swords, all rejoice in their victory. Tieh-
mei holds aloft the red lantern while crimson light radiates." 52
In each of these four finales, the audience is left with
clear symbolic analogies of the religious and political meaning
of Maoist ultimacy. To be "red" is to be Maoist; to believe in
Mao's ability to lead China to Communist ultimacy; to follow
Mao's teachings; to dedicate oneself totally to socialist
construction which means uncompromising political participa-
tion; to give one's life, if necessary, for Mao and Maoism.
To be "red" is spirtually correct and politically correct.
And, during the Cultural Revolution, when it was more critical
than ever (for the Maoist camp) that China's population choose
to be "red", the model revolutionary operas as we have seen
were vital political learning tools in that they provided
the sanctions, role-models, and symbols which established
political correctness based on the Maoist religious belief
system.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
THE MAOIST RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
So long as we confuse all authority with supernatural
authority, reason in society cannot exist.
Hugh Daniel Duncan*
Throughout the preceding chapters, we have discussed
two major thesis arguments: first, that we could observe
Maoism functioning as a religious belief system during the
period of the Cultural Revolution in China (1966-1969); and,
secondly, that we can further observe the Maoist religious
belief system functioning as a standard for correctness in the
political socialization process during the Cultural Revolution.
Our data for these arguments, the model revolutionary operas,
have provided us with a novel point of view of the social-
political thinking of the Maoist camp during the Cultural Revolu-
tion. More specific to our needs, the model operas have provided
us with insights and an empirical base from which we could
view the process of political socialization during the Cultural
Revolution (giving particular attention to political learning
and the functional role of Maoism in that process). It is upon
these insights and observations drawn from the data contained
*Communication and Social Order, p. xxiii.
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in the four model opera scripts that our conclusions are based.
Before we discuss our conclusion, however, we feel it important
here to reiterate the intentions of this study.
As we stated in our introduction, this study is meant
to be primarily descriptive and secondarily explanatory. Our
intent was simply to observe and describe the process of
political socialization during the Cultural Revolution using
four model revolutionary operas as our telescope. Then, on the
basis of our observations, we were to present in our concluding
statement, an assessment of the impact of the functioning of
the Maoist religious belief system on the effectiveness of
the political socialization process in China. This assessment
would suggest explanations for the outcome of the Cultural
Revolution relative to our focus on the religious dimensions
of Maoism.
For obvious reasons, we chose not to look at the inten-
tions of the political system with regard to political socializa-
tion or at the impact of the socialization techniques used on
the popuplation. We realize that our telescopic view is not
actual contact with the people and events observed and, there-
fore, does not provide a firm basis for any grandiose general-
izations. However, our method of research and data source does
support our ability to accurately and validly describe the
function of a process and to present suggestions or pose
critical questions on the basis of this description. This is
our task in this final chapter. We will first summarize our
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description of the function of Maoism operating as a religious
belief system in the political learning phase of the political
socialization process, based on our conclusions drawn from the
script content of the model revolutionary operas. Our final
task will be to discuss the significance of our description
of the function of the Maoist religious belief system in the
political socialization process, relative to the cumulative
evolution of China's political culture.
At the conclusion of a study such as ours, one very
interesting questions one should ask is: Why it is so important
to have had Maoism function as a religious belief system in the
political socialization process during the Cultural Revolution,
in addition to its function as a political ideology or as a
popular movement led by a charismatic political figure? One
answer to this query is found in the nature of China's political
culture. As we have indicated, politics and religion have had
a functional interrelationship since the Ch'in dynasty when
political authority was first legitimized by establishing a
divine association between Heaven and the political leader (so
called the Son of Heaven to accentuate this association).
Religion, as we have seen, has traditionally been very critical
to political legitimacy and, one might argue, to political
socialization--where political learning amounted to compliant
response to the stimuli from the emperor because of his
association with Heaven. What we have attempted to illustrate
here is that this traditional functional relationship between
religion and politics has been carried over to contemporary
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China, where we observe Maoism functioning as a religious belief
system to legitimize political authority. The personality cult
of Mao and the superhuman power attributed to his thoughts
serve as observable illustrations of this function.
A second response to our question is also found in China's
past--specifically, in China's religious traditions. Confucian-
ism, the official religious belief system, was the primary
contributor to the establishment of the traditional functional
interrelationship between religion and politics. The Taoist
religious belief system, as we have seen, justified popular
rebellion against any political authority which, by its corrupt-
ness or injustice to the people, demonstrated its "loss" of
the Mandate of Heaven. Thus in China's past we find one
religious belief system legitimizing political authority and
another religious belief system legitimizing popular dissent
against political authority. The Maoist religious belief system
seemingly attempted to merge the conflicting functions of
these belief systems. On the one hand, Maoism was to be
regarded as the official religious belief system of the Cultural
Revolution period which legitimized the authority of Mao. Yet,
it was simultaneously to be regarded as the popular religious
belief system which legitimized criticism of the CCP and the
authority of anti-Mao, pragmatic political officials, such as
Liu by the Chinese masses.
Elements of the Maoist religious belief system which were
functional requisites for the political learning process during
the Cultural Revolution also serve to illustrate the Confucian
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and Taoist influences in contemporary Maoisrm. The Maoist
communist individual was to be exemplary of self (i.e., truly
Confucian) in providing a model of correct behavior, yet selfless
(i.e., truly Taoist) in his sacrifice and dedication to the
larger community. Above all, the individual was to exhibit
total discipline in lifestyle, a virtue shared by Confucianism
and Taoism. As we have seen from the character Han in the model
revolutionary opera, On the Docks, this was a difficult tight-
rope to walk for the average, non-hero-type Chinese individual
and particularly for the youth of the Cultural Revolution
oeriod.
Although one might take the meaning of a cultural revolu-
tion literally--that is, an abrupt change or upheaval of China's
socio-political culture--the functioning of the Maoist religious
belief system during the Cultural Revolution seemed tobe a
restatement of the Confucian-Taoist influenced political culture
rather than an upheaval of that culture. We make this assertion
even in the light of the slogan which propelled the Red Guard
in their activities--"Destroy the Four Olds" (old ideas, old
culture, old customs, and old habits). There is an answer
to this seeming contradiction between policy and practice
observable in Mao's directives during the Cultural Revolution.
It is as follows: If we view the Cultural Revolution from a
secular perspective as a power struggle, where Mao Tse-tung
was the attacked and Liu Shao-chi and his supporters the
aggressors, one might view Mao in the position of a political
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leader struggling to reestablish the legitimacy of his author-
ity. In this position, Mao vascillated between which strategy
would most effectively defend his position. This position
of having one's authority challenged was not, as we have seen,
alien to China's political traditions. Although the Red
Guard were instructed to "Destroy the Four Olds," Mao was in
the position of not discounting anything that might defend his
position. In our observations of the function of the Maoist
religious belief system during the Cultural Revolution, we
see Maoism transcending the realm of secular political authority
to establish an authority which would be perceived by the popu-
lation as superhuman, and in a manner of speaking, sacred.
Concurrently, Maoism served as an impetus to attack the secular
authority of the CCP declaring the majority of Party officials
as corrupt and misguided.
From whatever perspective one chooses, Maoism was func-
tioning simultaneously as both Confucian and Taoist. Strate-
gically, given China's tradition of political culture, this dual
defense was perhaps the most effective means for Mao to reestab-
lish legitimacy and power during the Cultural Revolution. His
political person was elevated to a position where it could be
perceived to transcend the human realm as was the person of
the Confucian emperor. His thoughts (doctrine), which were also
elevated to a level where they were perceived as superhuman,
and therefore sacred, instigated an attack on secular authority
with its corrupt pragmatism much the same way that Taoism
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attacked the secular authority of the political system.
Hence, from this perspective of viewing the Cultural Revolution
as a power struggle, we would suggest that the function of
Maoism as a religious belief system (which merged the tradi-
tional religious belief systems of Confucianism and Taoism)
significantly contributed to Mao's successful emergence as
legitimate political authority at the end of the Cultural
Revolution.
As we have stressed at various points in this study, we
cannot substantiate any theses of intention, on the part of
either faction (Maoist or non-Maoist) in the struggles of the
Cultural Revolution, with regard to the establishment of Maoism
as a religious belief system or to its function in the political
socialization process. However, it is clear that surrounding
the cult of Mao, which crescendoed to its peak during the
Cultural Revolution, one can observe elements of Maoism which
seemingly attempt to integrate elements of Confucianism and
Taoism into one religious belief system. Maoism both legitimized
Mao's political authority and justified the rebellion led by
his Red Guard youth against the Liu Shao-chi faction and its
ideologically corrupt heresies against Maoism. These func-
tional elements of the cult of Mao are seen in the continual
call for popular revolutionary struggle in the name of Mao
(or the Party) and in the continual legitimization of Maoist
communism throughout the model revolutionary operas.
Looking more specifically at these elements of the Maoist
religious belief system and their specific function in political
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learning during the Cultural Revolution, we see clear evidences
in the model operas that the Maoist religious belief system
established what constituted political correctness during
that four year period. One had to believe in the ultimacy of
Maoist communism for China, where the Great Harmony would pre-
vail. The role-modelheroes in the model operas introduced
and reinforced this lesson for every audience. One had to
adhere to Maoist religious orientations to life (selflessness,
self-sacrifice, exemplary life style, etc.) which, if followed,
would bring China one step closer to Maoist ultimacy. Each
positive role-model in the model operas (particularly the
heroes) personified correct political behavior based on these
Maoist orientations to life. And finally, one had to experience
Maoism religiously which motivated conversion, belief, and
adherence to the Maoist religious belief system through "re-
moulding" or through self-sacrifice and martyrdom.
The sanctions based on the Maoist religious belief system
were equally clear with regard to political correctness and
incorrectness. To comply with Maoist political stimuli
through correct political attitudes and behavior meant progress
toward Maoist ultimacy, manifest initially by increased,
tangible material gain (for example, more food) or increased
symbolic ego comfort (increased identity within the Maoist
"chosen" class of working or poor peasant). To reject or deny
Maoist political stimuli meant expulsion from Mao's select
class and loss of identity which meant ego discomfort;
embarrassment which was loss of face; or purge. In the model
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revolutionary opera, the Maoist's always received the positive
sanction rewards, while the enemies of Maoism always suffered
the punishment of loss of identity, embarassment, or purge.
(It isinteresting to note that no villains were killed in the
end. Obviously, death was an escape and too easy a punishment
for their gross wrongdoings.)
We can sum up the function of the Maoist religious belief
system in the political learning process during the cultural
revolution by returning briefly to our learning model presented
in Chapter V. The youth of China (aged 15-25 approximately)
can be inserted in our model as generation two.* In figure
12, we see the Maoist faction of the political system introduc-
ing the stimuli of participation in the Cultural Revolution as
correct political behavior. Based on the Maoist religious
belief system, the model revolutionary operas presented the
sanctions, role-models, and symbols which were to accompany
this stimulus and eventually lead to the automatic learning
with total symbolism (stage three).
However, stage three automatic learning was never
reached. Instead, the Maoist political system re-introduced
controlled learning under the auspices of the revolutionary
committees in addition to the controlled learning of the
In this case, generation one is the pre-1949 (adults age
40 and above) segment of the population who were socialized to
accept the political legitimacy of Mao as a result of the "success"
of the long March and the eventual victory of the CCP, the material
gain (land reform, increased standard of living for peasants, etc.)
received just prior to and after the communist victory and the
ego comfort associated with improved status of the peasant class.
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model revolutionary opera and the media, yet we suggest
that the Cultural Revolution was not successful in promoting
viable political learning which would advance political sociali-
zation by "ideologically remoulding" the population. The
thousands of Red Guard youth, who were the principal target
of the political socialization process, had to in the end be
restricted and surveilled. They had not learned correctly
what political "correctness" was. The reason for this lack
of success in the political socialization process can, we
suggest, be attributed to the function of Maoism as a
religious belief system as we described it above. Maoism, in
its attempts to merge Confucian and Taoist religious principles,
further confused the already confused youth. China's youth, as
wellas the majority of the adult population, were caught up
in a power struggle, where during most of the conflict, it was
difficult to distinguish sides. This created the problem of
perception. Who was Maoist and who was not? This distinction
was critical because the Maoists were to be exalted for their
"religious" virtue while the non-Maoists were purged for their
secular, pragmatic corruption. For most of the rampaging Red
Guard Units this distinction was not and could not be made. So they
attempted to purge almost everyone. One must ask: What has the
function of the Maoist religious belief system to do with
this confusion in the political learning process?
When Maoism seemingly merged both Confucianist and
Taoist religious principles to gain victory in the power
struggle, became both the official religious belief system
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system which legitimized its political authority and the
popular religious belief system which challenged that same
political authority. The Red Guard youth worshipped the
figure and thoughts of Mao Tse-tung yet were unknowingly out
to destroy the very foundation of his political authority--the
CCP. When Mao himself recognized that his power base was being
destroyed by the Red Guard rather than reinforced, he revoked
his support and attempted to render them impotent with the PLA
and later through the triple alliance of the Revolutionary
Committees.
As we have seen throughout this study, political socializa-
tion occurred during the Cultural Revolution and the Maoist
religious belief system functioned; as a standard for establish-
ing and measuring correct political attitudes and behavior.
But the Red Guard youth did not learn what they were supposed
to learn, primarily, we would argue, because the stimuli gener-
ated by the Maoist faction of the political system were confus-
ing and contradictory.
It has only been 11 years into the political socialization
process of generation two which began in 1966. Based on our
model we might venture to suggest that the recent occurences
in China (both surrounding the death of Chou En-lai, the anti-
Confucius and anti-Lin Piao campaigns, and more recently the
mass demonstrations staged to support the purge of the "gang
of four") are but a continuation of the political socialization
process begun in 1966, where the present political system is
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still attempting to pass generation two through stage three
(automatic learning--stimulus with symbols) to stage four
(internal motivation--symbol, no stimulus) of our generational
acculturation model. However, the mass demonstrations in
support of Chou En-lai, which were evidently not expected or
controlled by the political system coupled with the observations
*
of recentvisitors returning from the People's Republic of China,
that there is a seeming shift toward elitism and pragmatism
in what would be generation two of our model (the 25-35 year
old "former" Red Guard youth) indicates that political socializa-
tionof this generation in Maoist political correctness (which
condemned elitism and pragmatism and demanded communal
selflessness and "sacred" ideological righteousness) has still
not been achieved.
The success of the political socialization process
begun in 1966 can only be evaluated for its success or impact
with an analysis of the baseline for stage one in the political
learning process for generation three. From our model, we
might speculate that if the current political learning of
generation two, based on the Maoist religious belief system
(after Mao), continues through stage four--where the automatic
response to political stimuli of the revolutionary struggle
would be total participation in the revolutionary struggle
as a true Maoist--generation three would begin its political
learning process at a base-line where acceptance of the
*We refer here to comments and observations made by Lucian
Pye and Roy Hofeinz on their recent -(1977) visits to the People's
Republic of China at a meeting of Chino Scholars in November, 1977.
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political legitimacy of Maoism (carry over from the base-line
of generation two) and automatic, voluntary participation in
a Maoist-defined type of revolutionary struggle would be modus
operandi assumptions.
Based on our current observations of generation two,
this scenario becomes unlikely. Rather, what we see is a
situation where the political system under Hua Kuo-fang (without
Mao and his superhuman aura) is attempting to create a new
standard for political correctness for the adults of generation
two and the youth of generation three. This standard for
political correctness is much more grounded in pragmatism.
It is secular, rather than religiously based. In many ways,
it is apparently anti-Maoist. This divergence from Maoist political
correctness has been accomplished symbolically through the
campaign against the "gang of four." Mao's political, social,
and "ideological" mistakes have been separated from his figure
(image) and attributed to the "gang of four" or their influ-
ence over him through his wife Chiang-Ching. Mao remains
a sacred demi-god in the memories of the population while his
policies as well as much of his thoughts, which during the
Cultural Revolution were believed to have miraculous powers,
are being abandoned by the present leadership.
To sum up our functional analysis of the Maoist religious
belief system and its role in the political socialization
process in China during the Cultural Revolution process in
China, we must return to Hempel's analytical statement intro-
duced in Chapter I. Fitting our findings into the Hempel
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schema, we have:
(a) During the Cultural Revolution in China, political
socialization functioned adequately in the setting
of Chinese political culture with its historical
functional relationship between religion and
politics;
(b) Political socialization functioned adequately within
the setting of China's political culture because
a standard of correctness existed (was satisfied);
(c)' The Maoist religious belief system was one factor
in a class (of I) of empirically sufficient
conditions for a standard of correctness within
the context of political socialization during
the Cultural Revolution;
(d) We can observe through the model revolutionary operas
the Maoist religious belief system as being present
in the political socialization process during the
Cultural Revolution.
In other words, the political socialization process in China
during the Cultural Revolution could not have functioned
(irrespective of how it functionedor the nature of its results)
without a standard of correctness. We maintain this, in part
because of China's political culture, particularly the
Confucian influences, in which the political authority estab-
lished the standard for correct political behavior by his
actions, and, in part, because one cannot learn to comply with
a norm without a standard on which to measure that norm. The
Maoist religious belief system, which we know did functionally
exist, based on the content of the model revolutionary operas,
is one factor of many which could have functioned as a basis
for a standard of correctness in the political socialization
process during the Cultural Revolution. (For a further discus-
sion of this statement and others in the Hempel schema see
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the Appendix.) What is important here, is our conclusion on
the basis of this functional analysis, that to observe Maoism
functioning as a religious belief system in the political sociali-
zation process during the Cultural Revolution is to observe a
continuity in the political culture Mao sought to abruptly
change.
Although the Tenth Plenum in 1969 announced the victorious
end of the Cultural Revolution in favor of the Maoists, one
strong and vital element of the political culture remained
intact, the functional interrelationship between religion and
politics. Further, the Maoist religious belief system, by
its amalgamation of Confucian and Taoist elements, particularly
in its religious orientations to life, seems to have rekindled
the cultural influences of the two traditional religious belief
systems, rather than destroying them. Perhaps this suggestion
may present one explanation for the necessity and intensity of
the anti-Confucian campaign during the 1970's.
The Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution was a political
success of sorts for the pro-Maoist faction of the political
system because Mao emerged the victor in the power struggle
and managed to maintain that legitimized power base until his
death. However, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was
an unsuccessful attempt to politically socialize the youthful
generation of potential Maoist revolutionaries. The Maoist
religious belief system, as it functioned during the cultural
revolution, was responsible for both the success and the
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failure of the Cultural Revolution. Above all, we view the
function of the Maoist religious belief system in the political
socialization process during the Cultural Revolution as an
experiment in "ideological remoulding" which seemingly built
on rather than destroyed the religio-political traditions of
Cina's political culture. One major point it has clearly estab-
lished is that the dominant Confucian and Taoist influences in
the political culture could not be merged and at the same time,
have political socialization succeed.
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APPENDIX
STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONALISM * AS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The brief discussion which follows addresses our ration-
ale for using this formal analytical framework in our study
and our assessment of what we feel its contribution has been.
Our study posits two primarily conceptual theses--first that
Maoism can be viewed functionally as a religious belief
system and secondly that Maoism functioning as a religious
belief system has an integral role in the adequate (but not
necessarily intended) functioning of the political socializa-
tion process in China. This analytical framework of struc-
tural functionalism allows us to discuss in an easily separable
way, the functioning of Maoism in China and then about the
functioning of the Chinese political socialization process.
Without our analytical framework, it would not be a difficult
task to confuse the interrelated ideas of each of these themes
beyond recognition.
* The reader is directed to the following references with
regard to the major generalizable theories upon which prediction
can be based. Sources used in our discussion here: Carl Hempel,
"The Logic of Functional Analysis," Symposium on Sociological
Theory, ed., Llewellyn Gross, New York (Harper and Row), 1959;
Karl Deutsch, "Integration and the Social System: Implications
of Functional Analysis," Integration of Political Communities,
ed., P. E. Jacob and J. V. Toscano, Philadelphia (J. B. Lippin-
cott), 1964; and David A. Groslin, ed., Handbook of Socializa-
tion Research and Theory, Rand McNally, 1955.
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The most significant contribution our analytical frame-
work makes is that it fixates the interrelationships of the
political socialization process which would otherwise be con-
voluted by the dynamics of the process. Without this categori-
zation of variables, we would not have been able to propose
and support our generational acculturation model of political
socialization--a model we claim can be used as a guide to pre-
dictive statements about China.
Since structural-functionalism usually only classifies
variables and defines relationships, some theoreticians have
been led to criticize functional analysis. One of these
major criticisms of functionalism is its tendency to produce
a more retrospective analysis rather than an analysis which
produces generalizable theories upon which prediction can be
based. That is, after functional analysis has been used to
categorize the variables and define the relationships of a
system, the results of the analysis can fall short of having
predictive import. In the single circumstance, however, where
the functional analysis can be construed as implicitly invoking
an "hypothesis of self-regulation," it does become possible
to use the analysis for explanatory and predictive purposes.
As we will discuss here, our study of the political socializa-
tion process lends itself to such an analysis.
The discussion in the body of our study presents the
basic elements of a structural-functional requisite analysis,
first of Maoism and then of political socialization. We first
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identify in Chapter II the historical setting of our analyses
(.i.e., pre-MaoistChinawith its traditional relationship be-
tween politics and religion). In Chapter III we begin a
structural-functional prerequisite analysis of Maoism by dis-
cussing the contemporary setting of pre-'49 China as influenced
by Mao. As we examine the origins of Maoism, we place into
perspective the regard held for and the position given to the
Long March and Yenan by the Chinese. Continuing the analysis
into Chapter IV, we define the functional prerequisites of a
religious belief system as being: (1) the addressing of
ultimate eschatological questions; (2) the presentation of
morals, values, or orientations to life; and (3) the genera-
tion of what can be identified as religious experiences. As
we discuss the structure of Maoism we address each of these
requirements and establish that Maoism can indeed be viewed
as functioning as a religious belief system.
In similar fashion we begin our analysis of the function
of the Maoist religious belief system in political socializa-
tion. We recall the unit's setting (i.e., Maoist China with
its historical traditional relationship between politics and
religion as discussed in Chapter III) as characterized by the
specific internal and external conditions during a selected
time period (i.e., the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
as outlined in Chapter IV). We then discuss the functional
requisite of the system under observation--a standard for
political correctness--in Chapter V.
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As first proposed in our introduction, we present in
Chapter V via the formal logic of the Hempel model that Maoism
did function as a standard for correctness in the political
socialization process in China. The modification of premise
(c) to premise (c') through the insertion of the Class of I,
as discussed in our introductory chapter, is the appropriate
form of our analysis, as this identifies the basis for satisfy-
ing our functional prerequisite as a class of traits rather
than as a single trait. As suggested by the Hempel model,
we will discuss here briefly the other members of our class
of I: political ideology, the Chinese political culture,
and the Chinese historical experience. Each of these are
traits equivalent to the Maoist religious belief system in
their ability to provide a basis for political socialization.
We can see from our discussion in Chapter III and IV of
the origins and structure of the Maoist religious belief system
that the momentum of China's historical experience and political
culture is captured in the functioning of Maoism. That is to
say, there are elements of political precedents, modes of
legitimization, and timeworn religious and cultural traditions,
which could be a basis for the establishment and communication
ofa correct standard for,:political attitudes in historical experi-
ence and political culture. Those elements when embodied in
the Maoist religious belief system or when identified in the
above are the same or are strikingly similar. This fact is
not surprising when we observe the amount of cultural, religious,
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and historical continuity preserved or built upon by Maoism.
As for political ideology, its position as a basis for
correct political ideas is unquestioned. As for its equivalence
to the functions of the Maoist religious belief system, many
of the same parallels cited above do apply. We know that the
nature of political ideology is intimately related to the
basic operations of the political system. From a socio-political
communications point of view of the political system, China
as we discussed in Chapter III is different from some standard
models. Instead of a chain of communication from policy-
makers to the socio-political bureaucracy to the socio-political
masses back to the policy-makers, we have in contemporary (as
well as in traditional) China feedback communication between
the policy-makers and the bureaucracy and between the bureau-
cracy and the populus (see Figure 4). Though the means of
communication between the policy-makers and the bureaucracy
may have been closer to classically-based political ideologi-
cal methods, the communication between the bureaucracy and
populus surely was not. As we pointed out, ideological inter-
pretations of correct political behavior and its response from
the populus were transmitted through the elements of the
Maoist religious belief system.
A much more intuitive and therefore more speculative
approach to the discussion of whether the standard for politically
correct ideas was based upon the Maoist religious belief system
or upon pure political ideology is to examine the hierarchical
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relationship of environmental factors affecting which course
of the two might have been taken. Again from Chapter III,
Figure 1 contrasts the same list of environmental factors which
are arranged differently only with respect to their hierarchial
order. Our speculation is that Political Socialization Pro-
cess I applies to China during the Cultural Revolution. This
is based upon both (a) the internal requirements and conditions
affecting political socialization during this period before an
observable course had been chosen and (b) our ranking of the
environmental factors deemed most important during the Cultural
Revolution. This ranking was compiled by observing the areas
in which most energies were applied and upon which most reli-
ance was placed to legitimize current or future activities.
The important conclusion to reach here is that, notwith-
standing which element is most prominent at any one time, we
have identified all major bases for the functional prerequisite
of political socialization during the Cultural Revolution. It
is not strict formalism which has driven the above discussion
of Hempel's Class of I. In the context of our study, it cannot
and should not be argued that only a religious belief system
could have been a standard for political socialization in con-
temporary China. Though we do feel that the Maoist religious
belief system was of primary importance, it becomes necessary
to explore other possible standards for correctness so as to
place into context the standard we have chosen to examine exten-
sively.
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The examination of our second thesis--that Maoism does
indeed function as a religious belief system--is made possible
through this formal, elemental presentation of a structural-
functional requisite analysis. Our analytical framework pro-
vides a neatly separable backdrop of definitions and concepts
for Chapter V. In Chapters VI and VII, we move to an empirical
level to further our analysis of the functioning of Maoism by
separately examining the sanctions reinforced by Maoism from the
symbols it defines.
As we introduced earlier in our discussion here one of the
most significant contributions of our use of this formal struc-
tural functional framework is that it made possible our pre-
sentation of the generational acculturation model. Because we
identified political socialization as having an hypothesis of
self-regulation, we are able to justify our building of this
explanatory model. It is upon this underlying theme of self-
regulation in Chapter V that our analysis shifts from one of
how Maoism as a religious belief system came into being to one
of what is the basis for the continued, adequate functioning of
the political socialization process in China, during this
period of the Cultural Revolution. Let us now explain this
idea of self-regulation before continuing the discussion of
the model we formalized in Chapter V.
We mean by a hypothesis of self-regulation that one can
empirically observe the following characteristics in an
adequately functioning system: that the system within definable
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limits exhibits traits which act to compensate for events or
influences in its environment which adversely affect its
operation, purpose or existence. If the system were not able
to develop these traits which help satisfy the system's func-
tional requisites, its continued, adequate functioning would
be in jeopardy. For example, if a hostile change in a hydra's
environment caused it to be split into pieces, each of the separ-
ate pieces would attempt to regenerate into a completely whole
hydra. Though it was not discussed in detail in Chapter V, it
is the author's speculation that functioning political socializa-
tion processes are self-regulating systems. That is to say,
that if there were internal or external environmental changes
threatening the functional requisites of say the political
socialization process in China, that the system would develop
traits which would act to compensate for unsatisfied functional
requisites--hypothetically if a certain type of political
behavior represented an unauthorized redefinition of the stand-
ards for political correctness, a new play for example could
be written in which this new and threatening behavior would
be strongly deplored or reprimanded. As we discussed in
Chapter V, it is the learning process in political socializa-
tion which is cyclical (once initiated) and, therefore, self-
perpetuating, as well as self-reinforcing.
With an associated hypothesis of self-regulation, the
results of a functional analysis can have predictive importance.
In a formal sense, the syllogism used in Chapter I containing
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the Class of I generalization is allowed to have a conditional
conclusion by combining (a) with (d'), resulting in the follow-
ing model:
(b) System s functions adequately in a setting of kind
c only if condition n is satisfied;
(c') I is a class of empirically sufficient conditions
for n in the context determined by s and c; and I
is not empty;
(d'') If s functions adequately in a setting of kind c
at time t, then some one of the items in class I
is present in s at t.
Hence if political socialization functioned adequately in
Maoist China during the Cultural Revolution, then the influences
of at least one of the Maoist religious belief system, political
ideology, the Chinese political culture, or the Chinese histori-
cal experience provided the basis for the functional requisite,
a standard for political correct behavior. To evaluate this con-
clusion at a different time period say after the Cultural Revo-
lution or today, we must return to the generational accultura-
tion model proposed in our study.
Our model of generational acculturation describes from
a system dynamics point of view why the Maoist religious belief
system functions whenever the political socialization process
functions adequately. Because the Maoist religious belief
system was intimately tied to the political learning process
in China, its place in political socialization was assured.
We were able to show in Chapter V that the basic modes of poli-
tical legitimacy and authority used by Maoism were part of a
historical continuum and not a new occurence unique to Maoism
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or the Cultural Revolution. Our model is in the mold of
Richard Merleman's conceptualization of the political learning
process. When we take this type of systemic view of the politi-
cal learning process and add to it both the dynamic inter-
relation of historical momentum and cultural continuity and the
self-regulating character of functioning learning processes,
our conceptualization of generational acculturation is the
result. Figures 7 and 9 taken from Chapter V capsulize
our model. With it we can make speculations as we do in our
concluding chapter, as to the nature of the adequate function-
ing of political socialization at a different time period
(e.g., to explain the period immediately after the Cultural
Revolution or to predict the occurences of tomorrow).
One can see the relevance and benefit of utilizing a
behaviorist theoretical foundation, such as those of Hempel
and Merleman, to describe the role of religion (with regard to
its affect and transcendental qualities) in the political learn-
ing aspect of the political socialization process during the
Cultural Revolution in China. As we mentioned particularly
in our discussion of Hempel's analytical framework, we did not
allow this foundation to influence our conclusion about the
role of the Maoist religious belief system in political
socialization in China. Nor, for that matter, did we draw
any insightful interpretations of the insignificance of the
religiousity of Maoism during the Cultural Revolution solely
or even principally on the basis of this foundation. We
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utilize it only inasmuch as it facilitates the presentation of
what might otherwise be regarded as a study of religion and
its intangible, "unknown" qualities (particularly in the
Chinese context) and religion's functional impact on political
socialization during a period of chaos and disorder, the
Cultural Revolution. In other words, the Hempel foundation
and our own model which was presented briefly above provided
us with a structured framework and logical basis within which
we could begin to look at and analyze an unstructured and
chaotic period of China's history.
